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Abstract
The last eight decades of urban transportation planning and engineering in the United States have 
been dominated by the hegemony of the automobile. Auto-oriented planning of the transportation 
and land use system has had a profound impact on the built environment both in greenfield 
developments and neighborhoods that predated the auto. The pedestrian quality of cities has been 
eroded by the automobile, and urban renewal in the United States erased many neighborhoods 
strongly oriented around walking and transit use. Equally pervasive as the auto itself is the place for 
the car in the institutional cultures and practices involved in shaping the city. 
The shortcomings of mobility-oriented transportation planning have been well critiqued, even from 
the very early days of Interstate building. In recent decades there has been a flurry of interest in 
articulating sustainable transportation policies to provide multi-modal accessibility and to consider 
the interactions between transportation, land use, and other policy realms such as health, energy, 
environment and equity. The current impending crisis of aging and ailing highway structures in 
the United States presents a momentous opportunity to reassess the need and purpose of such 
infrastructure, and to rebuild, reconceptualize, or remove it in a matter more consistent with current 
policy goals and planning processes – rather than the ones in place when initially built. 
Despite the interest, need and opportunity to reconceptualize aging infrastructure in America to 
support a more sustainable reshaping of land use and activity patterns, the potential to do so is 
heavily impaired by a transportation planning process that is still dominated by the tools, methods 
and assumptions, political biases, procedural failures, and instilled human behaviors of the first 
highway-building era. The McGrath Highway in Somerville, MA is used as a case study to discuss 
how persistence of 1950s technical, procedural and political dysfunctions threaten to undermine 
this opportunity. Short-term actions and strategies to avoid this impending fate are suggested for 
McGrath Highway with applicability to a wider national context of similar opportunities.
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Introduction
“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we 
created them” 
 – Albert Einstein
The last eight decades of urban transportation planning and engineering in the 
United States have been dominated by the hegemony of the automobile. Auto-
oriented planning of the transportation and land use system has had a profound 
impact on shaping the built environment. The effects of the automobile can be 
observed all across the metropolitan landscape, with its strong influence not only in 
shaping suburban built forms but also in altering the integrity and function of inner 
city neighborhoods that were built in the eras when walking, the horse car, and the 
streetcar were the dominant transportation technologies. 
The form and function of these inner city areas in the United States have since been 
eroded by the automobile and the infrastructure built for it, and together with urban 
renewal these planning actions succeeded in erasing many neighborhoods strongly 
oriented around walking and transit use. In particular, elevated freeways that were 
forced into the center of cities became a pervasive and destructive influence on the 
city. Equally pervasive as the auto itself is the place for accommodating the car in the 
political will of the country’s decision-makers, as well as in the institutional cultures 
and practices involved in shaping the city: namely, those of transportation planning 
and engineering, and land use planning. 
In the 1920s auto oriented zoning requirements began to create neighborhoods 
which were designed to accommodate the auto and of inadequate density to support 
transit access. In a frenzy of building after the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 
authorized $25 billion over twelve years to accelerate construction of the national 
system of Interstate highways, many cities laid waste to huge swaths of downtown 
cores to build high-capacity, high-speed freeways. Some of these structures, such as 
McGrath Highway in Somerville, were built before the Interstate program using 
local funding. However, the offer of 90% federal funding for Interstate projects did 
not improve the quality of highway projects despite the opportunity to increase 
spending on better design and impact mitigation. Most of these structures were built 
hastily, with little or no meaningful public consultation and before the passing of 
planning process legislation such as 1962 planning requirements, Section 4(f ), and 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. However, in some cities the tide 
turned on the concept of total reliance on the automobile. City government and 
citizen support began to increase for investment in public transits systems. Anti-
highway protest movements led by citizens sprouted across the nation from Boston 
to Baltimore to Memphis and San Francisco, in a period referred to as the ‘highway 
revolt.’ Although some planned urban expressways through cities were successfully 
stopped, many communities live still today with the legacy of hulking highway relics.
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The shortcomings of freeways in cities and mobility-oriented transportation planning 
focused on the car have been extensively critiqued, almost as soon as cars began to 
emerge in cities. However, in recent decades there has been a flurry of interest in 
articulating sustainable transportation policies to provide multi-modal accessibility 
and to consider the interactions between transportation, land use, and other policy 
realms such as health, energy, environment and equity. Although these policy 
changes have yet to have a substantial impact on the shape of cities, an impending 
infrastructure crisis presents the opportunity to reset the path.
 “The beautiful thing about concrete is that it eventually crumbles. Pound it with 
ice, salt, and relentless traffic for a few decades, and it falls to pieces.”1 America’s 
highway infrastructure, the bulk of which was built with federal grants since the 
1950s and 60s and inadequately maintained, is now ailing. The Federal Highway 
Authority has rated one in nine bridges in cities “structurally deficient,” and estimates 
that an investment of $70.9 billion will be needed to rehabilitate these structures.2 
This presents a momentous opportunity to reassess the need and purpose of such 
infrastructure, and to rebuild, reconceptualize, or remove it in a matter more 
consistent with current policy goals and planning processes – rather than the ones in 
place when initial construction occurred.  
Furthermore, infrastructure in cities impacts not only the function of a local 
transportation system, but it can also affect the value of adjacent property and 
shape surrounding land uses. Regional transportation infrastructures, which focus 
on providing movement and throughput rather than access to land parcels, tend 
to be locally undesirable features on the landscape due to traffic, pollution, and 
the interruptions in the urban fabric that these facilities create. As such, derelict 
land parcels, low-density and low-intensity uses, and locally undesirable activities 
(such as scrap yards and waste management plants) tend to be spatially co-located 
along and near these corridors.3 Therefore, reconceptualizing or removing highway 
infrastructure may often hold the potential to serve as a catalyst for much more 
widespread neighborhood regeneration and revitalization.
Of course not every aging highway is necessarily a candidate for removal and 
replacement with a boulevard. A thoughtful evaluation, including consideration 
of how to mitigate traffic disruptions during construction with increased transit 
and redirecting traffic, will still likely show that it may be appropriate to rebuild or 
rehabilitate many structures in place. However, in other cases where neighborhood 
impacts of highways are not tolerable and adjacent land use redevelopment potential 
1  McMorrow (2012)
2  Transportation for America (2011), 3-6
3  The nature of  the relationship between infrastructure and the quality of  
surrounding neighborhoods is likely cyclical. Although infrastructure might have been 
initially built though areas of  the city perceived as having lower-value, the externalities 
generated by the infrastructure undoubtedly reinforces such patterns (if  not initially 
establishing them in entirety).
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is high, elevated facilities should be replaced with reconceptualized transportation 
corridors that include the use of new transit facilities and even tunnels if traffic is 
particularly intense. But in many cases, careful consideration of revisions to the 
transport network required during construction in any case, and of the land reuse 
potential of the area, will reveal that it is a better idea to redevelop a corridor with 
urban streets. Because of the constructions costs involved, the opportunity to address 
the negative impacts of highways on surrounding neighborhoods, and the potential 
redevelopment value of urban land, infrastructure rebuilding warrants careful 
evaluation and consideration under the principles of the National Environmental 
Policy Act.
Purpose
Despite the interest, need and opportunity to reconceptualize aging highway 
infrastructure in the United States, there is a serious risk that the potential to do 
so will be heavily impaired by a transportation and land use planning process still 
dominated by the tools, methods and assumptions, political biases, procedural 
failures, and instilled human behaviors of the first highway-building era. This thesis 
attempts to explore and reveal those biases, which are often seemingly innocuous 
and rooted in basic assumptions about the dynamics of the transportation and land 
use system and the nature of travel demand. Without recognizing the technical, 
procedural and political dysfunctions ingrained in the societal process of planning 
for and building infrastructure and developing urban land, the status quo approach 
threatens to usher in a second era of thoughtless national highway (re)building. 
Short-term actions and alternative strategies to avoid this impending fate are explored 
in the context of a case study of the McGrath Highway in Somerville, Massachusetts.
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Prior work 
There have been a number of tear-down projects of elevated highways in cities already 
executed, including: the West Side Highway (7.6km) in New York City, Central 
Artery (2.9km) in Boston, Cheonggyecheon Expressway (9.4km) in Seoul, Harbor 
Drive in Portland (4.8km), Central Freeway (1km) and Embarcadero Freeway 
(2.6km) in San Francisco, Park East Freeway (1.6km) in Milwaukee, Alaskan Way 
in Seattle (4.5km) and Cypress Expressway (2 km) in Oakland.4 These projects have 
generated a small amount of research examining both the technical and political 
factors underlying the planning and execution of highway removal, as well as studies 
attempting to monitor and analyze the post-implementation impacts of these 
interventions. 
Cervero (2006) examines the effects of the reconceptualization of the Central 
Freeway and Cheonggyecheon Expressway on adjacent land values, neighborhood 
development, traffic congestion and roadway safety; he concludes that while much 
of the evidence remains anecdotal, on balance the effects to date seem to be positive. 
The optimism around the transformative potential of demolishing elevated freeways 
in cities has spurred efforts such as the annual Freeways Without Futures ranking 
which lists the top opportunities in North America for replace aging urban highways 
with boulevards according to the Congress for New Urbanism, and a recent report by 
EMBARQ and ITDP, “The Life and Death of Urban Highways,” which documents 
the impacts of five tear-down case studies. Interest in the topic continues to grow 
and there exist ongoing planning studies or proposals for the possible tear-down of 
elevated segments of the Sheridan Expressway in New York City, Route 34 in New 
Haven, I-64 in Louisville, I-81 in Syracuse, the Clairborne Expressway in New 
Orleans, and the Gardiner Expressway in Toronto.5
Nevertheless, there is a shortcoming of literature on the topic of freeway removal 
in cities, especially given that efforts to reduce or reprioritize highway capacity are 
by and large niche interests in the practice of traffic engineering. The most notable 
change in this paradigm is work in the area of Context Sensitive Solutions (CSS): a 
line of research sponsored by the Federal Highway Authority that aims to support 
the development of both engineering practices and design solutions to better balance 
rather rigid roadway design guidelines (such as those in the AASHTO Green 
Book6) with community concerns and sustainable planning goals. However, this 
area of research and literature is focused on the physical roadway (e.g. “resurfacing, 
restoration, rehabilitation”), with little emphasis on the engineering and planning 
processes through which freeway removal projects are subject to before reaching the 
final design stage. 
4  EMBARQ, ITDP (2012); Spicer 2011
5  EMBARQ, ITDP (2012); Spicer 2011
6  The Policy on the Geometric Design of  Highways and Streets is produced by the American 
Association of  State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and often referred to as 
the “Green Book.” Although the FHWA describes the Green Book as a series of  guidelines, 
roads in the National Highway System must conform to its standards by law.
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Napolitan (2007) makes an important contribution in analyzing the circumstances 
underlying the successful demolition of and replacement with an at-grade boulevard 
of the Central Freeway in San Francisco and the Park East Freeway in Milwaukee, 
in contrast to the decision to leave elevated and repair the Whitehurst Freeway in 
Washington DC. Based on these cases, she proposes a theory of freeway removal that 
identifies four factors supporting a decision for de-elevation: “(1) the condition of 
the freeway must be such that there is concern over its integrity and structural safety, 
(2) a window of opportunity exists; the window may be the precondition itself or 
another event that enables a freeway removal alternative to gain serious consideration 
and legitimacy, (3) the value of mobility must be lower than other objectives such as 
economic development, quality of life, etc., and (4) those in power must value other 
benefits more than they value the benefits associated with freeway infrastructure for 
the alternative of freeway removal to be selected over other alternatives.”7
Spicer (2011) explores the freeway as a roadway typology in American cities, and also 
focuses on the case of the McGrath Highway. Based on evidence of neighborhood 
change from three removal precedents in the U.S. (Central Freeway, Cyprus 
Freeway, West Side Highway), she proposes an at-grade boulevard and a parkway (in 
combination with a new transit extension) as urban design strategies for de-elevating the 
McGrath Highway that are likely to be successful and create favorable outcomes. 
Although the structurally deficient condition of many bridges across the nation may 
help satisfy the first and second preconditions theorized by Napolitan, this thesis 
examines how the window of opportunity for freeway removal may be threatened 
by the political will to respond to a perceived crisis of crumbling infrastructure 
with special “fix it first” legislative acts that seek to rapidly repair ailing structures 
rather than engage in the planning process that may elucidate the potential for their 
reconceptualization. Furthermore, the third and fourth preconditions proposed 
by Napolitan may also not be realized since the perceived myth of expanding 
automobile mobility beyond finite capacity constraints is perpetuated by the misuse 
of transportation forecasting and modeling processes, which thereby undermines 
potential political will to remove freeways and repurpose the urban land.
7  Napolitan (2007)
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Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following six sections:
• Chapter 1: Building the automobile city – lock in and path dependence 
This section explores the initial period of road expansion in US cities. The effects 
of road infrastructure on the built-form of cities, individual demand responses to a 
changing urban landscape, and political responses to automobile growth, are linked 
in a systems model to understand the growth of the automobile city.
• Chapter 2: Case study – McGrath Highway
This section examines the history of the McGrath Highway as an example of the 
broader narrative of lock-in to the automobile described in chapter 1. The current 
physical, planning, and political conditions that may be aligning to support the 
reconceptualization of McGrath Highway and surrounding areas are discussed.
• Chapter 3: Transportation planning & engineering – the status quo machine 
This section discusses the assumptions and biases embedded in transportation 
forecasting and modeling approaches that hinder sustainability policy objectives 
by violating real-world capacity constraints and by pre-determining auto-oriented 
outcomes through projecting existing behaviors far into the future.
• Chapter 4: A perfect storm – for or against change? 
This section describes how planning processes, infrastructure funding programs, and 
the proclivity of governments to respond swiftly to perceived crisis, demonstrate 
systemic distortions in how benefits and costs are considered, thereby working to 
generate anti-environmental outcomes that undermine the reconceptualization 
potential of McGrath Highway and hinder the implementation of the Green Line 
Extension as a public transit alternative.
• Chapter 5: An opportunity to rethink automobile infrastructure
This chapter examines how inevitable construction disruptions and taking mitigation 
actions for them, as well as making spot improvements to improve pedestrian and 
motorist safety can be used to create an incremental implementation strategy that 
moves toward an at-grade McGrath Highway as the new normal. 
• Chapter 6: Summary and conclusions 
This chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis. Based on the general policy, 
procedural and political shortcomings identified in the thesis, and building upon 
the strategy to achieve a better outcome in the McGrath Highway case, I infer 
approaches that can be encouraged nationally to facilitate more sustainable outcomes 
in dealing with the infrastructure crisis.
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1. Building the automobile city – lock in and 
path dependence 
This section explores the initial period of road expansion in US cities, focusing on 
the Boston area as an example. The effects of road infrastructure on the built-form 
of cities, individual demand responses to a changing urban landscape, and political 
responses to automobile growth are linked in a systems model to understand the 
growth of the automobile city. 
1.1 Street, highway and city form 
“When the American people, through their Congress, voted a little while ago 
for a $26 billion highway program, the most charitable thing to assume about 
this action is that they hadn’t the faintest notion of what they were doing.”8
– Lewis Mumford (1957)
Even before the sweeping national changes of the Interstate program occurred, 
the automobile had already come to have a profound effect on changing the role, 
function and design of the right-of-way in American cities. The initial growth of 
the automobile in cities was largely an unplanned phenomenon; it seemed to just 
happen. Although much of the core urban street network in cities like Boston was 
planned and built before the first automobiles hit the road, these networks appeared 
to have held a latent capacity to absorb the movement of the motorcar within their 
existing curb lines – for the early automobile could be considered just a horseless 
replacement to the carriage.There was concern about the absorptive potential of 
the automobile in the city from the very first introduction of automobiles, but the 
excitement of elite owners of automobiles overcame early attempts at regulation and 
promoted concepts like the parkway to introduce higher speed auto traffic into park 
paths.
The initial influx of cars into the urban environment rapidly became a deluge. The 
number of motor vehicles registered in the nation grew from 8,000 in 1900, to 
108,000 in 1906, to 944,000 in 1912, to approximately 8 million by 1920. The 
automobile was in full control of the transportation scene by 1930 with 23 million 
vehicles on the road: one car for every 5 citizens, and more than half of American 
families owning a car.9 This initial growth of the automobile dramatically altered the 
character of the street and the urban environment, and in doing so, sparked a broad 
discourse of how to manage and plan for the car in the city. (figure 1)
Modernist theory about the city, which began to emerge in the late 1920s focused on 
the role of infrastructure and urban street systems as machines and instruments to the 
functioning of the city – rather than places of activity in their own right. Modernists 
did not recognize the street as providing the fundamental spatial structure for the city 
8  Mumford (1957), 244
9  Southworth and Ben-Joseph (1997), 56; Gordon (1991), 9; Lewis (1997)
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Figure 1: Washington St looking north to the Orpheum Theatre in 1921 (top); Washington St 
looking south to the Orpheum Theatre in 1932 (bottom)
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Figure 2: Salem St in Boston’s North End, photographed here in 1954, illustrates the concept of 
life between buildings.
through the relationships of building massing and street widths.10 The automobile, 
and the thinking it spurred about urbanism, challenged the very function of the 
street itself as a realm for “life between buildings.” 11 (figure 2) 
A notable advocate of this thinking in this line was Le Corbusier: “the little fish are 
the pedestrians in our cities, the big fish are the cars… the result will be a massacre, 
the complete destruction of all the fish, large and small, because the aquarium is too 
small for such high speeds.”12 Corbusier, who was admittedly concerned with the 
negative impacts of the car’s machine-ear speed on the biological speed of pedestrians, 
chose to embrace the car as victor and chastise the street as villain in his vision of 
the Radiant City: “Our streets no longer work. Streets are an obsolete notion. There 
ought not to be such things as streets.”13 
10  Southworth and Ben-Joseph (1997), 72
11  The concept of  life between buildings has been popularized by Gehl (2010) 
and includes “all of  the very different activities people engage in when they use common 
city space: purposeful walks…promenades, short stops, longer stays, window shopping, 
conversations and meetings…”
12  Corbusier (1935), 121
13  Corbusier (1935), 121
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Figure 3: Action Comics, Vol 1 # 12 (panel 15, 20)
Instead, the street was to be redefined as “a machine for traffic, an apparatus for its 
circulation, a new organ, a construction in itself and of the utmost importance.”14 
Discussion of the destructive effects of automobiles on city life was not just a niche 
concern among city planning professionals, but it pervaded into the popular culture 
of the country. In May 1939, the American cultural icon, Superman, declares war 
against the car (figure 3):
“Attention, citizens of the city! A warning from Superman - Pay close 
heed! The auto accident death rate of this community is one that should 
shame us all! It’s constantly rising and due entirely to reckless driving and 
inefficiency!”
– Action Comics: Vol 1 # 12
14  Corbusier (1929), 123
23
In the same year that Superman was thrashing cars, five million visitors passed 
through the “Futurama” exhibit at the New York World’s Fair, which depicted the 
American landscape in 1960 as envisioned by Norman Bel Geddes (and funded by 
General Motors). According to Geddes, the Futurama responded to the problems 
of motorists who are “harassed by…the nuisances of intersectional jams, narrow, 
congested bottlenecks…irritating traffic regulations…[and] appalled by the daily toll 
of highway accidents and deaths,” by showing “how a motorway system may be laid 
down over the entire country – across mountains, over rivers and lakes, through cities 
and past towns – never deviating from a direct course and always adhering to the four 
basic principles of highway design: safety, comfort, speed and economy.”15 
It is equally important to recognize that ideas in land use planning and architecture 
also expressed design concepts that worked to set and reinforce the path toward a city 
organized around the car. The viability of the very concept of urbanism came into 
question soon as it was observed how automobiles and the space they consumed for 
circulation and parking overwhelmed dense city environments. In the Disappearing 
City (1932), Frank Lloyd Wright identifies the automobile as underlying the rationale 
for his Broadacre City: an anti-city concept where population is dispersed in a 
landscape where each household is sited on one acre of land. “The fundamental unit 
of space-measurement has so radically changed that the man now bulks ten to one 
and in speed a thousand to one as he is seated in his motor car. This circumstance 
would render the city obsolete… The traffic problem is not a symptom of urban 
success but evidence of urban failure.”16 Wright even dismisses highways in cities as 
a remedy, in favor of complete abandonment of the core: “Why deck or double deck 
or triple deck city-streets at a cost of billions of dollars only to invite further increase 
and eventually meet inevitable defeat? Why not allow citizenship to keep the billions 
it would have to pay for “decking” to buy more motor cars and get out and get more 
out of living in a more natural and fruitful life.17”
“We will solve the problem of the city by leaving the city”
 – Henry Ford 
At the urbanizing fringe, the walkable city was becoming an outmoded typology 
and burgeoning automobile ownership exerted an important influence on new 
designs. In 1927 on two square miles of farmland in Bergen County, New Jersey, 
Clarence Stein built Radburn. Some scholars have incorrectly interpreted Radburn’s 
influence, arguing that it was the predecessor of conventional, low-density suburban 
sprawl.18 This debate notwithstanding, Stein’s vision for Radburn was clear: “a town 
15  Geddes (1940), 4
16  Wright (1932), 20-21, 35
17  Wright (1932), 32
18  Vander Ryn and Calthorpe (1986) argue: “Levittown inherited many of  the 
planning ideas of  Radburn.” While Lee and Ahn (2003) demonstrate that privatized gardens 
and monotonous parallel rows of  houses at Levittown bear no similarity to Radburn’s focus 
on shared open space and walkways, Radburn helped popularized the superblock and cul-de-
sac forms that now typify suburban America.
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Figure 4: Cambridge Street looking south near Scollay Square in 1925 (top) and looking north 
from Scollay Square during road widening in 1930 (bottom)
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in which people could live peacefully with the automobile – or rather in spite of 
it.”19 Stein held that the “automobile was a disrupting menace to city life in the 
U.S.A.”20 However, rather than designing Radburn as a rejection to this “flood of 
motors,”21 he too embraced the car and also viewed the city as the problem. Stein 
critiqued the gridiron street pattern as “obsolete as a fortified town wall,” and 
derided contemporary urban cores as outmoded “dinosaur cities.”22 Stein argued that 
cities like New York had reached the “limits of efficiency,”23 and lobbied President 
Roosevelt for policies to hasten decentralization since cities were “fundamentally 
antagonistic to out needs.”24 
The prescriptions about reforming the street from Corbusier and other 
contemporaries were more than the mere musings of futurists, and the transition 
from street as urban landscape to a servicing infrastructure soon became built into 
the city. The Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) was founded in 1930, 
defining a new profession of highway engineering as “a branch of engineering which 
is devoted to the study and improvement of the traffic performance of road networks 
and terminals. Its purpose is to achieve efficient, free, and rapid flow of traffic…yet at 
the same time, to prevent traffic accidents and casualties.”25
Within the core of Boston, early erosions of the city’s walkable fabric came in the 
form of spot improvements and flyovers at intersections. The Report on a Thoroughfare 
Plan for Boston (1930) focused on improving “the chief source of congestion 
and delay which results from the crossing at grade.”26(figure 4) More dramatic 
alterations came in the form of linear, limited-access parkways such as Storrow 
Drive. Constructed in 1950, Storrow Drive replaced a two-lane, tree-lined, frontage 
road to the city’s waterfront Esplanade with a six-lane, high-speed parkway that 
displaced much of the original Esplanade and created a noisy and polluting barrier of 
traffic that cut-off the city from its riverfront.27 Parkland taken for the construction 
of Storrow Drive was replaced by shifting the park outward and reclaiming land 
from the Charles River, however, the quality and desirability of the space was 
fundamentally altered by the presence of the new roadway. (figure 5) 
Critics such as Lewis Mumford bemoaned such trespasses: “the motorway has 
repeatedly taken possession of the most valuable recreation space the city possesses, 
not merely by thieving land once dedicated to park uses, but by cutting off easy 
access to the water front parks, and lowering their value for refreshment and repose… 
19  Stein (1957), 37
20  Stein (1957), 41
21  Stein (1957), 41
22  Parsons (1998), 24
23  Clarence Stein in essay, March 18, 1949. (in Parsons, 470)
24  Clarence Stein to President Roosevelt, march 23, 1931. (in Parsons, 200)
25  Southworth and Ben-Joseph (1997), 75 
26  Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston (1930), 15
27  The Esplanade Association (2012), 37
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Figure 5: The Charles River Esplanade frontage road ca.1940 (top) was replaced by Storrow Drive 
1954 (bottom)
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witness the shocking spoilage of the Charles River basin parks in Boston.”28 Whereas 
the era of intersection spot improvements and parkways modified the street system 
for the automobile, but more or less within the existing urban structure and right-
of-way patterns, the intrusion of elevated freeways in cities would be far more 
destructive to urban fabric and further degrade urban living and walking conditions. 
Elevated structures were not a novel invention of the highway engineer. Leonardo 
Da Vinci speculated about a multi-level city, stratified based on social class, with 
upper levels for the gentry and lower stages for services, carts and tradesmen.29 
Elevated transport viaducts in cities emerged as early as the 1860s in New York City 
and in 1901 in Boston, as a strategy to increase space for and improve the speed 
of rail transit systems in dense urban environments where right of way space was 
constrained. However, the noise and visual impacts of elevated transportation on 
the urban quality were so unsatisfactory that they were replaced in cities around the 
world with subway tunnels that were not only more costly to construct, but arguably 
also more unpleasant to travel in.30(figure 6) Despite that correction of course, the 
West Side Highway, constructed in Manhattan in 1927, was one of the first elevated 
highway structures built in the country, and a concept for an elevated Central Artery 
through downtown Boston appears as early as 1930.31(figure 7) Both of these ideas 
well pre-dated the national Interstate program. 
The devastating path that many freeways cut through urban neighborhoods and 
blocks was a deliberate quality of the Interstate program. Thomas MacDonald, chief 
of the national Bureau of Public Roads, argued in favor of road expansion to solve 
transportation problems within major cities, and the enacted Interstate legislation 
included plans to bring highways right into the downtowns of cities.32 Freeways into 
cities, alongside massive urban renewal schemes, were ironically advanced as a form 
of social and economic therapy to rescue cities by providing access to downtown jobs 
for a rapidly suburbanizing workforce and to alleviate traffic congestion where it was 
perceived to be the worst.33 
Elevated highways may have initially seemed less intrusive than accommodating 
traffic at grade by leaving the ground level free for local streets to cross and to provide 
parking. However, elevated highway structures proved to be tremendously more 
detrimental than earlier elevated rail transit lines. Freeways through cities are the 
ultimate expression of the anti-street, with no relationship to the rest of the built 
form. Freeways were conceptualized as mobility conduits for vehicles, which allowed 
drastically more vehicles to flow into urban areas than would have otherwise occurred 
owing to the constraints of a city’s historic surface-level street network (even with 
28  Mumford (1957), 251
29  Shelton (2010), 163
30  Mumford (1957), 251
31  Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston (1930)
32  Reid (2006), 39
33  Rose (1990), 5
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Figure 6:  Atlantic Avenue Elevated before (top) and after demolition in 1942 (bottom)
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Figure 7:  Conceptual drawing of elevated central artery through downtown Boston (1930)
spot improvements). Moreover, whereas streets provide access to land and define 
development parcels, urban freeway alignments completely defied existing built form 
and block patterns in their alignments. Freeways not only divided the fabric of the 
city physically and psychologically, but they also fractured the logic of urban space 
by creating vacancies and voids, and left-over parcels whose shape was defined by 
the turning radius of the automobile at 55-miles per hour. (figure 8) Each mile of 
freeway took approximately twenty-four acres of land and each interchange another 
eight acres.34 Indeed Robert Moses, the “master builder” of freeways in New York 
City is quoted: “when you operate in an overbuilt metropolis, you have to hack your 
way with a meat axe.”35 Demolition and land clearance for freeway construction was 
also often drastically increased in scale than that needed to accommodate the right of 
way by plans for broader neighbourhood urban renewal schemes that were developed 
in tandem. A 1975 review of the elevated segment of I-93 though Somerville, 
commissioned by the Federal Highway Authority and Massachusetts Department 
of Public Works, concluded that the structure is “completely out of scale with the 
urban zone through which it passes” and “there is a great deal of wasteland associated 
with the right-of-way, and extensive visual voids.”36 These outcomes underneath and 
around elevated highways through cities were in stark contrast from the rosy pictures 
painted by highway departments in their feasibility studies and planning reports, 
which showed public spaces with high amenity value and animated with people and 
children playing. (figure 9)
34  Lewis (1997), 153
35  Lewis (1997), 193
36  Lewis (1997), 236
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Figure 8: Proposed alignments to connect the Central Artery to the Inner Belt Highway 
demonstrate Figure how Interstate freeway planning completely defied established block and street 
patterns. Although the West End neighborhood shown here was demolished for urban renewal, the 
Belt Highway was never constructed.
Figure 9: Artist’s conception of the “veiw under the interchange” from the preliminary draft of the 
Basic Design Report - Interstate Route 95 and 695: Boston, Masssachusetts (1965)
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Similar impacts on the surrounding neighborhood land use were felt across the 
nation. Fairfield (2010) describes the devastation in Oakland, where: “Construction 
leveled large parts of West Oakland, isolating neighborhoods from one another and 
cordoning others off behind a mass of concrete... Construction scars, ugly structures, 
and accumulating refuse blighted poor neighborhoods and lessened property values. 
Repair shops and car washes, muffler and spray paint services, and used car lots 
and parking garages arose disproportionately.”37 These results were the massive 
amplifications of the same basic phenomenon noted by Clarence Stein in 1929: 
“frontage on the through highway has very limited value…people no longer want to 
live at such places.”38 
The continuity and quality of inner city urban environments was further degraded 
by the provision of parking lots as a solution to both perceived traffic and land use 
problems of the inner city. In 1923 The National Conference of City Planning 
encouraged cities to allocate sites for off-street parking facilities, and the first 
municipal parking lot was provided in Boston in 1930.39 During the 1920s and 
1930s the process of clearing old buildings was used systematically to remove 
unwanted uses from the central city. Parking lots were viewed as the best solution 
to provide short-term economic revenue to property owners since they generated 
good rents without much investment. (figure 10) By mid century the rapid 
suburbanization of jobs and housing fuelled this destructive cycle onward as 
buildings in declining central business districts were torn down and replaced with 
parking lots, reducing property tax revenues but justified by the hope of attracting 
suburbanites back to the city.40 Yet these lots further extended the linear impact of 
roadways and highways in the city into broader neighborhood area impacts that again 
undermined the viability and fabric of the walking and transit-oriented city.
Beyond the direct impacts on the form and function of adjacent urban places, 
the Interstate highway program through cities has been cited as the single-most 
influential measure contributing to the demise of urban living and to the creation 
of the automobile-dependent metropolis.41 Although urban renewal programs 
physically destroyed the urban fabric of the inner city, freeway capacity in cities and 
the mobility it provided greatly accelerated the trend of metropolitan decentralization 
that was already underway in US cities since the era of the streetcar suburbs. Freeways 
enabled the spatial extent of the city to spread out into vast new areas of undeveloped 
land, and within new developments mass-motorization enabled the construction 
of suburban landscapes characterized by low densities, the ample provision of 
parking, and the separation of land uses and activities into large mono-functional 
zones as dictated by the contemporary ideologies of zoning codes. These patterns of 
development were enabled by the automobile, and also therefore necessitated using 
37  Fairfield (2010), 255
38  Clarence Stein letter to Benton MacKaye, Oct 12, 1929. (in Parsons, 154)
39  Ben-Joseph (2012) ,69
40  Ben-Joseph (2012), 73
41  Fishman (1999)
32
Figure 10: Parking Lots Near New England Telephone Building (1954)
Figure 11: The quantity and pattern of social relationship changes dramatically from a quiet street 
with 2000 vehicles per day (top) to a heavy traffic artery with 15,000 vehicles per day (bottom)
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the automobile. The development of these vast suburban areas exacerbated lock-in to 
the automobile not only in these neighborhoods but also at the metropolitan scale. 
For, trips with either origin or destination in these new places would be made by 
automobile no matter how transit-oriented or incapable to accommodate car traffic 
the city form at the other end. 
Although the visual and neighborhood effects are hard to measure, the impact of 
vehicle traffic and its infrastructure on pedestrian movement, social relationships 
and the neighborhood fabric has been documented. In the seminal work The Image 
of the City (1960), Kevin Lynch, a professor of urban planning at MIT, documents 
individuals’ perception of city form based on interviews and sketches of their mental 
maps. Lynch’s work recognizes the increasing impact on the city from spot widening 
to parkway to highway. “Cambridge Street divides two regions sharply but keeps 
them in some visual relation. Storrow Drive is clearly related to the Charles River, 
and is thus tied to the general pattern of the city. The Central Artery on the other 
hand, winds inexplicably through the center…[it] seems to divide absolutely, to 
isolate.42 Appleyard (1981) illustrates the negative correlation between traffic volume 
on a street and the number of relationships between neighbors. As traffic increases, 
the number of neighborly acquaintances not only drops drastically, but the pattern 
of relationships becomes strongly aligned only along one side of a street with few 
relations crossing busy arteries.43 (figure 11) Not only do the number of activities 
change as the quality of space declines, but Gehl (2010) argues that so too do the 
nature of activities: necessary activities may persist, but social and optional activities 
decline or disappear. (figure 12) Likewise, in cities that have attempted to improve 
the pedestrian quality of space, such as Copenhagen where the amount of pedestrian-
only zones was increased from 15,000m2 in 1962 to 100,000m2 by 2005, the 
conclusion has been “unequivocal: if people rather than cars are invited into the city, 
pedestrian traffic and city life increase correspondingly.”44 
In summary, the growth of automobile travel, the infrastructure to support it, and 
the changes in metropolitan structure and development patterns it enabled created 
a pattern of lock-in to the car. The physical effects of auto-oriented infrastructure 
have dramatically undermined the viability or existence of other modes of travel 
in cities and the fabric that hitherto supported them. Walking became unpleasant, 
undesirable, and at times impossible. And with the decline of walking, the ability to 
access public transportation was also eroded, further consolidating the role of the car. 
In new (sub)urbanizing landscapes opened up by freeway connectivity, development 
patterns were oriented wholly around the auto, contributing to metropolitan-scale 
lock-in to automobile travel.
42  Lynch (1960), 23, 63-64
43  Appleyard et al.(1981) 
44  Gehl (2010), 12 
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Figure 12: Conceptual relationship between quality of the physical environment and the type and 
amount of pedestrian activity.
Figure 13 (left),      Figure 15 (right)
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Figure 14: Diagrams from the Highway Capacity Manual (2000) showing the conceptual 
relationship between traffic speed, flow and density, and how capacity (flow) drops as a roadway 
beceomes overloaded
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1.2 Disaggregate demand response
The phenomena of lock-in and path dependence can also be understood in terms 
of a system dynamics micro-economic model of individual demand responses to 
a motorizing city. The initial growth of the car in the city (demand), and the road 
building that followed (supply), triggered a feedback loop to perpetuate the demand 
for auto travel.
1.2.1 Theoretical model
A series of simple supply and demand curves, each illustrating a principle, will be 
used to model the effect of transportation supply on shaping demand. 
Transportation systems are governed by capacity constraint
The amount of transportation supply available in a system at a given time is finite,45 
and the supply is completely inelastic in the short-run. Although this may seems self-
evident, it is important to emphasize that demand cannot in practice exceed supply 
(figure 13). 
Finite capacity constraint creates congestion effects
For a given supply constraint, the quantity consumed impacts the quality of the 
service. This principle of congestion stems from the fundamental relationship 
between speed and traffic flow, whereby traffic speed declines as the number of users 
approaches saturation capacity (Vm) of the roadway. In other words, level of service 
experienced by an individual user degrades as more people use the system, and as too 
many people use the system capacity drops. (figure 13, 14)
 
Supply expansion and movement along the demand curve
The demand function represents the willingness to pay for transportation. The 
willingness to pay reflects a whole host of factors including the utility (or benefit) 
derived from travel, but also many background factors such as the availability of 
alternatives. If the finite constraint on supply is loosened, for example by widening 
a road to increase the quantity of capacity from Qmax-1 to Qmax-2, a new equilibrium 
point on the existing demand curve is realized. The quantity of consumption increases 
from Q1 to Q2, and price decreases from P1 to P2. Due to existence of congestion 
effects, expanding the quantity of road capacity from Qmax-1 to Qmax-2 results also in 
improving the quality of supply. For any given number of people now using the road, 
everyone experiences a better level of service. (figure 15) This improvement leads to 
the following effect.
45  Supply is defined as the maximum throughput in a network for a given piece of  
infrastructure and technology with which to manage it.
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Supply expansion and shifts in the demand curve  – induced demand 
Increasing quantity supplied, and therefore reducing the level of congestion 
experienced at a given amount of consumption, increases the marginal benefit of 
consumption because it reduces the time taken to complete a given task.46 Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that initial congestion reduction will increase demand (that is 
change the demand curve), until demand reaches the point Q3 which restores the 
initial level of congestion in the system and the initial price point P1. There are now 
more people using the system, but it is just as congested and the level of service is 
no better than before the road capacity expansion. This erosion of initial congestion 
relief to demand growth is referred to in the literature as induced demand. (figure 16)
Downs (1992) explains this phenomenon as a principle of “triple convergence” which 
makes it “almost impossible to eradicate peak-hour traffic congestion on limited-
access roads” unless a road can simultaneously carry every commuter at the moment 
of peak demand. The congestion relief from road capacity expansions are ultimately 
offset by drivers who formerly (1) used alternative routes, (2) traveled at other times, 
or (3) used public transit. These three forces will cause traffic volumes to rise until 
vehicles again experience the same level of congestion as before an expansion.47 
The notion that accommodating automobile travel begets further car use is neither 
recent nor an argument advanced only by anti-car critics. Traffic engineers have been 
well aware of the phenomenon since the origins of the profession and continued to 
acknowledge it the Interstate era:
46  Gibson (2003) 
47  Downs (1992), 29, 145
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“It is sometimes said that it is useless to increase street capacities in central 
areas as any additional capacity provided will be immediately taxed to 
the saturation point…there are undoubtedly a considerable number of 
persons who now use the automobile for trips that could be made just as 
conveniently and more economically by railroad or rapid transit line. A 
further slowing up of the traffic movement would stop some of these ill-
advised trips.”
– Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston, (1930)
“Another function of the [inner] belt, not wholly desirable, yet inevitable, 
is that of an interval bypass of the city core. For generations, the 
congested city streets have served as an effective barrier to motor vehicle 
travel from north to south or vice versa. The belt highway will break this 
down and cause a flow of induced traffic not revealed by any surveys 
based on past conditions.”
– Study of the Belt Expressway Through Cambridge, (1957)
Supply expansion and shifts in the demand curve – lock in 
Capacity expansion and the phenomenon of induced demand suggests that changes 
in supply alone can bring about changes not only in the quantity demanded, but also 
the nature of the demand curve itself. In addition to inducing demand, loosening 
capacity constraints and building more transportation supply increases the size of 
the road network and may produce lock-in. In chapter 1.1, I articulated arguments 
based in urban design thinking for how expanding automobile infrastructure 
produced lock-in to the car by eroding the quality of the urban environment. This 
effect of expanding the supply of automobile capacity in the transportation system 
can also be modeled, first as a further upward shift in the demand curve (from Q3 
to Q4), and second as a pivoting of the demand curve that represents movement to 
a more inelastic demand function due to the disappearance of alternatives to the 
car.48 Therefore, a road capacity expansion that results in an increased transportation 
network size may ultimately increase the amount of travel (from Q1 to Q4) increase 
the price (from P1 to P4) and increase the level of congestion.
49(figure 17)
These models demonstrate how supply-side responses (i.e. road building) to initial 
traffic demand can work to amplify demand and shape consumer preferences for 
automobile travel. They also provide a theoretical link between the form-based 
critiques of auto infrastructure and neoclassical models of decision-making.
48  This includes declining transit performance and competitiveness, reduced transit 
service, and the erosion of  walkability. 
49  Gibson (2003)
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1.2.2 Empirical validation
There have been several attempts in the past decade quantify the extent to which 
road capacity expansions produce induced demand. Developing a robust study 
design to answer this question is challenging, due to the reliance on observing natural 
experiments, the procedural difficulty of monitoring traffic changes through time, 
and the conceptual challenge of developing an adequate framework to distinguish 
various sources of traffic growth. However, the research reviewed supports that some 
portion of the anticipated congestion relief from projects that increase supply is lost 
to increased travel and mode shift from transit to the automobile.
Duranton and Turner (2011) examine the relationship between highway lane 
kilometers and highway vehicle-kilometers travelled in American cities over several 
decades. They find that VKT increases proportionately to highways, and that 
therefore, “supply is unlikely to relieve congestion, and current roadway supply 
exceeds the optimum.” The study estimates a roadway elasticity of VKT between 
0.67 and 0.89 and suggests four sources for this new traffic growth, of which changes 
to individual behavior and changes in commercial driving are the most important. 
Cervero (2003) examines road expansion projects in California between 1980 and 
1994, and estimates a long-term elasticity of VMT with respect to traffic speed 
of 0.64. His results suggest that about 80% of expanded roadway space becomes 
used by new peak-period travel, and that nearly half of this 80% is due to capacity 
expansion itself (as opposed to other factors such as changes in land use patterns 
caused by road building).
1.3 The political tragedy of expanding the concrete commons
“…the followers of a new cult which, instead of the golden calf, has chosen as 
its goddess the private automobile. The cult of the autocrats, which I will name 
‘autocrazity,’ is perfectly willing to sacrifice our cities on the altar of the new 
goddess.”
 – Victor Gruen (1960)
 
In his seminal article, The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin (1968) argues that an 
open access pasture with a finite capacity to support a herd of grazing animals is 
destined to be overused and degraded:
 “the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to 
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another…. 
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman 
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush…”
Hardin prescribes the need for “mutually agreed upon coercion” to regulate the 
use of such common access resources, since there are “no technical solutions” to 
inherent natural scarcities. If we fail to recognize these constraints and take action, he 
forewarns that society will “greatly increase human misery.” 
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The transportation system can be considered a concrete version of Hardin’s 
commons, governed by a finite capacity constraint and prone to overuse and 
congestion as every self-interested driver seeks to use the system to their benefit 
without regard for the damaging impact of every additional user on the overall 
quality of system performance. However, unlike the pasture, fishery, or forest that 
cannot be recreated, building a bigger transport commons holds the allure of a 
technical solution to the finite capacity constraint. Yet, therein lies the political 
tragedy of the concrete commons and the source of misery: expanding it. 
Congestion in the concrete commons is a curiously self-limiting problem. Based 
on the principle that actual demand cannot exceed supply (and that capacity drops 
as demand strains supply), the amount of road space in a city imposes a finite limit 
on the amount of vehicle traffic that can be accommodated. Therefore the observed 
performance level of a road can be considered an expression of a user equilibrium 
point between the demand for travel (willingness to pay) and the availability and 
cost of using the road (supply curve). J.G. Wardrop (1952) articulates this as his first 
principle of traffic equilibrium: “the journey times on all the routes actually used are 
equal, and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any 
unused route.”50 
Absent a regulatory scheme on its use, a road will be just as slow or congested as 
drivers are willing to tolerate, but the condition of the system can get no worse 
than crawling speeds, the loss of throughput capacity, and complete gridlock at the 
extreme – beyond this point there is no where else to go and no physical capacity to 
accommodate growth. Gehl (2010) reiterates the point: “The volume of car traffic 
almost everywhere is more or less arbitrary, depending on the available transportation 
infrastructure… every city got precisely as much traffic as space would allow… in 
the effort to cope with the rising tide of car traffic, all available city space was simply 
filled with moving and parked vehicles.”51
The key observation is that traffic growth beyond capacity limits cannot simply just 
happen as it must be invited or at least physically encouraged. Whereas congestion 
is a self-limiting condition in the physical sense, the rise of cars in cities alongside 
efforts to build our way out of it triggered a third feedback loop in the automobile 
growth story: the political will to build infrastructure. As described previously, 
the early rise of automobile travel in cities was a non-decision by government that 
could be accommodated by the latent capacity of existing street networks to absorb 
some traffic. The initial growth of the car in cities to the point where existing streets 
became congested can be considered an expression of inherent consumer preferences 
for personal mobility. However, the continued growth of auto-mobility was more 
than preference accommodating; government intervention in the form of road 
building, alongside the failure to maintain transit or an alternative transforming 
opportunity, created lock-in and was preference-shaping. 
50  Wardrop (1952), 345
51  Gehl (2010), 9
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“The city’s street system should be adapted to the requirements of a motor 
age. The art of street design and construction has lagged far behind the 
art of vehicle design and construction.” 
 – Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston (1930)
However, Wardrop’s user-optimal traffic equilibrium is by no means an ideal 
outcome. Although users stuck in traffic and congestion provide de facto evidence 
of a willingness to pay the cost, the aggregate disutility for all travelers is not at its 
minimum. Furthermore, congestion is a cost in wasted time and inherently different 
than payment in dollars that the transportation supplier could use to improve service. 
Whereas the cost (in terms of time and congestion) of using the auto rises with usage 
as demand approaches capacity and level of service drops, the cost of transit tends 
to decline as ridership grows, since higher passenger densities enable better service, 
shorter headways, and spread large fixed operating costs over more riders. If the 
personal costs of road congestion were invested collectively in public transit and some 
automobile trips are consequently diverted on to transit, congestion could be reduced 
and overall travel times would improve and move toward a social optimal. (figure 18) 
Indeed, such an investment in transit service may be the only promise of a technical 
solution to this commons problem. However, in the political tragedy of the concrete 
commons this alternative vision of more sustainable growth supported by transit is 
overwhelmed by the majority status of the auto and its supporting interests. 
Figure 18: Transit investment as a potential technological solution to expanding the concrete 
commons
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TRANSIT INVESTMENT AS A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION 
TO THE TRAGEDY OF EXPANDING THE CONCRETE COMMONS
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Despite the conceptual attractiveness of public transit, governments expended both 
huge sums of money and summoned enormous political will to cater for the car. 
In 1916 congress authorized $75 million52 over five-years for road construction.53 
By 1929 every state in the country had enacted gasoline sales taxes (usually three 
to four cents per gallon) to finance road construction, and collectively all levels of 
government invested $34.6 billion on road construction between 1921 and 1940.54 
Whereas urban citizens accessed a fair degree of mobility from public transportation 
systems and the walkability of dense urban environments, the automobile provided 
a great leap forward for mobility in rural areas. As such, early road expenditure 
programs focused on farm-market roads motivated to help get traffic “out of the 
mud.” This landscape, coupled with the rural representation bias of the US Senate 
system, likely helped build the political will for federal support of state and local road 
building.
Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects of the 1930s spent ten-times as 
much money on road building projects as on public transportation.55 This funding 
bias for roads over transit may have been driven in part by the institutional structure 
of transit. Public transit service in the United States was primarily developed and 
operated by for-profit enterprises with some degree of public oversight to award route 
concessions and also regulate fares. As such, it may have been politically difficult to 
justify channeling depression-era stimulus funds for investment in privately held 
public transit systems,56 rather than in a state sponsored and publicly executed road-
building scheme.
Public expenditure on road building was just the tip of the iceberg. Whereas 
investment in public transit usually provides a complete system (track, vehicle, 
maintenance and driver), in the automobile system the costs of vehicle ownership, 
operation and parking are private. Kothari (2007) estimates that in Boston, the ratio 
of private spending on the automobile outweighed public spending by a factor of 
over 14. By investing in roads, the state stimulated massive consumer spending in the 
auto industry and petroleum sector, thereby creating two very strong and increasingly 
powerful political interests in favor of perpetuating the automobile growth machine.
By the end of the 30s a proposal for an $8-billion, 30,000-mile national network 
of tolled super highways was being debated in Congress but ultimately blocked in 
Senate in 1938 by the successful lobbying efforts of state and federal road builders 
52  1.6 billion in 2012 dollars
53  Rose (1990), 8
54  Gordon (1991), 11; Rose (1990), 4
55  Gordon (1991), 11
56  Although some transit facilities were transferred from private to public ownership 
rather early in Boston (the Cambridge subway was sold to the Commonwealth in 1920 as a 
form of  public subsidy to the private operator), rail systems in New York and Chicago were 
purchased by the state in 1940 and 1947, respectively.
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Figure 19: Downtown Boston before (top) and after the construction of the elevated Central Artery 
in 1954 which demolished approximately 1000 buildings (bottom)
43
who advocated for a toll-free system.57 By 1954, President Eisenhower directed his 
administration to devise a “dramatic plan to get 50 billion dollars worth of self-
liquidating highways under construction”: expenditure greater than the recently 
ended Korean War.58 These projects increased the behavioral lock-in to the car 
(as described in chapter 1.1 & 1.2), thereby creating an ever-growing political 
constituency in favor of the car, and in turn further fuelling the political will to 
expand the concrete commons. 
From early intersection spot improvements, to the trespasses of the parkways on 
parklands, and ultimately the dramatic intrusion of freeways into cities, government 
summoned enormous political will to destroy the fabric of the city and displace 
citizens in the path of the road. These were not only side effects of highway 
building, but also articulated policy objectives. In the report, Toll Roads and Free 
Roads (1939), the Bureau of Public Roads articulates the link between freeways 
and urban renewal by suggesting: “the whole interior of the city is ripe for…major 
change.” The National Interregional Highway Committee created by president 
Roosevelt recommended in the report Interregional Highways (1941) that a new 
system of national highways should enter into the core of metropolitan areas and 
integrate with “the future development of the city.” 59 However, the scale of the 
changes brought by highways and the detriment to the already declining city was 
enormous. Construction of the Central Artery through Boston (which predated 
the Interstate program) required demolishing 1,000 buildings and displacing 
20,000 people. (figure 19) With the Interstate program mayors of cities further 
invited these highway projects, both for the temporary boost to the economy that 
Interstate highway construction funds brought to the local economy, as well as out of 
desperation to remain connected to the growing suburban reaches of the metropolis. 
According to the U.S. House Committee on Public Works by the late 1960s federal 
highway building was demolishing over 62,000 housing units annually with an 
impact on as many 200,000 people per year.60 The provision of parking also fuelled 
the destruction of the city, and in 1946 the American Society of Civil Engineers 
reported that fifteen states had laws enabling the use of condemned properties for 
parking lots.61
In addition to spending money on roads, an entire bureaucracy was created around 
the enterprise. For example, more people worked for the Bureau of Public roads in 
the Philippines in 1952 than in the entire Bureau in 1919.62 Political will was also 
summoned to further entrench the dominance of the automobile on land use by 
codifying auto-oriented designs through engineering design standards and land-
use planning law. The requirements of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
57  Rose (1990), 5 
58  Lewis (1997), 98-99
59  Mohl (2004), 677
60  Mohl (2004), 680
61  Ben-Joseph (2012), 81
62  Lewis (1997), 91
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which provided financial assistance and mortgage insurance, had a profound impact 
on building a decentralized and auto-oriented metropolis. In its 1935 circular, 
Subdivision Development, the Administration “insist[s] upon the observance of 
rational principles of development in those areas in which insured mortgages are 
desired” such as a minimum 10 foot lane width for traffic lanes and 50 foot frontage 
for dwelling lots. The following year, an FHA bulletin proclaimed: “the gridiron plan 
which has been so universally adopted in most of our cities has several very decided 
disadvantages.”63 Parking provision was also entrenched systemically, and according 
to a 1947 report by the ENO Foundation 70 cities in the country had included 
parking standards as part of their zoning requirements. The ENO report concludes: 
“the parking problem can be effectively tackled through zoning requirements.”64 
Despite legal challenges from some property owners, courts upheld parking 
requirements as part of zoning codes. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled in 1966: “the reasonable premise of requirement for off-street parking spaces 
for new buildings is that parking automobiles nearby is an established function of the 
use of any building.” 
Such sweeping changes and regulations could not have been advanced if the 
interests of the auto were not also aligned with the perceptions of the majority of 
Americans: Americans who now overwhelmingly traveled (and had to travel) by car. 
These perceptions were also shaped and reinforced by multi-media marketing by 
the hegemony of petroleum, automobile and road-building lobbyists, who helped 
sell the vision that the auto was central to the American way of life. Unfortunately, 
those displaced to build freeways into cities were usually the poorest members of 
society and a politically weak minority who lived in the walkable core of the city: 
they often could not afford the auto, but neither did they need it by virtue of the 
urban environment in which they lived. Ignoring the socioeconomic damage of the 
urban freeway and urban renewal was intrinsic to the ruthless efficiency of driving the 
automobile city forward. 
Although heavy-handed highway projects would be unthinkable today, the 
tragedy still continues. Whereas complete gridlock or crawling travel speeds could 
be considered the very “human misery” that Hardin forewarns, in the concrete 
commons the “mutually agreed upon coercion” in the form of taxation and spending 
to expand the commons have actually worsened misery over the decades. Vehicle 
Miles Traveled (VMT) has grown dramatically over the last six decades, reaching 
a national total of approximately 3 trillion miles per year in 2010. (figure 20) 
And with this growth in VMT, mobility and access to opportunity have become 
inextricably linked with a dependence on unsustainable and insecure fossil fuel 
energy. Every year the Urban Mobility Report published by the Texas Transportation 
Institute (TTI) issues its highly publicized Travel Time Index measure, which 
invariably warns that congestion and delay in the nation’s transport system is getting 
worse. In 2011, the report estimates national congestion costs exceeding $100 billion 
63  Ben-Joseph (2012), 83-84
64  Ben-Joseph (2012), 76
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and that the average annual delay experienced by each commuter has increased to 
34 hours from only 14 in 1982. These startling figures are often cited as evidence of 
a worsening congestion crisis in the nation, and used to summon the political will 
for more capacity based interventions and the expansion of both road and transit 
systems. However, misleading political interpretation of mobility-based measures in 
the TTI report also continues to erroneously support the notion that more highways 
can be part of the solution, rather than the source of misery in the first place. The 
TTI report relies on the ratio of congested travel time during the peak to the free 
flowing time off-peak to define delay, therefore implicitly assuming that uncongested 
travel is not only desirable but also achievable (a notion dispelled by Downs’ 
principle of triple-convergence). Instead, in the report Driven Apart (2010) published 
by CEOs for Cities, congestion is measured based on trip distance and total travel 
time. Driven Apart reports that the most hours spent in traffic are in places like 
Indianapolis, Louisville and Memphis (where densities are low and destinations are 
far apart), and not in the traditional targets of criticism like New York and Chicago 
(where peak-period congestion levels may be high but locations are closer together 
47
and more easily accessed by walking and transit).
1.4 Toward a model of automobile growth 
“First we shape the cities - then they shape us”  
– Jan Gehl
Three brief narratives of the growth of the automobile in American urban areas have 
been presented: the story of design, planning and engineering of infrastructure and 
physical space; the micro-economic model of demand responses to changing supply; 
and, the political perspective to investment in highways and urban renewal. The 
initial growth of the car in the city may have been an unplanned and exogenous 
expression of consumer demand for motorized mobility. However, the initial growth 
story rapidly became a self-enforcing process through the impacts of the car and 
car-oriented philosophy on urban design, zoning, metropolitan decentralization, 
suburban development patterns, individual travel choice and the political will. 
But, this series of outcomes did not need to be necessarily so. Congestion has been 
shown to be a self-limiting problem in a physical sense. However, highway engineers, 
land use planners, the public, and political decision-makers accepted the myth of 
capacity building as the solution and as key to the competitiveness of cities, thereby 
contributing to a vast expansion of the road-based transportation system.
 
Despite the fascination with the study of travel demand in the field of transportation 
planning, the public sector is primarily engaged in the enterprise of managing supply. 
The design impacts of roads and freeways on walkability, as well as the impact of 
an expanding and increasingly auto-oriented transportation system on individual 
decision making demonstrate how the provision of transportation supply has not 
only induced demand but also locked-in behavior. At the same time, this very lock-
in supported the political will to further expand the concrete commons by creating 
worsening traffic conditions and a large and agitated constituency who rely on the 
automobile as a necessity for accomplishing life activities. However, without the 
collective decision to build infrastructure, the motorization feedback loop would have 
been cut-off. (figure 21) It is the key linchpin. Supply has largely driven automobile 
demand (rather than the other way round) and society has been driven to congestion 
by the myth of capacity building and the political will to build infrastructure.
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2. Case study – McGrath Highway
The McGrath corridor consists of three major segments that connect Wellington 
Circle in Medford in the north with Leverett Circle in Boston in the south. Traveling 
south from Wellington Circle across the Mystic River to Interstate 93 the corridor 
is named the Fellsway. In Somerville, the corridor is named McGrath Highway 
and runs south from I-93, over the MBTA Lowell line tracks, and further south 
over the MBTA Fitchburg line tracks using the Squire’s Bridge. Just south of the 
Squire’s bridge, at the Cambridge/Somerville city line, the corridor changes names 
to Monsignor O’Brien Highway and travels south past Lechmere Square, across the 
Craigie Bridge where it joins Leverett Circle in Boston and Meets I-93 again65(figure 
22). The focus of this thesis and case study is on the portion of the corridor through 
Somerville. 
2.1 A legacy of infrastructure: railway, street, throughway, highway
The history of the McGrath Highway and the surrounding neighborhoods in 
Somerville, MA, exemplifies the broader narrative described in chapter 1 of 
transportation growth, infrastructure change, land use effects, urban renewal and 
ultimately lock-in to the automobile. 
Though not easily discernable today, the area along the McGrath Highway corridor 
has long been of historic importance to Somerville. East of the present-day 
intersection of Somerville Ave, McGrath Highway and Medford Street in the area 
now known as Brickbottom was the location of the McLean Asylum. The Ward II 
area to the west of this intersection was one of the most densely built areas in the 
city.66 Between 1850 and 1890 dozens of streets and hundreds of building lots had 
been speculatively platted east of Medford Street on and near the Asylum grounds, 
however, only a few were built; Linwood, Joy, Poplar and Chestnut streets, which 
define the present-day Brickbottom neighborhood, were platted in 1855 (figure 23). 
Railroad construction through the Cobble Hill area near the Asylum began in 1837, 
and in 1896 the Asylum grounds were purchased by the Boston and Lowell Railroad 
and the existing structures were cleared for the expansion of railroad yards. 67
Several proposals for a cross-town boulevard were proposed between 1895 and 1925, 
continuing a discussion on the topic of a pleasure drive for carriage traffic started 
in the 1850s. In 1911, a Cambridge-Somerville boulevard was considered to link 
Massachusetts Avenue at the Harvard Bridge to Broadway Park. The route was to 
65  The McGrath is described here in terms of  its relationship with I-93 to help 
current-day readers understand its location in the city. However, it is important to emphasize 
that the corridor was conceived of  and constructed decades before even the concept of  I-93 
was put forth. At that time, the spatial logic of  the corridor was a connection between the 
Mystic River and Charles River.
66  Zellie, C (1990), 37
67  Zellie, C (1990), 90
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follow Webster Ave, Prospect Hill Ave, Cross St, and link with the Fellsway across the 
Mystic River. 68 
In 1927, Boston Globe reporter Donald Willard wrote: “Not long ago a noted 
humorist wrote a sad little skit about a man who had his troubles in traffic. This 
motorist left home early in the morning, equipped with a radio, lunch and supplies 
for a week… Was the humorist exaggerating when he describe the traffic jam in such 
picturesque hyperbole?” To see for himself, Willard drove the city streets of central 
Boston for several hours during the most congested periods and measured his speed 
and waiting times at intersections. From the pioneering data-driven approach he 
concluded: “there is no question that traffic is heavy, with more than 200,000 cars 
coming into Boston every day, and most of them going out again every night, there 
is bound to be some congestion. Under normal conditions, however, there seems no 
insuperable difficulty in getting about… the observer found that traffic conditions in 
Boston are not half as bad as they look.”69 
Despite Willard’s observations transportation planners and land use planners 
undertook bold actions to accommodate the automobile along and around the 
McGrath corridor. The Cambridge-Somerville boulevard discussion culminated in 
the construction of the Northern Artery in 1925 (renamed McGrath Highway in 
1933), to provide a high-speed automobile connection between the Charles and 
Mystic Rivers. The southern part of the alignment of the Northern Artery followed 
the existing paths of Bridge Street, Somerville Ave and Medford Street. However, 
between the intersection of Medford St/Highland Ave and Broadway, and unlike the 
proposed boulevard of 1911, the Artery’s alignment ran straight through the densely 
populated neighborhood and demolished dozens of homes fronting Aldrich St and 
Dana St. (figure 24) In total, construction of the Northern Artery demolished 220 
lots and 200 homes.70 
The Northern Artery divided the East Somerville and Winter Hill neighborhoods 
and also isolated from the rest of the city the few residential streets built in 
Brickbottom.71 During the construction of the Northern Artery, the Boston Globe 
recognized the undesirable effect of road capacity expansion on the neighborhood: 
“for the whole three-mile stretch from Mystic av, Medford, to Commercial av, 
Cambridge, the 100 foot swath of the new highway shows like a huge scar upon the 
thickly settled communities… through which the grotesque claws of steam shovels 
have gashed the path.” 72 Despite this disruption to the form of the existing city, the 
Northern Artery wounded but did not completely break the walkable urban fabric 
68  Zellie (1990), 48
69  “Autos Slide Through Rush-Hour Traffic Easy As You Please.” Donald Willard. 
Boston Daily Globe; Nov 6, 1927; B1
70  Spicer (2011), 46
71  Zellie (1990), 48
72  “Girders of  Bridge Soon Will Link Sections of  Big Northern Artery,” Boston 
Globe. 17 August 1926; 13
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since it accommodated major streetcar lines that generated pedestrian interactions 
between the street, sidewalk and adjacent buildings. (figure 25) Furthermore there is 
evidence of efforts made to mitigate or minimize the impact of the Northern Artery 
on the urban fabric, as another news article remarks how: “engineers have neatly 
performed an operation on the big brick building in East Cambridge which jutted 
out into the widened thoroughfare. They have cut a slice off this building and moved 
the front wall back 20 feet.”73 Aesthetics were also given some consideration during 
construction, as “a grass plot will be placed between paving block lines in the middle 
of the street. This will serve the double purpose of separating traffic and beautifying 
the boulevard.”74
Following the trajectory from street to throughway to highway, the McCarthy 
Viaduct was built in 1955. The overpass is a 4-lane structure that elevates a 0.51 mile 
section of the McGrath Highway corridor between the Squire’s Bridge and Medford 
St/Highland Ave. In doing so, the McCarthy Viaduct creates a grade separation of 
traffic at the intersections of Somerville Ave/Medford St and Washington St, and on- 
and off-ramps to the elevated are provided at these intersections. (figure 26) Building 
the McCarthy Viaduct and the associated surface roads further scarred the area and 
doubled the width of the corridor between the Somerville Ave and Washington St 
intersections. This required demolishing a substantial number of the buildings along 
the eastern side of the alignment that provided the Northern Artery with something 
of an urban context and street façade. (figure 27) The current configuration and 
alignment of the corridor remains essentially unchanged since the construction of 
the McCarthy Viaduct. However this part of Somerville faced the threat of urban 
renewal and further highway construction for several decades. 
The 1948 Master Highway Plan for the Boston Metropolitan Area proposed a 
network of radial freeways including an elevated Northern Expressway (I-93) 
through Somerville to connect the downtown Central Artery to Medford and points 
north. The 1948 plan also proposed an Inner Belt Expressway (Interstate 695) to 
circulate traffic around the radial system of freeways. The proposed alignment for 
an elevated Inner Belt highway of 170-300 feet in width would run through the 
Brickbottom neighborhood westward, interchange with McGrath Highway near the 
Squire’s Bridge, and then continue westward to meet an extension of MA Route 2 
in Somerville’s Union Square. (figure 28) Plans and alignments for the Inner Belt 
were revised numerous times through the 50s and 60s. (figure 29) The proposed 
Inner Belt and the Southwest Expressway through Jamaica Plain and Roxbury 
were abandoned in the early 1970s by the protest of local citizen anti-highway 
movements that lead to a realignment of local and state political positions on freeway 
construction. 
73  “Northern Artery, Three-Mile Crosscut, In Last Stages Of  Construction.” Boston 
Daily Globe; Oct 19, 1926; A12
74  “First Stretch Of  Roadway Of  Northern Artery Laid.” Boston Daily Globe; Sep 
15, 1926; A32
56
Fi
gu
re
 2
6:
 1
95
5 
C
on
tsu
cti
on
 p
la
ns
 fo
r M
cC
ar
th
y V
ia
du
ct
57
RO
AD
 W
ID
EN
IN
G 
AN
D 
LA
ND
 A
CQ
UI
SI
TI
ON
19
55
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
pl
an
s 
fo
r M
cC
ar
th
y 
Vi
ad
uc
t
N
or
th
er
n 
ar
te
ry
 ri
gh
t o
f w
ay
 b
ou
nd
ar
y
La
nd
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
fo
r M
cC
ar
th
y 
Vi
ad
uc
t
Fi
gu
re
 2
7
58
IN
NE
R 
BE
LT
 P
RO
PS
AL
19
48
 M
as
te
r H
ig
hw
ay
 P
la
n
fo
r t
he
 B
os
to
n 
M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 A
re
a
Fi
gu
re
 2
8
59
IN
NE
R 
BE
LT
 P
RO
PS
AL
19
67
 A
lig
nm
en
t C
on
ce
pt
Fi
gu
re
 2
9
60
However, by this time I-93 had already been built from New Hampshire up to the 
Medford/Somerville town line and was dumping thousands of vehicles down Mystic 
Avenue and McGrath Highway. Given this condition, community activism shifted 
away from stopping the completion of I-93 and toward advocating that the section 
through Somerville to the Central Artery be built as depressed highway to minimize 
its impact. However, I-93 was ultimately constructed as an elevated route that again 
displaced hundreds of families living in the dense neighborhoods characteristic of 
Somerville.
Although the Inner Belt was stopped, housing in the Brickbottom neighborhood 
and the adjacent neighborhood to the east between the MBTA Lowell Line and 
I-93 (now called Inner Belt) were cleared in the 1950s for an urban renewal plan to 
create a Somerville Industrial Park that would benefit from the anticipated highway 
network. The purpose of the renewal plan was to destroy the existing neighborhood 
grid pattern and to reorganize the area to accommodate the Interstate, provide 
automobile circulation and parking, and establish single-use zoning. Prepared by the 
Somerville Redevelopment Authority, an agency of the City, the 1968 the Urban 
Renewal Plan for the Inner Belt area aimed to: 
“provide a new and significant entrance to the city from the Inner 
Belt…; to improve the traffic circulation pattern of the City and of 
the Area through the correction of conditions contributory to traffic 
hazards and congestion and, more specifically, through... the widening 
and realignment of streets... the elimination of narrow and congested 
minor streets... the provision of adequate off-street parking; to eliminate 
blight and blighting factors and to prevent the recurrence of blight by 
the clearance of structures which are structurally substandard… by the 
relocation of residential uses and incompatible nonresidential uses.” 75
The primary driver of form and the control of development intensity in the plan 
was “the quantitative relationship between floor space and off-street parking, 
loading, and landscaping areas.76 A real estate booklet advertising the anticipated 
industrial district describes Inner Belt as a “unique parcel [which] combines the 
advantages of a suburban type development in a downtown location.”77 Ultimately 
the comprehensive plan was not realized and the Inner Belt and Brickbottom 
neighborhoods redeveloped incrementally. The area is now characterized by 
windowless one-story concrete block style structures set back 20 to 30 feet from the 
roads in which warehousing, distribution facilities and light manufacturing are the 
primary activities.
The construction of the McCarthy Viaduct which elevated McGrath Highway, as 
well as the building of I-93 two decades later, created disruptions in the city that 
75  City of  Somerville (1968) 3-4
76  City of  Somerville (1968), 16
77  City of  Somerville (2008)
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were quite detrimental both in their linear and area effects. The elevated structures 
are significant visual and physical barriers that lock-in the Brickbottom and Inner 
Belt areas and leave them inaccessible for development. Kevin Lynch (1990) writes 
about how the disamenity value of elevated highway structures in central areas creates 
“urban remnants,” citing McGrath Highway as a prime example:
“ Linwood Avenue, in inner Somerville, Massachusetts, is typical of such 
marginal areas. Isolated behind the elevated McGrath Highway, it is 
accessible only by a single indirect entrance. Its low, repatched, concrete 
block buildings, spotted with signs, are closed in on themselves. They 
are warehouses, services industries, and repair depots. They stand within 
ragged dirt and asphalt yards, full of discarded objects. The broad streets, 
surfaced in cracked and oily paving, have no regular edges, but are 
sporadically lined with broken chain-link fences. An ugly, polluted, yet 
tolerant place... it is a refuge for infant and relict enterprises.”78
Though Lynch is both critical and congratulatory of the place for its character, the 
connection between the linear impact of the highway and the broader neighborhood 
impact is unequivocal. Actions to accommodate the car along and around the 
McGrath Highway corridor have had a significant impact on the character of the 
area. Therefore, in reconceptualizing McGrath Highway for the 21st century around 
a new vision of multi-modal transportation there exists the potential to not only start 
reversing the pattern of lock-in to the automobile along the corridor, but also a much 
larger potential to free the surrounding area of its infrastructural legacy and to enable 
a significant area in Somerville to revitalize as walkable and transit-oriented place. 
Indeed, the latent desirability and development potential of the Brick Bottom area, 
owing to its proximity to downtown Boston, has long been recognized ever since the 
area was burdened by the first era of infrastructure building: the railways. An 1872 
article in the Somerville Journal speculates: “the grounds, from their nearness and 
convenience to Boston, if laid out in streets and provided with gas and water and 
proper sewers would be immediately taken up at good prices… and if the asylum 
grounds come into the market laid out in streets and building lots we shall very soon 
have such a population there.”
78  Lynch (1990), 113
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2.2 McCarthy Viaduct: reconceptualization potential
Over the past decade discussion and debate about the future of McGrath Highway 
have been brewing. This section describes current physical, planning and political 
conditions that may support the reconceptualization of McGrath Highway and 
surrounding areas around a more balanced and less auto-oriented vision.
2.2.1 Functional obsolescence: regional network change 
The McGrath Highway corridor and McCarthy Viaduct structure were both 
conceived and built when the regional transportation network had a very different 
shape, when the road network played a different role in metropolitan mobility, and 
when local and regional patterns of land-use and population were different. 
The Northern Artery was conceived and constructed in 1925 by the Metropolitan 
District Commission (MDC): ironically an agency established by the State legislature 
to oversee and maintain the metropolitan park system.79 The Artery provided the 
primary high-speed route between the Charles and Mystic Rivers and provided access 
to the then outlying communities of Medford and Malden. The regional function 
of McGrath Highway was emphasized in the 1948 Master Highway Plan for the 
Boston Metropolitan Area: a more comprehensive plan for the region’s roads prepared 
by a joint board that included the MDC, Department of Public Works (DPW) 
and federal assistance from the Public Roads Administration. In the 1948 plan, the 
segment of McGrath between the Charles and Mystic Rivers is designated part of 
a proposed Northern Expressway that would eventually extend from the origin of 
McGrath at Leverett Circle in Boston out to Route 128. (figure 30) To support this 
role the plan proposes grade separations for McGrath Highway with an underpass at 
Somerville Ave/Medford St and an overpass at Washington St. The construction of 
the McCarthy Viaduct in 1955 built both of these grade separations as overpasses. 
However, the regional function of the McGrath Highway was cast into doubt by 
plans for the Interstate system that were developed after the McCarthy Viaduct was 
constructed. By the mid 1960s, highway plans developed by DPW showed a different 
path for the Northern Expressway (I-93) that did not use McGrath Highway, but 
instead follows the basic alignment of I-93 that exists today and that connects directly 
with the Central Artery. The section of McGrath Highway north of Washington 
Street was not even designated a “major arterial” in the plan of the mid sixties. (figure 
31) Nevertheless, the planning process did not incorporate a mechanism to revisit the 
need and function of existing infrastructure in light of new facilities and changing 
facts that may replace or reshape the role of the existing. Another telling example of 
this in the Boston area was the steadfast reluctance of Interstate planners to abandon 
the proposed Inner Belt segment through Roxbury after the MassPike was extended 
into the city – even though the highway department’s own numerical models showed 
that the MassPike provided the same traffic functionality and made the Inner Belt 
redundant and underutilized.80  
79  Department of  Conservation and Recreation (2012)
80  Remarks by Fred Salvucci, April 23, 2012
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Observations of traffic behavior on McGrath collected over the past decade also 
suggest a mismatch between the corridor’s design as a limited-access through route 
that emphasizes regional mobility and actual use patterns as a distributor route 
for local accessibility. In 2003 the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) 
conducted a corridor study of Route 28 (the state highway designation for McGrath) 
using data collected prior to the completion of the Central Artery/Tunnel project. 
The study used traffic counts and a license plate trace of vehicles to understand 
origin-destination patterns and the “extent to which the roadway is used for long-
distance travel that may actually “belong” on I-93.” Of the vehicles observed using 
the corridor southbound at Otis St in the AM, 58% were from the immediate 
vicinity including Somerville, Cambridge, Medford, Everett, and Malden. The 
balance originated in communities to the north and northwest with good access 
to southbound I-93, and it was speculated these vehicles enter McGrath via I-93. 
Approximately 11% of AM inbound vehicles observed at Otis St were observed 
to continue through to the Museum of Science, leading to the conclusion that 
the McGrath is “used far less as a through facility to Boston than as a collector/
distributor facility between origin and destination towns that are not served well by 
I-93.” 
Repeating the origin-destination study in 2011 CTPS finds that approximately 14% 
of the vehicles observed at Otis St inbound in the AM follow through to Boston. 
Although the relative share of regional through users has changed slightly between 
2003 and 2011, the absolute number has declined by about 1000 since total Average 
Daily Traffic (ADT) in the corridor has decreased by 27% (from 43,000 to 32,000) 
after the opening of the Central Artery/Tunnel.81 These observations suggest a decline 
in the regional importance of McGrath Highway compared to when it was conceived, 
and that the corridor is not being used primarily as a through route to Boston but 
rather as a distributor road for trip destinations in Somerville and Cambridge. In 
addition to the 14% of vehicles using McGrath as an alternative to I-93 in to Boston, 
a notable amount of the remaining so-called ‘local’ traffic originating north of Otis 
St is likely destined toward the major employment hub of Kendall Square and should 
therefore be considered regional in nature too. This speculation is supported by the 
observation in the 2011 CTPS study that 62% of the AM inbound traffic observed 
at Otis St enters into East Cambridge (which provides a cut-through to Kendall Sq) 
through Medford St (16%) and other access roads such as Rufo Road, 3rd Street, and 
Land Boulevard.82
There is also increasing interest in reconsidering the existing design of McGrath 
Highway as a regional facility in light of the a legal commitment by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to extend the MBTA Green Line from its terminus 
at Lechmere northward to Union Square and Medford Hillside. Projected to open 
81  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #2, Aug 3, 2011
82  CTPS (2012)
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between 2016 and 202083, the Green Line Extension (GLX) will run in disused 
railway right of way that lies within a few hundred feet of McGrath Highway in 
the section of the corridor between Lechmere and Medford St/Highland Ave. As 
such, the GLX will serve many of the same origin-destination patterns as McGrath 
Highway and offers the potential for mode shift away from the automobile and 
on to public transit. In addition, a new infill station on the MBTA Orange Line at 
Assembly Square that is under construction will provide another transit alternative 
that may help intercept automobile trips into Boston originating from Somerville 
and points north. Furthermore, the proposed (but currently on-hold) plans for 
Urban Ring bus service will also improve transit accessibility to Kendall Square and 
Lechmere, which are major origins and destinations for McGrath Highway users. 
Although transit cannot completely replace the need for a roadway, the scale of the 
proposed changes is substantial and the transformative potential quite significant. 
For example, the forecast increase in boardings of 30,700 passengers per day on the 
GLX on opening day84 is of a similar order of magnitude to the ADT of 32,000 on 
the McGrath Highway. Furthermore, transit ridership tends to be skewed toward the 
peak hours which is when roadways get overloaded. Since peak hour traffic volumes 
tend to drive roadway designs that end up oversized the other 22-hours in a day, 
transit ridership may have a substantial impact on reducing operating and design 
pressures for a reconceptualized McGrath.
2.2.2 Functional obsolescence: substandard design 
Despite the intent of improving traffic flow and throughput by providing grade 
separation, the McCarthy Viaduct and its ramps and adjoining surface roads have 
created an extremely complex situation.
The design of the supporting piers and bridge abutments of the McCarthy Viaduct 
is such that they occupy the entire width of the overhead cross-section. As such, the 
elevated roadway does not substantially increase the number of travel lanes that can 
are accommodated at-grade within the right of way since the footprint of the elevated 
lanes consumes most of the space beneath them. (figure 32a,b) Instead, the primary 
functionality of the elevated section of McGrath is that it allows vehicles to ‘flyover’ 
intersection delays at Washington St and Somerville Ave. With some traffic diverted 
overhead on the viaduct the performance of at-grade intersections should also (in 
theory) improve since there remain fewer vehicles to process. Yet, while freely flowing 
conditions are observed on the elevated viaduct throughout the day and the flyover 
principle is achieved for vehicles using it, conditions in the at-grade intersections are 
very poor. 
Given the usage pattern of McGrath Highway as a local distributor discussed above, 
many vehicles are headed for the Washington St and Somerville Ave intersections. 
However, these flows are crowded on to two-lane off ramps that are constrained in 
83  The opening of  the project has been postponed from 2011 and then 2014. A 
discussion of  this delay is provided in chapter 4.3.4
84  Massachusetts Department of  Transportation (2010)
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their capacity to process the existing volumes. The McGrath design also inhibits 
access to the Inner Belt area from the north and west. Paradoxically, the flyover 
effect enabled by the viaduct may be contributing to significantly worsening overall 
conditions in the corridor since there may be a misallocation of space in the right 
of way: too much space used by the elevated to provide regional mobility and too 
little on the surface roads to provide local accessibility for vehicles and pedestrians. 
As such, reconfiguring McGrath Highway as an at-grade roadway may not degrade 
performance for auto users since there is an opportunity to reallocate space in the 
right of way to more appropriate functions.
Furthermore, the McCarthy Viaduct causes complex, confusing and unsafe 
conditions at-grade. Though the elevated has created a landscape that is highly auto-
oriented, complex lane channelization, unintuitive traffic islands, unusual signal 
phasing, and badly designed weaving sections at the off-ramps make the facility 
perform poorly even for automobile users. As a result, crash rates along McGrath 
Highway at the intersections of Broadway, Washington St, and Somerville Ave/Poplar 
St exceed Massachusetts averages. 85 
For abutting properties and those on foot or bicycle the McGrath Highway is an 
unpleasant and inhospitable environment. The width of the travel way, tangle of 
surface roads, and the hulking mass of the McCarthy Viaduct create a strong visual 
and perceptual barrier in the neighborhood. Beneath the underpass the environment 
is dark and characterized by spalling concrete, pigeon droppings, brake dust and 
soot. Walking along and across McGrath is unpleasant, inconvenient, and at times 
impossible. Sidewalk segments end abruptly and designated crosswalks are distant. 
At the intersection of Somerville Ave/Medford St/Poplar St there is no provision 
for pedestrian crossing across the corridor other than a painted crosswalk across 6 
lanes of traffic (figure 33). In 2003 the Boston MPO concluded that bicycle travel 
along the McGrath corridor “is not safe” and that pedestrian crossings under the 
structure are difficult and lead to circuitous route choices. This effect is aggravated by 
the interruptions in the local street network, which would otherwise offer alternate 
walking routes, caused by the limited-access configuration of McGrath Highway. 
Where crossing are provided wait times for walk phases are long, and particularly at 
Washington St crossing requires endless ‘hopping’ between traffic islands. Concern 
over this lack of porosity and permeability across the corridor is heightened by the 
location of the future Brickbottom Green Line Extension station that will be sited on 
Washington St immediately east of McGrath Highway. Daily, 2,020 pedestrians are 
anticipated to try and access the station when it opens, or conversely, the ridership 
of the station may suffer if the station is perceived as inaccessible. In either case, 
remedial action is required. Similar concerns about pedestrian access exist with 
developing a potential GLX stop at McGrath and Somerville Ave (near the existing 
Target retail store).
85  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #2, Aug 3, 2011
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Figure 33:  Pedestrian Crossing Conditions at Somerville Ave / NB McGrath Highway
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2.2.3 Political attention & planning action
The condition of the McGrath Highway has attracted political attention and led to 
two ongoing processes in the corridor. Because the regional function of McGrath 
Highway has been replaced by the construction of I-93 in the 70s, the City of 
Somerville has expressed a desire to modify McGrath Highway from its current 
classification by MassDOT as “other freeway” to an at-grade boulevard design. In 
response to this, as well as the other concerns about the viability of the McCarthy 
Viaduct, in summer 2011 the MassDOT Office of Transportation planning initiated 
the Grounding McGrath study as a “comprehensive effort to evaluate the feasibility 
and impacts of de-elevating portions of McGrath Highway.” The study, which is 
being advised by a working group of institutional and public interest stakeholders, 
is being framed as a conceptual planning study (and not a formal environmental 
assessment or design process) and will release a package of short, medium, and long-
term recommendations for the future by summer 2012. Undermining this effort, the 
McCarthy Viaduct is also being attended to as part of the Massachusetts Accelerated 
Bridge Program. The program has identified the steel in the overpass as being in “fair” 
condition with rusting at deck joints, and the concrete in “poor” condition with 
spalling and exposed reinforcement. A $14 million scope of work to address these 
issues has been proposed by the Accelerated Bridge Program, and the MassDOT 
board of directors voted to approve awarding construction contracts for this work in 
March 2012. (Extensive discussion of the Accelerated Bridge Program is offered in 
chapter 4.2)
2.2.4 Transit oriented redevelopment 
More than 200 acres of land in Inner Belt and Brickbottom are now locked-in 
and cut-off by the McGrath, and the city of Somerville is exploring the potential 
of these areas as engines of economic development by improving transit access 
with the Green Line Extension and Urban Ring, and increasing connections in 
the street grid by reconceptualizing McGrath Highway as a boulevard. In its 2010-
2030 comprehensive plan, called SomerVision, the City is aiming to develop 
approximately 10,000 new jobs and 5,000 new households in the Inner Belt/
Brickbottom district, and with a target mode share of 50% of new trips by walking, 
bicycle and public transit. At the northern end of the McGrath corridor in Assembly 
Square, 1.78 million square feet of offices, 2,100 residential units and 1.07 million 
square feet of retail development are planned over the next decades. At the southern 
end of the corridor in Lechmere Square, the ongoing North Point redevelopment is 
planned to add 3.6 million square feet of mixed-use development at full buildout in 
20 years. However, without a supportive urban context and transportation network 
these major redevelopment plans risk being only transit-adjacent rather than transit-
oriented. At the moment the Assembly Square plan includes building 1,300 new 
parking spaces, and the North Point plan over 6,500 spaces. 
The success of economic development in nearby Kendall Square is an interesting 
precedent. Kendall Square is served by roadways of moderate capacity (Main St, 
Broadway, 3rd Street) and the MBTA Red Line. It seems dubious that Somerville, 
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served by Interstate 93 and about to have the Green Line Extension, Assembly Square 
Orange Line Station, and Urban Ring connection to Sullivan Square, Lechmere and 
Kendall, needs McGrath highway to attract development.
2.3 Summary
There are clearly many factors that bring attention to the McGrath Highway and the 
McCarthy Viaduct at this moment in time: historical changes in the transportation 
network and local land use environment, planned expansions to public transit, 
aspirations for transit-oriented land redevelopment, functional, operational and 
structural deficiency, and political attention to address the challenges of aging 
infrastructure. All these factors and forces beg the question of whether it is preferable 
to reconceptualize the design of the corridor rather than to simply rebuild it in the 
same manner as conceived decades ago. Despite these opportunities and the current 
saliency of debate on the future of the highway, the next two chapters of this thesis 
examine how this window of opportunity for removing the McCarthy Viaduct may 
be threatened by: 1) the perceived myth of expanding automobile mobility beyond 
finite capacity constraints that is perpetuated by the transportation forecasting and 
modeling process being used in the Grounding McGrath Study; 2) dynamics in the 
planning process, political attitudes to infrastructure building and maintenance, and 
the distribution of costs and benefits; and 3) ignoring the network opportunities 
caused by I-93, the Green Line Extension, the proposed Inner Belt Road to North 
Point Boulevard bridge and the Urban Ring proposal. In these cases, current behavior 
and agency culture undermine generating the necessary political will to change course 
and remove the obsolete McCarthy Viaduct infrastructure rather than to follow the 
existing path of lock-in to the automobile.
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3. Transportation planning & engineering 
– the status quo machine 
Despite their statistical rigor, transportation forecasting and modeling may hinder the 
achievement of policy objectives for sustainability, multi-modality and livability since 
they depict the world as it is today – without necessarily recognizing the processes 
of how it has come to be. The approaches tend not to explicitly reflect the dynamics 
of system change, and instead can systemically overlook important pathways to 
modifying the transportation landscape – especially the interactions (from chapter 1) 
between road availability, user demand, and the political will to build infrastructure. 
3.1 Modeling transportation behavior
A basic concept in transportation geography put forward by Edward Ullman is that 
the need for transportation arises in response to patterns of supply and demand that 
are localized in space. If the entire world could be compressed into a single point in 
space there would be no (and no need for) transportation. Therefore, the demand for 
travel is not intrinsic: it provides little value to travel in and of itself. Instead, travel is 
a demand derived from the desire to interact with economic and social opportunities 
that are arranged throughout the urban landscape. Although this may seem self-
evident, the role of landscape as the driving force behind travel must be emphasized. 
The landscape of the American city has been produced and oriented toward the 
automobile for decades, both by transportation projects that handed over an ever-
increasing amount of space for traffic and that eroded urban fabric in doing so, as 
well as by ideologies and practices in land use planning that sought to accommodate 
the automobile by decentralizing activities and de-urbanizing design. Implicit in 
both these sets of forces that shaped the form of the city was the notion that traffic 
congestion is a failure of the transportation and land-use system.
According to Boston’s regional metropolitan planning organization, CTPS, the 
purpose of transportation modeling is to predict “how many trips will be made by 
people in a given region on a typical day, where those trips will go, and what modes 
and routes those trips will utilize” in order to “predict how many vehicles will use a 
new or modified roadway, or how many people will board a new or modified transit 
line.”86 Regional transportation models are also used to predict the transportation 
impacts of growth and change in land use patterns. 
Overall transportation outcomes are the result of thousands of individual decisions 
about why, where, when and how to travel, and therefore, the CTPS explains, 
“travel models are built on the basis of people’s observed behavior.”87 However, 
this section explores how models in use focus on the demand-side of the process, 
without recognizing the broader supply factors that have produced existing individual 
behaviors, and without recognizing constraints that make predicted flows impossible. 
86  CTPS (n.d.)
87  CTPS (n.d.)
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Figure 34: Schematic representation of the CTPS regional travel model from the Casey Overpass study public 
consultation materials
CASEY OVERPASS PROJECT
T R A F F I C   2 0 1 0  -  2 0 3 5
FIVE-STEP TRAVEL DEMAND MODEL
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3.2 The 4-step transportation model 
Transportation modeling methods were developed as part of urban transportation 
studies during the late 1940s and 1950s. Prior to the development of models, 
transportation forecasting (if practiced at all) was based on accommodating existing 
travel demands or forecasting future demand by applying uniform growth factors 
that extrapolated historical trends.88 The use of models was substantially strengthened 
by the 1962 federal planning requirements; sophisticated models make possible a 
much more comprehensive understanding of networks and capacity constraints. Yet, 
paradoxically the role of capacity constraints in the application of modeling is often 
substantially ignored.
There have been refinements to the statistical techniques and vast increases in 
computing capabilities over the last decades, yet, conceptually the Boston CTPS 
regional transportation model used today is structured around the same 4-steps 
developed in the 1950s: trip generation, trip distribution, mode choice, and route 
assignment. (figure 34) These four steps are briefly described below.
Network and Zones
To operationalize the model and reduce computational complexity, the city is first 
divided into a series of transportation analysis zones (TAZs). TAZs in the CTPS 
model are approximately one square mile in size, and each is assigned values for the 
amount of land use and population contained within based on survey and census 
data. TAZs in the model are connected with a map of the transportation network 
(i.e. streets, highways, transit lines) so that trips moving between the TAZs can be 
assigned onto the actual transport system. An overall estimate of total traffic volumes 
is achieved by loading all the interactions between TAZs onto the network.
Step 1: Trip Generation
There are two primary inputs to the 4-step model: a description of the city’s land 
uses and socio-demographic information about the population. Together, these 
two make an attempt to represent the spatial organization of activities as well as the 
decision-makers moving about these opportunities. When modeling the impact 
of future development, such as that planned for Inner Belt and Brickbottom in 
Somerville, anticipated values for land use and demographics are used for the TAZs 
where development will occur. Following the concept of transportation as a derived 
demand, the number of trips generated within and attracted to a TAZ is estimated 
based on the type and amount of activities within the zone (e.g. number of residents, 
offices, schools, shopping, etc.), as well as by considering relevant attributes of the 
individuals traveling. For example, the number of trips made by teenagers, adults and 
seniors is likely to vary owing to the different activity patterns of these demographics. 
Trip generation uses observed trip rates (from surveys) that are averages for different 
segments of population and different land uses. For example, a household with 
4 people and two cars may produce 2 commuting to work trips per day. When 
88  Weiner, ch3
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complete, the trip generation step establishes a prediction of the total amount of 
travel that will occur. This is summarized as a table showing the number of trips 
produced in and attracted to each TAZ (a production-attraction matrix).
Step 2: Trip Distribution
Using the production-attraction matrix from the generation step, which defines 
how many trips are emanating from the households in each TAZ and attracted 
to the activities within it, the distribution step establishes where trips produced 
are going to and where trips attracted are coming from. The distribution of trips 
is estimated using the “Law of Gravitational Attraction,”89 which is a model 
that expresses interaction between two places as a function of the size of the two 
places and the time-distance between them. The gravity model recognizes that 
complementarity between two TAZs increases with size of population in each place, 
that the transferability of supply (e.g. of employees) in one place with demand (e.g. 
for workers) in another place decreases with distance, and that likelihood of an 
intervening opportunity intercepting a trip increases with time-distance. The number 
of trips attracted between two TAZs is assumed to be directly proportional to the 
relative sizes of the two zones (raised by some empirically estimated exponent): as 
the size of an attracting TAZ grows, it will attract a greater number of trips from 
a producing TAZ. Also, the number of trips between two TAZs is assumed to be 
inversely proportionate to the distance between the two zones: as distance grows 
fewer trips produced in one TAZ will be attracted to another TAZ. The result of the 
trip distribution step is an origin-destination matrix that quantifies the number of 
trips moving between every TAZ and every other TAZ.
Step 3: Mode choice
In this step, the trips in the origin-destination matrix are assigned to a particular 
mode. Although statistically quite complex, the mode choice model consists of 
defining four basic elements: alternative modes of travel, attributes of the alternative 
mode choices, the decision rule, and the decision maker. The travel modes considered 
in the Boston CTPS model are: auto drive alone, auto shared-ride, walk-access 
transit, drive-access transit, and walk all the way.  For each of these various modes 
of travel for a trip between any two TAZs, attributes distinguishing the modes can 
be measured. In the CTPS model, the attributes considered are time (divided into 
walking, waiting, and transfer times for transit) as well financial costs such as fares, 
tolls, fuel and parking. Collectively, these attributes are conceptualized as a measure 
of the disutility (or generalized cost) of each alternative mode choice available for a 
given trip. Based on the concept that travel is a derived demand, the decision rule 
assumed is one that individuals will try to minimize the disutility of their travel costs 
when choosing how to travel from origin to destination.
Estimates of traffic speed and transit travel times generated by the model are used to 
define the alternatives available and the cost attributes of each one for every origin 
89  CTPS (n.d) 
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and destination pair in the regional model. Surveys of actual travel behavior are used 
to observe the number of people that actually choose each of the different options. 
Then, statistical techniques (such as regression and maximum likelihood estimation) 
are used to examine relationships between the attributes of a choice and number of 
people actually making actually that choice. This process derives equations, known 
as utility functions, which express how people perceive the different cost attributes 
of a mode and how all the cost attributes sum together to form an overall cost (or 
disutility) for that mode. However, since the sensitivity to the different time and 
cost factors varies within the population (with some groups likely more sensitive to 
cost and others to time) the process of estimating the utility functions is conducted 
separately for different demographic categories. Finally, the utility functions of 
the different alternatives are compared using another statistical technique (Logit 
modeling) that provides an estimated probability of choosing one alternative versus 
the others available based on the relative differences in the utility functions of the 
options. For example, if one mode were very attractive for a given trip and had a 
very low disutility, the Logit equation would estimate a high probability of people 
choosing it over an alternative that is unattractive due to high time or cost values. By 
comparing utility functions using Logit for every trip made in the origin-destination 
matrix, each trip is assigned to a mode, and an overall estimate of the number of 
people traveling by each of the different modes is obtained.
Step 4: Route Assignment
The model has now determined where trips are produced and attracted, where they 
are going to and coming from, and the number of people using each travel mode to 
make these trips. The final step is to determine how these trips will use the actual 
travel network by assigning each trip to a specific road or transit path. Similar to 
mode choice, the underlying decision rule in the assignment step is to minimize 
travel time. The process first requires determining for each travel mode the shortest 
path in the network connecting every origin-destination pair. In an ideal world, 
every trip desires to take the shortest path. However, since any given path has a finite 
capacity and will become congested and slow down as that constraint is approached, 
the shortest path may change as trips are assigned to the network. Therefore, the 
assignment process is iterated. Trips are shifted between more congested and less 
congested links until an equilibrium is reached, whereby the traffic levels (and the 
associated congestion and travel times) on all the paths assigned between a given 
origin and destination are shorter than any unused paths. The result is a final 
representation of trip making in the region: volumes on specific roads and the 
number of boardings and alightings at transit stations and bus lines. Together these 
define congestion levels in the system and provide an estimate of the actual travel 
times between every origin and destination in the region.
Outputs & Feedbacks
The model generates many outputs, including the production-attraction matrix, 
origin-destination matrix, and mode choice estimates. However, the most significant 
output is the result of the route assignment that produces an estimate of levels 
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of congestion and travel times. These measures provided simple proxies of the 
performance and user experience of the transportation system and the underlying 
land use pattern that generates activities. Furthermore, travel time is an important 
decision variable in the 4-step model: as described above it is a key input to the trip 
distribution, mode choice and route assignment steps. As such, it is the primary 
mechanism to account for feedback effects within the model. If a large number of 
trips using a link produces congested conditions and slower travel times, this in turn 
could shift the pattern of origins and destinations, change the relative attractiveness 
of different travel modes, and also impact the links used. However, it is important 
to note that there is no feedback in the 4-step model between travel time and trip 
generation. Trip generation numbers are essentially an exogenous input derived 
by applying fixed trip rates to the land use scenario that specifies the location, 
distribution and intensity of activities. 
3.3 Grounding McGrath case study 
In the Grounding McGrath study, the CTPS 4-step regional travel model is being 
used for two purposes: first, as a forecasting tool to develop a so-called ‘no build’ 
scenario, and second as a modeling tool to analyze the performance of different 
alternative designs of McGrath against this base case scenario.
The No-Build Scenario: Driven to Expansion
Transportation modeling is a tool to help decision-makers better understand what, 
if any, impact different possible planning actions may have on outcomes of interest 
such as traffic volumes and levels of congestion. However, modeling as practiced, 
and particularly the process of developing the no-build scenario, is geared toward 
evaluating the performance of different options given a fixed future scenario, rather 
than examining how different infrastructure options themselves may shape the future.
The narrative of the growth of the automobile presented in chapter 1 demonstrates 
how the level of traffic in cities has been shaped by transportation and infrastructure 
systems, and the patterns of behavioral lock-in they created. Although attitudes about 
accommodating or providing for traffic growth have changed since the early days of 
highway building, and now include dissenting voices against the desirability of road 
expansion, the premise of predicting and providing for traffic growth is still deeply 
engrained in the transportation planning process. 
“Street facilities can and should be designed for the traffic that will wish 
to use them. It is wrong to start with the assumption that city growth and 
street traffic can or should be restricted to approximately present street 
capacities.”
 – Report on a Thoroughfare Plan for Boston (1930)
Though perhaps not as ideologically explicit as in 1930, the present day process of 
determining the no-build scenario essentially works to produce future automobile 
demand and then prescribe this future as that which must be planned for. In the 
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Grounding McGrath study, the forecast travel demand for the no-build year (2035) 
was obtained by running the CTPS 4-step model, but using as inputs 2035 values 
for land use patterns and transportation infrastructure adopted from the Boston 
region MPO’s Long Range Transportation Plan. These land use and transportation 
inputs for 2035 include planned changes to the transit network such as the Green 
Line Extension, neighborhood population and employment growth projections 
determined by the Boston MPO, and also assumptions about future demographics 
characteristics (that impact trip generation and mode choice behavior) determined by 
the MPO.
The purpose of the model run is to “provide travel demand peak period forecasts for 
existing conditions [and] a future no-build (2035) [year]. Growth in trips between 
the base year and 2035 are supplied to the consultant to feed a local model that 
completes traffic and multimodal analysis on a project scale.” 90 The result of this 
modeling process is that automobile traffic along the McGrath Highway corridor is 
being forecasted as 7.5-12.5% higher in 2035 compared to existing levels. 
Approached this way, the Grounding McGrath study elucidates little potential to 
consider reconceptualizing McGrath Highway around a less auto-oriented and 
more multi-modal vision. For, implied in accepting the traffic growth projections 
is the notion that reducing automobile capacity is directionally incorrect and likely 
to worsen congestion. Indeed, of the five alternative design proposals presented by 
MassDOT to the Grounding McGrath Working Group in March 2012, four have 
been designed to provide capacity such that “2035 projected volumes assume no trip 
diversions from current patterns.” One alternative aimed at lowering automobile 
capacity was presented – described as a “boulevard road diet” (figure 35) – but its 
viability and attractiveness in the evaluation process is still threatened since it assumes 
“significant trip diversions from 2035 No Build.” Important stakeholders in the 
process, such as local Congressman Michael Capuano, have stated that “he would 
not like to see any changes to McGrath that would result in traffic diversions to 
residential streets.”91
However, a forecast of increased vehicle traffic in 2035 is not simply an inconvenient 
truth that besets aspirations to reconceptualize McGrath Highway. Instead, 
such projections are the product of a forecasting and modeling paradigm whose 
assumptions and non-mathematical biases have encouraged road expansion for 
decades. In particular, this approach fails to adequately consider real-world capacity 
constraints that will curtail traffic growth, and projects existing behavioral patterns 
far into the future rather than allowing for behavioral change and social learning in 
response to a changing decision-making landscape. These shortcomings systematically 
undermine seeing the potential for using changes to the McGrath Highway itself as 
the very pathway to a different outcome by 2035. 
90  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #3, Dec 12, 2011
91  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #1, June 29, 2011
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Figure 35: Conceptual draft of a ‘boulevard road diet’ presented at the March 8, 2012 meeting of the Grounding 
McGrath study Working Group
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The process of change is of particular relevance to the case of dealing with failing 
infrastructure since the reconstruction process itself will disrupt traffic patterns and 
force different pathways to be used. Mitigation during construction, such as the use 
of alternate routes or improving transit options, if used over a period of time may 
generate new scenarios and new equilibrium points. Yet, the models are seldom used 
to demonstrate such possibilities.
3.3.1 Violating capacity constraints
One of the major shortcomings of forecasting future no-build scenarios using the 
4-step model is a failure to recognize real-world capacity constraints in roadway 
throughput that are defined by existing infrastructure conditions. In the case of 
McGrath Highway, there is a critical constraint in capacity at the Medford St/
Highland Ave intersection caused by the width of the bridge over the MBTA 
Lowell line that constrains the corridor to 3 lanes in each direction. Widening this 
bridge can be considered for all intents and purposes an unfeasible option since 
the structure is tightly hemmed-in by the neighboring buildings. Moreover, the 
at-grade intersection with Medford St/Highland Ave, with the presence of a heavy 
northbound left turn movement to Medford St and high pedestrian crossings creates 
an essentially complete constraint on the through capacity of McGrath. There is a 
finite number of vehicles per hour that can move past this segment. Therefore, this 
‘pinch point’ or ‘bottleneck’ has a major role in defining the capacity of McGrath, by 
throttling the amount of throughput that can advance downstream beyond this point 
(and onto the McCarthy Viaduct or a grounded boulevard). There is an additional 
significant pinch point at the Lechmere end of O’Brien Highway where the existing 
Green Line station is being relocated to the easterly side of the road, thereby forcing 
all pedestrians and busses using the station to cross the Highway. In the short to 
medium timescale, reconstruction of various other nearby bridges and roadways 
in Somerville is an additional reality that will reduce capacity below the existing 
constraints of these intersection ‘pinch-points.’
There are several conceptual failures that contribute to this inconsistency of violating 
capacity. First, the future land-use scenario for 2035 is an exogenous input based on 
population and forecasting exercises that do not consider the role of transportation 
supply on how, where and whether such growth will occur. Instead, forecast 
growth is taken as a given and the number and pattern of trips associated with new 
development generated by running the 4-step model are also taken as given, even 
though the roadway capacity to accommodate such trips does not actually exist yet 
– and is unlikely to ever exist. As a consequence, the output of the 4-step model for 
future ‘no-build’ scenarios often shows worsening levels of congestion and delays. 
However, this approach to forecasting and modeling demonstrates a contradictory 
relationship with capacity constraint. On the one hand, the fundamental nature of 
capacity constraint is affirmed by the fact that more traffic trying to use the road 
results in worsened operating conditions. On the other hand, it fails to recognize 
that worsening operating conditions constrain auto-oriented land use growth and 
development potential.
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Figure 36:  Photograph of a poster summarizing 1969 “DPW” planning values used in a BTPR 
workshop. (courtesy Jack Wofford, Director, Boston Transportation Planning Review)
Developing the no-build scenario in this manner leaves little or no room for debate 
about the appropriate or desired size of transportation infrastructure as well as debate 
about land use and desired mode shares. Instead, future traffic volumes are taken as a 
fait accompli. Indeed, a senior staff member of the Grounding McGrath study team 
described the 2035 no-build traffic forecast to the study’s advisory group as “what the 
world we need to plan for looks like”92 and providing “the 2035 projections that we 
have to live with.”93 
Despite reforms to the goals of transport planning and the demonstrated ability 
for infrastructure to shape communities (in both positive and negative ways), the 
reluctant acceptance of future forecast traffic is the same today as was prevalent in 
the Interstate era. Lupo (1971) summarizes this ideological problem in his critique 
of the highway-oriented Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project (EMRPP) 
92  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #3, Dec 12, 2011
93  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #4, March 8, 2012
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Figure 37:  Photograph of a poster summarizing planning values of transportation restudy shown 
in a BTPR workshop. (courtesy Jack Wofford, Director, Boston Transportation Planning Review)
of 1969 (figure 36) that was eventually dethroned by the BTPR of 1971-1972 and 
a renewed focus on building transit (figure 37): “the basic attitude of the EMRPP 
report is, by 1990 we’re going to have more than twice as many cars on the road, 
and we’d better start building roads for them. No one stopped to ask: do we want 
twice as many cars in Boston by 1990?”94 Equally fundamental, highway planning 
implicitly assumed that the capacity constraints of the already congested city roadway 
system and fully utilized parking supply would be “solved” by others, but with no 
analysis of the acceptability or feasibility of the unspecified solution.95 Similarly, a 
booklet prepared in the 60s by the Massachusetts Department of Commerce and 
Development proclaimed: “at best, planners can plan and promote transportation 
improvements which reinforce development decisions made at the local level.” 96
94  Lupo (1971), 149
95  This failure for highway planning to be comprehensive at the system level is further 
discussed in chapter 4.3.4
96  Lupo (1971), 149
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Although the land-use inputs may generate an improbable number of vehicle 
trips in the no-build year, the route assignment step of the 4-step model also fails 
to accurately recognize existing capacity constraints in the manner it assigns trips 
to specific links in the road network. This is in part because of a methodological 
shortcoming as well as confusion in the language. We must first define a few terms.
• Capacity: this is the maximum throughput of vehicles (e.g. vehicles/hour) 
for a given combination of physical roadway conditions (e.g. number of lanes) 
traffic control systems (e.g. signal timing), and driver behavior (e.g. following 
distance, speed, aggressiveness). Capacity drops when conditions are congested 
(but this inconvenient truth is usually ignored). 
• Arrival rate: this it the rate at which vehicles approach a given point or 
segment of capacity constraint in a road system. (e.g. vehicles/hour)
• Volume: the actual observed throughput of vehicles past a given point of 
capacity constraint (e.g. vehicles/hour)
It is easy to appreciate how the capacity of a roadway is fixed due to physical 
limitations, and as mentioned in chapter 1 important to emphasize that serviced 
demand (volume) cannot in practice exceed supply (capacity) since this would 
constitute a physical impossibility. Furthermore, although capacity represents a finite 
physical constraint, it is not a static value. Instead, it is a dynamic value with a fixed 
upper bound (maximum throughput) and that varies with respect to the arrival rate. 
As the arrival rate of vehicles approaches the theoretical capacity limit, capacity is 
actually lost and the amount of volume that can be processed decreases (figure 14). 
This occurs because a certain amount of maneuvering and following space 
is required by drivers, and as this space becomes inadequate traffic flow becomes 
unstable, breaks down, and can experience jammed conditions. This results in a loss 
of throughput and exponential delays.  
However, the route assignment step of the CTPS 4-step model allows V/C >1: that is 
for demand to in fact exceed supply! This occurs because ‘volume’ (V) in the model 
is not is not taken to be the actual throughput of vehicles that can pass through 
the network (which is inherently constrained by capacity), but instead the “desired 
demand” (more similar to the arrival rate) as based on the first 3 steps of the model: 
trip-generation, trip distribution, and mode choice. These values are simply forced 
through the road network, despite violating capacity constraints. Furthermore, the 
CTPS model uses a so-called ‘static assignment’ process that does not reflect how 
capacity breaks down and delays grow exponentially as volume approaches capacity. 
These exponential delays hold the possibility to create exponential changes in the 
trip distribution and mode choice steps of the model (in which travel times are key 
sensitivities), thereby offering the potential to elucidate how constrained roadway 
space can be a trigger to move traffic away from McGrath on to alternate routes (such 
as I-93 and the proposed North Point to Inner Belt bridge), shift trips out of cars and 
on to other modes such as the Green Line Extension, and trigger policy changes. But 
instead, the static assignment process allows vehicles to flow though the road network 
at volumes exceeding capacity, but at imaginary speeds (e.g. 5-10mph). (figure 38) 
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Figure 38:  Comparison of different speed-flow curves used for traffic modeling which allow forved 
traffic flow at V/C>1 and at (imaginarily) low speeds.
These curves should be contrasted with those in figure 14 that show how capacity 
drops when conditions are oversaturated. Keeping the cars moving artificially 
perpetuates the relative attractiveness of driving in the model. This problem could 
be in part corrected using dynamic traffic assignment methods (which recognize 
queue propagation between intersections) that are supported by many commercially 
available transport modeling packages.
Initial modeling of the ‘Boulevard Road Diet’ alternative for McGrath was reported 
to have a V/C ratio of 3 to 4,97 which therefore dramatically undercuts the perceived 
viability of this design by suggesting that it will not be able to handle traffic demands. 
However, the opposite is equally true: that the traffic demand will not be able to 
handle the road. The latter is a more instructive way of thinking of the model output 
since a modifying the roadway design is something that can be achieved in a relatively 
short timeframe, whereas 2035 traffic growth represents an abstract forecast that can 
not actually happen.
3.3.2 The statistical approach & Homo Automobilicus
According to CTPS, travel models are built on the basis of people’s observed 
behavior.98 However, herein lies another way that the forecasting and modeling 
practice can be implicitly driven to suggest road expansion. There are many 
technicalities in each step of the 4-step model that could be discussed at great length. 
For each step there exist differing theoretical approaches and practical methods 
to achieve results. Leaving aside the conceptual and empirical validity of these 
differences (which are beyond the scope of this thesis), all forecasting and modeling 
approaches, regardless of their rigor, share an inherent similarity in their underlying 
logic and approach. The basic premise is to describe the phenomena of interest as 
equations that capture the relationship of dependent and explanatory variables. In 
other words, the various elements of travel behavior of interest (trip generation, 
destination choice, mode choice and route choice) are all expressed as functions of 
other measurable quantities. The following are some illustrative examples:
97  Grounding McGrath Working Group Meeting #4, March 8, 2012
98  CTPS (2012)
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Trip generation rate for condominium
number of trips generated = 0.827*ln(number of dwelling units ) + 0.309
Trip distribution 
number of trips from zone i to j = k[(Pi Pj)/dij]
 
Mode choice 
Disutility of transit = 2.356 + IVTT +  Walktime + WaitTime + Xfer_Wait + Fare  
Despite the apparent differences, all of these equations share the same basic form: 
 variable of interest = ƒ(explanatory variables)
      y  = ßx1 + ßx2 + ßx3… + ßxn
‘Y’ is the variable of interest, ‘Xn’ are the explanatory variables, and ß’s are the 
coefficients that describes the strength and direction of the relationship between X’s 
and Y. For example, if a ßn is large then a small change in the variable Xn produces 
a proportionately larger change in Y than if ßn were smaller. The foundation of all 
transportation modeling is to apply statistical analysis techniques to survey data in 
order to develop statistically significant equations and estimate the ß’s. Thereon, the 
process of modeling outcomes for different scenarios is conceptually no more than 
inputting different explanatory variable values into the equations (e.g. a shorter wait 
time for the bus or a larger number of dwelling units). 
The 2035 no-build scenario for the Grounding McGrath study was developed 
primarily by modifying the quantity of and spatial arrangement of land uses being 
inputted into the trip-generation step of the model. The distribution of trips, 
mode choices modeled, and assignment of traffic to the network are outputs. The 
fundamental shortcoming of approach is that it assumes that the relationships 
between explanatory and dependent variables are absolute (that ßs are constant) 
rather than contingent on broader conditions and varied through time. This 
modeling and forecasting approach based on using current behavioral relationships 
(as defined by statistical analysis) fails in entirety to recognize that infrastructure 
changes can result not only in changes to behavioral outcomes, but changes in the 
nature of the decision-making process itself. Explicitly considering these second-
order effects of infrastructure on changing the nature of behavioral responses is key to 
elucidating the transformative potential of infrastructure reconceptualization. Failing 
to do so categorically ignores an important pathway to path-breaking change. (figure 
39) Even more fundamental, volume approaching the limits of capacity creates 
unstable disequilibria that demonstrate that existing behaviors can no longer be 
supported. 
Existing behavioral relationships between transportation demand characteristics (e.g. 
trip generation, destination choice, mode choice, and route choice) and explanatory 
variables (such as the disutility of travel time and travel cost) are imbedded in the 
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realties of the existing decision making context. The (in)sensitivity of the mode 
choice decision is indicative of a landscape which often lacks reasonable or desirable 
alternatives to the automobile, and a political establishment which for decades has 
continued to justify construction projects based on the flawed logic of building 
your way out of congestion and proposing expanded road capacity in an effort 
(albeit unsuccessful) to abate growing travel delays. In chapter 1.2 the discussion 
demonstrated how this structuring of transportation supply and urban form around 
the automobile have worked to fuel induced travel demand and create lock-in to 
the car. These demand responses were modeled as movement to new demand curves 
(higher and steeper), which in turn, represent supply and demand relationships that 
are defined by changing ß’s.
The Tragedy of the Commons described by Hardin (1968), in which every human 
is “locked into a system” has been criticized for naturalizing homo economicus: a 
competitive, capitalist social order in which individuals and society are incapable 
of social learning and co-operation. In a similar vein, the tragedy of expanding the 
concrete commons (discussed in chapter 1.3) is perpetuated by a transportation 
forecasting and modeling approach that naturalizes homo automobilicus: Americans 
who will drive, only drive, and always drive! This view disenfranchises pedestrians, 
urban residents and transit riders.
The assumption that existing behavioral responses will carry forward to future 
planning actions may be reasonable for short timescales and minor interventions. 
However, the opportunity to redesign the McGrath Highway corridor around 
different values that reduce the emphasis on automobile throughput and increase 
environmental quality for pedestrians and transit users promises an opportunity 
to reverse lock-in to the automobile and create a fundamentally different decision-
making context. A boulevard design for McGrath encourages regional auto 
traffic to use I-93 and drivers to prioritize using McGrath Boulevard only for 
local access at lower speeds. Retaining the McCarthy Overpass, which provides a 
perception of high-speed movement (even though the corridor is constrained at 
one end by the Medford St / Highland Ave intersection and at the other by the 
Lechmere intersection), invites regional traffic and causes traffic problems for all – a 
phenomenon known as Braess’s Paradox. Perhaps even more importantly, forecasting 
for 2035 ignores the dimension of time and actions along the path from now until 
then.
3.3.3 Pattern break 
“ The conclusion from Copenhagen is unequivocal: if people rather than cars 
are invited into the city, pedestrian traffic and city life increase correspondingly” 
– Jan Gehl (2010)
The notion that reconceptualizing McGrath Highway can have a transformative 
effect on behavior is far from just wishful thinking. However, the conventional 
transportation modeling process is not structured to see this potential. In a review 
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of the literature on the effects of added transportation capacity on travel, Kitamura 
(2009) notes that induced traffic is not captured in the sequential travel demand 
forecasting procedure, and that “it is not common practice” to use variables that 
represent the effect of transportation supply on trip generation. These two forces are 
the very effects that stand to be actuated by reconceptualizing McGrath Highway: 
unleashing induced and latent demand for non-automobile travel modes and altering 
trip generation and traffic growth patterns by managing supply. Empirical evidence 
suggests that behavioral responses can change substantially and rapidly in response to 
large infrastructure changes in transport supply as well as to minor tweaks. 
Zegras and Hannan (forthcoming) attempt to identify such changes between 1991 
and 2001 in the rapidly urbanizing and motorizing environment of Santiago de 
Chile. They find that elements of the built environment such as proximity to the 
expanding metro system influence vehicle ownership, but the extent of this influence 
changes over time. Preferences influencing vehicle choice have changed, and in lower 
income groups there is a decreasing tendency for vehicle ownership that is possibly 
due to improvements in public transportation. In summary, they find: “household 
preferences for vehicle ownership are dynamic over time and that they respond to the 
rapidly developing and evolving environments around them.”
In Los Angeles, a concerted social marketing campaign by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority that poked fun at car culture resulted in “a 40% increase 
in user perception of efficiency, frequency and quality of service, even though at 
that time, there were no significant changes made to these areas.” Although transit 
frequency is captured in the mode-choice step of the 4-step model, it is considered an 
objective variable as measured by travel time, rather than a variable that changes with 
perception and image. Similarly, the image of congested roadways is well understood 
by motorists in the real world, but not reflected if models allow volume to exceed 
capacity.
Compelling support of shifting behavioral responses in response to changing roadway 
characteristics also comes from research on the phenomenon of ‘traffic evaporation.’ 
Cairns et al (1998) examined over 100 cases of road-capacity reductions such as 
closures, car-free zones, and roadway demolitions. They observe a 25% average 
overall reduction in traffic along the studied corridors, and more notably that a 
proportion of traffic that had previously traveled along the corridor with now 
reduced capacity could not be found diverted on to neighboring streets. In a follow-
up study, Cairns et al (2002) find a median traffic reduction from similar projects 
of 11%, and conclude “that predictions of traffic problems are often unnecessarily 
alarmist” and “traffic reduction is a real phenomenon that occurs when road space for 
cars is reduced.”
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3.3.4 Timescale & self-selection ‘bias’
As describe earlier, a substantial amount of new development is planned along the 
McGrath Corridor from Assembly Square to Lechmere Square. Traffic impact studies 
have forecast an 18% transit mode share for the Boynton Yards redevelopment. For 
Assembly Square, the projected transit mode shares are 35-47% for residential trips, 
25% for office trips, and 5% for retail trips. These forecasts estimate large increases in 
vehicle trip generation at full build-out: the Assembly Square development alone is 
anticipated to put another 11,000 vehicle trips per day on to the McGrath Highway 
through Somerville. The anticipated addition of thousands of residents and jobs in 
these developments largely drives the 7.5%-12.5% growth in vehicle trips associated 
with the 2035 no-build scenario being used in the Grounding McGrath study.
Although such traffic could be interpreted as reason to increase (or at least maintain) 
the capacity of McGrath Highway, the exact opposite could be advisable. Without 
substantial changes to make the McGrath Highway a pedestrian friendly corridor, 
these new developments risk never occurring. Reconfiguring McGrath with a 
boulevard design that emphasized local accessibility over regional capacity is essential 
to attract the new development, but also will reduce the attractiveness of the link 
for through traffic and work to dissuade further traffic growth (before it happens) 
by establishing hard constraints on the automobile. Reducing road capacity with 
respect to existing traffic levels might contribute to increased delays, congestion, and 
reduced accessibility if there is a lack of alternatives. However, redesigning McGrath 
Highway in the near future and constraining capacity decades before anticipated 
land use development and growth occurs can work to curtail the auto-orientation 
of new travel behaviors. This is since existing travel behaviors and automobile use 
patterns are to some extent rooted in habits and bound by preexisting decisions about 
residential and job location choice as well the sunk costs of automobile ownership.99 
However, the travel patterns of future residents and workers are far more elastic and 
malleable. This notion is corroborated by two concepts. 
First, 2035 travel demand patterns will not be experienced instantaneously. Instead, 
they will form over the next 20 years. If the McGrath corridor and adjacent 
developments are truly transit-oriented, there is good reason to believe that 
travel preferences and behavioral responses will adapt to this changing landscape 
as illustrated by the empirical studies of Santiago, Los Angeles and the work of 
Cairns et al (1998 and 2002). Indeed the argument is somewhat tautological: auto-
oriented development will necessitate auto use and transit oriented development 
that has constrained automobile access and limited parking should encourage transit 
ridership. 
Second, if prospective tenants in the surrounding redevelopments are aware that auto 
access in the area is limited, but that access to the Green Line Extension is pleasant 
and plentiful, this may help attract individuals interested in walking, transit use and 
a car-free lifestyle to choose these areas. This hypothesis is supported by the work 
99  Bamberg et al, (2003); Garling and Axhausen (2003), 
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of Zhao (2009), who examined the impact of eight psychological factors including 
personality traits, environmental attitudes and car pride, on individual mode choice 
and levels of vehicle ownership in London. Findings from this research suggest that 
individual preferences have an effect on behavior similar in magnitude to the effects 
from household income and population density. For example, the proportion of the 
population who do not own a car increases substantially by 5.1 percentage points 
when individuals’ general environmental attitudes and support for government’s 
actions and taxations to protect the environment increased by one standard 
deviation. Research interested in the association between the built environment and 
travel behavior has long expressed concern about this so-called self-selection effect, 
whereby people sort themselves into built environments that are conducive to their 
preexisting values and travel preferences (Mokhtarian and Cao 2009). In this research 
self-selection bias has been described as potentially masking the “true effect” of built 
form on travel behavior. In other words, there exists uncertainty as to whether transit 
oriented developments cause higher rates of transit use all else equal, or whether 
they merely enable people who are already predisposed to use transit to do so more. 
However, in the case of Somerville this debate is academic. Redevelopments along the 
McGrath corridor need not attract a complete cross section of the entire population 
of the Boston metro region to be successful. Rather, they need only attract a sufficient 
number of residents and business tenants interested in this form of low-car living 
to be economically viable for development. As such, self-selection bias is not the 
problem as usually portrayed in the literature, but rather a phenomenon that could 
be harnessed as an opportunity in the McGrath corridor. 
Much closer evidence of these phenomena in support of the potentials of auto-
constrained development comes from the neighboring Kendall Square in Cambridge. 
Kendall is booming economically and home to a cluster of research and innovation 
that is of global significance. Over the last fifteen years approximately 4 million 
square feet of development has been added in the Kendall neighborhood without 
any significant expansion of road capacity. At the same time, mode shares for non-
auto choices have increased from 1990 to 2000. Among those working in Kendall 
and living in Cambridge, the non-automobile mode share for the journey to work in 
2000 was 76% (47% walk and bike) versus only 44% for all employees irrespective 
of household location. (figure 40) This demonstrates the potential of live-work 
proximity on automobile use. Over the last past fifteen years as Kendall has grown 
average daily traffic (ADT) on the main corridors leading into the area has remained 
fairly stable and even shows a potential trend of net decrease. (figure 41) Traffic in 
the auto system has not grown with Kendall since the limits of roadway capacity had 
been reached already and conditions continue to be congested at peak times. While 
this has had undesirable impacts on bus service, it did not strangle growth.
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In understanding the ability of Kendall to grow, it is critical to emphasize that public 
transit constitutes the majority of non-automobile trips to Kendall and is the travel 
mode that has grown the most between 1990 and 2000. The growth success story 
of Kendall with constrained auto access is likely in large part due to the availability 
of transit access by the MBTA Red Line and the increased regional accessibility of 
Kendall that was achieved by extending the Red Line north to Porter Sq, Davis Sq 
and Alewife in the mid 80s and southward to Quincy in the 70s and Braintree in 
1980. Transit expansions connected Kendall via a one-seat subway ride to a diverse 
set of neighborhoods in the Boston region from which Kendall can attract a labor 
pool. The importance of transit expansion to the growth and success of Kendall is 
evidenced by the shifting of the peak load point on the northern half of the Red Line. 
Today there are more people inbound in the AM alighting at Kendall than boarding 
at Kendall and Charles/MGH combined. Outbound in the PM, more people board 
at Kendall than alight at Kendall and Charles/MGH combined.100 
Given these values from Kendall, it seems highly unnecessary to maintain the 
automobile capacity of McGrath Highway to support the future growth of Inner 
Belt / Brickbottom by an anticipated 2 million square feet of commercial space. 
Compared to Kendall in 2000, SomerVision target mode shares for Inner Belt/
Brickbottom in 2030 (50% of new trips by walk and bike and transit) seem highly 
plausible. Furthermore, the primary road capacity servicing Kendall is limited to 
the local street network (Massachusetts Ave, Broadway, Hampshire) and Memorial 
Drive, and this has not been a limiting factor on growth. A redeveloped Inner Belt / 
Brickbottom would have excellent regional automobile access to I-93 at Sullivan Sq, 
and on top would be complemented by the access from Washington St, Somerville 
Ave, and a future at-grade McGrath boulevard and Inner Belt to North Point 
boulevard bridge. The Green Line Extension will provide a significant addition to 
transit service and capacity through the area, and this will be vital and fundamental 
for Somerville in the same way as the Red Line for Kendall. These two neighborhood 
context comparisons suggest no need for the McGrath as another highway to service 
job and population growth in Inner Belt / Brickbottom.
100  Remarks by John Attanucci, May 21, 2012
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3.4 Summary & implications
“it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the 
lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for 
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm 
defenders in those who may do well under the new.” 
– Niccolò Machiavelli 
In the Grounding McGrath study process the forecast 2035 no build traffic volumes 
are essentially insensitive to the future designs possibilities for the corridor – so much 
so that completely eliminating McGrath would have little or no effect on the desire 
to use that corridor. This is since critical pathways of behavioral change in response to 
infrastructure change are systemically missing in the 4-step model.
Forecasting of the ‘no-build’ year is a misnomer since the practice of doing so is both 
conceptually and technically biased to perpetuate the business as usual approach 
of preferencing the car and providing for it. Forecasts of volume to capacity ratios 
exceeding 1 (V/C>1) create alarm over the operational (in)feasibility of traffic growth 
at levels that are fundamentally infeasible. Road capacity expansion becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy if no-build forecasts that violate existing capacity constraints are 
taken as given. The reality of capacity constraint is used selectively: on the one hand 
it undermines the perceived viability of road-diet options by imagining that V/C will 
exceed one in 2035, while on the other hand there is an underestimate of the role of 
approaching these constrained conditions in creating the very pressure necessary to 
change behavioral responses and trigger adaptation in terms of destination choice, 
mode choice and route choice decisions, and broader changes to policies and land use 
decisions.
Reconceptualizing the McGrath Highway around a vision that has a smaller emphasis 
on accommodating automobile traffic than the existing conditions is a challenging 
political proposition. By virtue of the fact that the corridor’s design is oriented 
around the car today, automobile drivers are the primary users of the corridor. As 
such, there is a strong political constituency in favor of maintaining the status quo 
and this creates substantial inertia to change. By contrast, pedestrians, transit riders, 
bicyclists and transit-oriented developers are at best a small, but vocal, constituency, 
and at worst latent stakeholders who do not yet exist because their presence has been 
excluded by (roadway) design. Providing for all of these constituencies simultaneously 
would be an ideal solution; however doing so is inherently unachievable since 
heavily auto-oriented designs are necessarily inhospitable to walking and bicycling. 
Furthermore, available space in any corridor is constrained, and so, width dedicated 
to one function, such as a sidewalk, is space necessarily unavailable for another use 
such as an additional automobile lane. Therefore, there is a Catch-22 in corridor 
planning: it is politically difficult to summon the will to allocate scarce space to 
marginalized travel modes when they represent a minority of users, but these 
travel modes will not realize their potential to grow so long as the infrastructure to 
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encourage their safe and effective use is not provided. Although it may be grandiose 
to anticipate that the transformation of a single corridor holds the possibility for 
path-breaking changes in transportation behavior, ‘the dose makes the poison.’ Any 
single corridor transformation may have a more limited effect on behavior change 
and mode shift, however analyzing the performance of each project individually as a 
series of small doses poisons the potential to see the gradual path of change that leads 
to building a strong multi-modal network. Rather than evaluating the performance of 
every project at a distant ‘no-build’ year, if a package of gradual improvements were 
modeled successively, each would benefit from the incremental changes in behavior 
in support of walking, cycling and transit use created by the previous interventions.101
Unfortunately, the misuse of modeling and forecasting as described in this chapter 
perpetuates the demand first versus infrastructure first paradox, and does not 
support such visionary thinking or incremental change. This is unfortunate since 
sophisticated models make possible a much more comprehensive understanding 
of networks and capacity constraints. Instead, the existing forecasting and 
modeling paradigm used by CTPS in the Grounding McGrath study does little 
to provide technocratic evidence that would support the political will to consider 
reconceptualizing the corridor with a smaller focus on the automobile. The process 
works to perpetuate the myth of capacity building, and provides pseudo-scientific 
results that help strengthen the arguments of constituencies that favor maintaining 
the established order of automobile-oriented transportation planning. Such misuse of 
the tools make modeling and forecasting policy-making, rather than policy analysis, 
by over-predicting traffic demand growth and pre-determining auto-oriented 
outcomes by projecting existing behaviors far into the future.
101  It is unlikely that walking, cycling and transit will completely supplant the 
automobile and the access it provides in the relatively short-term (especially considering 
the large expanse of  the metropolitan region). However, the presence of  pedestrians and 
cyclists inevitability reduce automobile throughput, and as walk and bike modes become 
more prevalent the ability to accommodate the auto in the urban in the urban street system 
declines. As such, it is directionally incorrect, and un-responsive to the dynamics of  the 
system, for the Grounding McGrath Study or CTPS models to assume growing automobile 
capacity in the future. Rather, auto capacity is likely to decline in the McGrath corridor as walk 
and bike ‘pioneers’ grow in numbers. Planning attention should be focused on responding 
to this capacity reduction by creating a more distributed street system, redirecting regional 
traffic to appropriate Interstate facilities, and also encouraging more mode shift.
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4. A perfect storm – for or against change? 
“Culture eats policy for Breakfast” 
– Jeffrey Mullan; former Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation 
As a response, in part, to the top-down nature of early road and highway projects 
national and state level environmental and planning process legislations were passed 
during the 1960s and 70s. As such, many highway structures in the country can be 
considered relics that may not have come to exist in their current configurations had 
the very environmental protections which they spurred been enacted earlier. 
Despite now being longstanding laws, the force of these legislative protections and 
reforms only become meaningful and relevant at the discrete points in time when 
infrastructure decisions are being considered. Indeed now is such a time across the 
United States as the bulk of the nation’s highways that were built with federal grants 
during the 1950s and 60s are ailing. Therefore, as this ‘grandfathered’ infrastructure 
reaches its end of life it is all the more relevant to ensure a strong application of 
planning process laws. 
However, the proclivity of governments to reinforce the status quo threatens 
to undermine the application of existing planning processes. Furthermore, 
environmental approvals processes, project evaluation methods, and the distribution 
of federal transportation funding systematically favor highway expansion over transit 
alternatives by placing a higher analytical burdens on transit projects. These dynamics 
are likely to have a strong impact on whether the political will to change course 
rather than follow the existing path can be generated.
4.1 The Highway Revolt and emergence of environmental policy
“Four years ago, I was the commissioner of the Department of Public Works: 
our road building agency… then nearly everyone was sure highways were the 
only answer to transportation problems for years to come. We were wrong.” 
– Francis Sargent; Governor of Massachusetts (Feb 11, 1970)
The anti-highway movement grew as Interstate construction spread into cities and 
tore though neighborhoods. Typical of countercultural activities of the 1960s, the 
highway revolt was a collection of individual, bottom-up, neighborhood movements 
in cities across the nation that were threatened by highways. Highway revolts rose in 
the 60s and early 70s in response to the destructive and dividing nature of freeway 
construction in cities, and because of a growing rejection of top-down decision 
making, concern about community change with out consultation, and increasing 
skepticism of technical expertise in planning and distrust of government.102 Public 
agitation against freeways led to local victories against projects across the nation. In 
addition to reaction from threatened neighborhoods, there was critical support from 
suburban and middle-class allies, and allies within government agencies and political 
leadership. 
102  Mohl (2004), 675; Weiner, 59
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Figure 42: Poster for a public rally against the proposed Inner Belt Expressway 
(adorned with the official seal of the City of Cambridge)
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The highway the revolt helped triggered a massive reversal in the political will to 
support building freeways through cities, (figure 42) and even more monumental 
the creation of landmark legislation to require a more thoughtful and responsive 
planning process. Notable policy and institutional changes that reflected a changing 
political climate began in 1962 with reforms to the Federal Highway Act. The 
Act required the state highway departments which were executing the Interstate 
plan to implement a 3 C’s process: “a cooperative, comprehensive, and continuing 
urban transportation planning process.”103 In 1966, the road-building paradigm 
was intended to be significantly reformed by the creation of the United States 
Department of Transportation; the DOT incorporated the Bureau of Public Roads 
(now Federal Highway Authority) into an agency with a mandate to administer a 
multimodal transportation system. Moreover, Section 4(f ) of the Department of 
Transportation Act that created the US DOT included a strong directive to protect 
the environment. Section 4(f ) permitted the taking of public parks, recreation areas, 
or land from an historic site for federal transport projects “(1) only if there is no 
prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or project 
includes all possible planning to minimize harm.” In legal tests of section 4(f ), 
including the landmark Overton Park v. Volpe case (1971) regarding a proposed 
section of I-40 though Overton Park in Memphis, the judiciary has set a high 
standard of compliance with 4(f ) and established a precedent that favors selecting an 
alternative that avoids harming 4(f ) resources unless such an alternative would create 
“uniquely difficult problems” or “costs or community disruption of extraordinary 
magnitude.” Section 4(f ) helped to reverse the dynamic of highway opposition 
by establishing a strong default rule that normalizes protecting 4(f ) resources, 
and placing the onus on the road building agency to prove a negative: “there is no 
prudent and feasible alternative to using that land.”104 
As public and political opinions about how highway building should be considered 
changed, small signs of reform within highway agencies began to emerge. In 
1968 an independent group of professionals was invited by the Federal Highway 
Administration to prepare a set of guidelines for the planning and design of 
urban expressways. The report, The Freeway in the City, recognizes how “the urban 
highway must not only function physically, as a path for vehicular movement; it 
must contribute to the total city environment,” and that once brought into cities by 
freeways “the thousands of parked vehicles themselves can themselves destroy the very 
area they were meant to serve.”
To further reduce the perceived inevitability of a highway project once proposed, 
in 1969 the FHWA established a two-hearing process. The first hearing was to be 
held before a route location decision was made in order to afford the public with 
the ability to comment on the need for and location of a proposed highway.105 
The second hearing was to see the actual proposed design, allowing the public to 
103  Mohl (2004), 680
104  49 USC 303
105  Weiner, 59
104
comment on specific design issues that would affect the extent of impacts and also to 
propose mitigation measures.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 created further regulatory 
checks against heady highway building, and established the basic principles of 
planning process and environmental project review still in use today. NEPA requires 
federally funded projects to analyze their impacts on the environment, and to 
communicate the information by preparing an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) that defines the purpose and need for the proposed action, documents 
existing conditions, considers alternatives to the action, enumerates impacts on the 
environment, and also contemplates measures to mitigate potential impacts. NEPA 
requires only that impacts be considered and does not have a mechanism to prevent 
projects from proceeding even if the documented environmental impacts are severe. 
Nevertheless, NEPA enforces a process that enables the public and decision makers to 
think about outcomes and impacts before actions can proceed, and the findings of an 
EIS may demonstrate that certain projects are politically unacceptable in light of the 
anticipated outcomes. More importantly, the process creates a procedural mechanism 
that challenges the mentality that highway expansion is inevitable, by requiring 
alternatives to be considered and also that the very need and purpose of a proposed 
action be articulated. However, NEPA leaves the highway agency as the administrator 
of the assessment process and the ultimate decision maker on whether or not to 
proceed with a proposed action.
In parallel, the reversal of political support to push highways through neighborhoods 
was quite swift. In 1961, the governor of Massachusetts, John Volpe, announced 
plans to extend the Massachusetts Turnpike twelve miles through Boston’s dense 
fabric up to the Prudential Center.106 In January 1969, just seven days after being 
appointed U.S. secretary of transportation, Volpe retracted the approval of the US 
Department of Transportation for a section of contested Interstate freeway through 
the Vieux Carré of New Orleans because it had not been adequately considered as 
required by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and his administration 
also cancelled I-5 through Seattle in July 1969.107
In Boston, the efforts of anti-highway citizen groups, supported by Mayor Kevin 
White and his transportation advisor, Fred Salvucci, led to the declaration of a 
moratorium on highway construction in 1970: Governor Francis Sargent halted 
work on all freeway projects (except I-93 through Somerville) occurring inside 
the boundary of Boston’s Route 128 circumferential highway. In tandem with the 
moratorium Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation, Alan Altshuler, convened 
the Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) to reevaluate the region’s 
transportation plans. The BTPR marked a significant expansion from the FHWA 
“3C’s” and “two-hearing processes.” The BTPR involved professionals, citizens, 
interest groups, and decision-makers extensively throughout the entire review 
106  Lewis (1997), 198
107  Lewis (1997), 208-9
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process. Public transit was evaluated on an equal footing with highways. The study 
used a wide set of evaluation criteria to account for social and environmental factors 
in addition to traditional transportation performance metrics. 108 As mentioned in 
chapter 3.3.1, the BTPR was premised around very different values and assumptions 
than those advanced by the Department of Public Works. In particular, the review 
recognized that decisions about the future direction of the transport system were 
not a purely technical exercise, but rather that “travel demand must be influenced 
by public policy – not accepted as an imperative.” (figure 37) It was designed to 
implement the just enacted NEPA rules and funded with federal funds. To this end, 
and perhaps the most important feature of the BTPR, the review was organized 
and run out of the executive branch of government and not by the highway or 
transportation department. Indeed, if highway building to date was culture eating 
policy for breakfast, the BTPR was the moment that policy ate culture for lunch and 
dinner.
Political pressure against the federal Interstate mandate continued. By the mid 1970s 
an effort supported by Governor Sargent, Representative Tip O’Neill, and Secretary 
of Transportation John Volpe (as well as other representatives on Capitol Hill and 
other governors and city mayors across the nation) succeeded in convincing Congress 
and President Richard Nixon to relax the inflexibility of Interstate funding promises. 
Money from the Highway Trust Fund, which was collected from federal gasoline 
taxes was reserved exclusively for highway building. Under the change, cities could 
now ‘trade-in’ their Interstate highway for an equivalent amount of money (though 
not from the Highway Trust Fund) to pursue a public transit alternative. Based on 
the results of the BTPR, this flexibility in highway funding was used in Boston to 
relocate and rebuild the Orange Line subway into a corridor that was cleared for a 
proposed (but defeated) Southwest Expressway, to extend the Red Line subway to 
Alewife in the north and Braintree in the south, as well as to renew equipment and 
rolling stock through the MBTA system.
In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act further reinforced 
the multimodal flexibility to use many categories of federal funds for transit as well 
as highways, put more stress on proper maintenance, and strengthened the role 
of the Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) vis a vis the state highway 
departments.
More recently, concern about global climate change has triggered another motivation 
to reconsider automobile oriented transportation planning. In Massachusetts, the 
transportation sector generates more than one-third of the state’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions. As a response, in 2010 MassDOT launched its GreenDOT initiative to 
achieve three primary goals: reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; promote the 
healthy transportation options of walking, bicycling, and public transit; and, support 
smart growth development. GreenDOT targets to reduce transportation sector GHG 
108  Gakenheimer (1976)
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emissions 7.3 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, by “balancing highway system 
expansion projects with other projects that support smart growth development and 
promote public transit, walking and bicycling.”109
4.2 Crisis and process failure – Accelerated Bridge Program and 
McGrath Highway 
Due to decades of neglect, more than 500 bridges in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts are classified as structurally deficient. In August 2008, the Patrick-
Murray administration passed legislation to enable a $3 billion Massachusetts 
Accelerated Bridge Program (ABP) in response to the fatal I-35 bridge collapse in 
Minnesota. More than 200 bridges are planned to be replaced or repaired over the 
course of the eight-year program. The goals of the ABP are to:
• reduce the number of structurally deficient bridges in Massachusetts by 1) 
removing current bridges from the structurally deficient list, and 2) preventing 
additional bridges from being classified structurally deficient; 
• create thousands of construction-related jobs and maintain the critical 
infrastructure necessary for the long-term economic growth of the 
Commonwealth; and,
• generate significant cost savings by accelerating projects now, thereby avoiding 
construction cost inflation and cost increases due to deterioration caused by 
deferred maintenance.
As part of the ABP legislation Accelerated Bridge Program work is exempted from 
the environmental review and planning process requirements of the Massachusetts 
Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) so long as “the design is substantially 
the functional equivalent of, and in similar alignment to, the structure to be 
reconstructed or replaced.” 110 MEPA would otherwise require MassDOT to engage 
in formal public process to prepare an environmental impact report that would 
consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed project and their environmental 
consequences. 
With the exemption from MEPA given to the ABP, MassDOT has been granted 
a level of power and discretion in project definition and execution not held by 
transportation agencies since the early days of the Interstate era. This is a very 
troubling aspect of the ABP legislation since the very structures that helped catalyze 
the change in political will and enact planning process legislation are now being 
given a free pass from the scrutiny of this legislation as their lifespan expires. This 
normalizes the continued existence of these structures as the null-hypothesis or ‘do 
nothing’ scenario. However, there is serious doubt as to whether many highway 
structures through cities were ever reasonable propositions. 
109  MassDOT (2012)
110  The specific exemption is from sections 61 to 62I, of  chapter 30 of  the 
Massachusetts General Laws
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The proclivity of governments to respond swiftly to perceived crisis situations 
threatens to systematically circumvent engaging in a serious planning process, and 
by doing so, to undermine a momentous opportunity to reconsider the need and 
purpose of aging highway infrastructure and to engage public participation that was 
not possible when many of the relics of the highway building era were built by the 
heavy handed methods of the 1950s urban renewal mentality. Although the need to 
rapidly improve bridges in poor structural condition is a compelling public policy 
objective, this end of life stage is also the very time that infrastructure investments 
are made and when such process legislation is triggered. Special exemption from 
legislation like MEPA is almost tantamount to striking these laws completely from 
the books, and fundamentally undercutting the commitment to thoughtful planning 
process. 
4.2.1 Troublesome timelines
‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here’ asked Alice. 
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t 
much care where--’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said 
the Cat. 
– Lewis Carroll (1865)
In the absence of a formal planning and evaluation process, the way that ABP 
projects are being scoped and phased has become quite troubling. As required by 
the enabling legislation, the Structurally Deficient Bridge Improvement Program 
Coordination and Oversight Council submitted its initial Bridge Preservation and 
Repair Plan for Calendar Years 2009 to 2011. The bridge list was developed using “a 
combination of data analysis and professional judgment.” The selection of projects 
resulted in a mix of replacement, rehabilitation and preservation, with individual 
projects prioritized for repair based upon: “the seriousness of the structural problem, 
the structure’s regional and local importance, geographic equity and cost and 
budgetary considerations… [and] each project’s relative level of difficulty, since one 
of the overarching requirements of the Program is that all projects be completed 
within eight years.” In this plan the McCarthy Viaduct was identified as “functionally 
obsolete,” meaning that it was not assessed as “structurally deficient,” but “included 
in the Program because cost effective preservation work is being undertaken in order 
to keep them from declining into structural deficiency.”111 Despite “transparency and 
accountability” being one of the program’s stated goals, the ABP has not provided 
any mechanism for formal public involvement or consultation either in identifying 
the selected ABP projects, in deliberating the scope of proposed maintenance, repair 
or rehabilitation actions, or in prioritizing projects and sequencing construction. 
Instead, these decisions have been made by the MassDOT bureaucracy and simply 
communicated to the public through update reports and construction notices. 
111  Commonwealth of  Massachusetts (2008)
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Based on these reports, the following sequence of decisions about the McCarthy 
Viaduct has been assembled. In the December 2010 ABP update report, MassDOT 
showed a timeline with work on McCarthy Viaduct going out for bid in August 
2013 and construction starting in early 2014. The work estimate for the McCarthy 
Viaduct in this plan was $22 million. In the spring of 2011, the MassDOT Office 
of Transportation planning initiated the Grounding McGrath study, a study whose 
very title substantiates that there is a serious doubt about the necessity and utility 
of the existing McCarthy Viaduct. The Grounding Study was scheduled to release 
a package of short, medium, and long-term recommendations for the future of 
the McGrath corridor by summer 2012, which would be well before August 2013 
when any possible repair work on the McCarthy Viaduct would be put out for bid. 
With this sequence, the ABP could be used to repair, remodel or even remove the 
McCarthy Viaduct in a manner consistent with the findings of the Grounding Study. 
Moreover, the loss of 50% of capacity on McGrath Highway in 2014 when the 
necessary Gilman St bridge reconstruction is scheduled is the sensible time to carry 
out disruptive reconstruction of any kind on the McCarthy Overpass. 
However, this logic of study, followed by decision, and then action has been 
completely upset by the discretionary scheduling of ABP projects. In the March 2011 
ABP update report the construction budget for the McCarthy project is reduced 
to $10 M from $22M. This is ostensibly as a response to a reduced scope of work, 
however, reasoning for the change is not explicitly specified in the report. In the 
September 2011 ABP update report, issued when the Grounding Study was well 
underway, a revised timeline is shown. In this schedule, the $10 M scope of work for 
McCarthy goes out to bid in fall 2011 (instead of summer 2013) and construction is 
scheduled to start in early 2012 before the scheduled release of the Grounding Study’s 
recommendations. Absurdly, this would have the effect of spending public money to 
lock-in the admittedly functionally deficient situation.
In its update reports, MassDOT does not provide any compelling reason or present 
any new structural assessments to the public to demonstrate why the start of repairs 
on McCarthy should be moved up by two entire years from spring 2014 to 2012. 
There is only a cursory connection offered in the September 2011 ABP report 
between scope and timeline. As reason for the February 2012 bid date the report 
cities: “project re-scoped as a repair contract while the ‘De-elevation’ study is being 
performed.” However, the logic of the September 2011 report is obscure, and it does 
not follow that re-scoping the work from $22 M to $10 M should demand a fast-
tracked timeline. In fact, reducing the scope of work should enable pushing back the 
timeline (or at least maintaining the original timeline) since there is a smaller amount 
of work to design and execute by the program’s 2016 end date. Regardless, even if 
the change of scope and timeline are indeed somehow related on technical merits, 
then MassDOT should have then indicated the change in timeline in the March 
2011 ABP update when the reduction in scope from $22 M to $10 M was first 
communicated to the public (instead of six months later in September 2011). 
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Lacking a communication mechanism of its own, the ABP has used the Grounding 
McGrath Study as a medium to share information about the McCarthy repairs and 
to respond to public outrage about the modified repair timeline. MassDOT ABP 
representatives define the scope of repairs to the McCarthy Viaduct variously as: 
“short term solution (approx.10 years) – not a long term rehabilitation plan” with the 
goal to “maintain existing level of service, while minimizing impacts to surrounding 
area, for the duration of Grounding McGrath Study.”112 In another public meeting, 
the rationale given for undertaking repair work is to “restore the viaduct and keep it 
in good repair for approximately ten years, the expected time that would be required 
to implement any long-term recommendations.”
These rationales and stated purposes are extremely weak and it is difficult to accept 
them as good faith actions by an agency that is actually committed to transparency, 
accountability and an open public process to debate the future of the McGrath 
corridor. By injecting millions of dollars into the existing elevated to provide ten 
years of life-support, MassDOT is making a de facto policy decision about the 
future of the McGrath corridor that completely undercuts it own ongoing public 
engagement process through the Grounding Study. The Grounding Study can reach 
one of three general recommendations about the path forward: 
• to fix/replace the existing viaduct more or less in its current design; 
• to maintain an elevated portion but with significant modification in design; 
or,
• to tear-down the McCarthy Viaduct and reconceptualize the corridor with an 
at-grade design.
Although the exact future of McGrath is yet to be determined, at least two of the 
three possible outcomes involve demolishing part of or the entire McCarthy Viaduct. 
Partial demolition of the viaduct, such as the elimination of certain on- and off-
ramps to improve safety and usability could be implemented within far fewer years 
than ten. As such, it would be prudent to defer investing any money toward the 
repair of the McCarthy Viaduct as long as possible. The ABP has the laudable goal 
of trying to correct for decades of neglect and deferred maintenance, and also to be 
forward-thinking by making repairs to the McCarthy now that would forestall the 
need for much more costly repairs in the future should the structure fall into more 
severe disrepair. However, the costs of not acting now must be weighed against the 
very real opportunity that the goal of reducing the number of structurally deficient 
bridges can be achieved simply by tearing-down the McCarthy Viaduct so that there 
is no bridge to maintain at all. This very approach was selected in spring 2012 for 
another similar ABP project: the Casey Overpass in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood 
of Boston. 
In the case of Casey, MassDOT initiated in March 2011 a process to study 
alternatives to replace the overpass and established a Working Advisory Group 
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(WAG) to support this work. By March 2012, MassDOT selected an at-grade 
alternative for the Casey Overpass that will use ABP funds to demolish the existing 
elevated structure and replace it with an at-grade boulevard. It is difficult to 
understand the reasons behind the completely different attitude and approach that 
MassDOT has demonstrated on the Casey overpass versus the McCarthy Viaduct. 
However, one notable difference is in the way the state has framed the existing 
condition of the two structures. In the case of McCarthy, repair work is being 
conducted to prevent the structure from deteriorating into a deficient condition. On 
Casey, MassDOT has asserted that the structure has already “deteriorated to a point 
where it can no longer be maintained…and is at the end of its serviceable life.”113 
Yet herein lies the irony of programs such as the ABP. In her work examining the 
factors contributing to successful and unsuccessful urban highway tear-down projects 
in the United States, Napolitan (2007) identifies several preconditions for success, 
including:
“(1) the condition of the freeway must be such that there is concern over its integrity 
and structural safety, (2) a window of opportunity exists; the window may be the 
precondition itself or another event that enables a freeway removal alternative to gain 
serious consideration and legitimacy”
Decades of neglect have created such concerns over the integrity of McCarthy 
Viaduct and open the necessary window of opportunity to reconsider its future; this 
opportunity has been recognized through the initiation of the Grounding Study. 
However, with construction scheduling left to the discretion of those in MassDOT 
administering the ABP, the agency is rushing to lock-in multi-million dollar contact 
commitments that will eliminate this window of opportunity. 
The lack of coordination between the timeline of ABP repairs on the McCarthy 
Viaduct and the issuing of recommendations by the Grounding Study is a sign of 
a major institutional failure within MassDOT. But this behavior is also a product 
of bad incentives in an agency operating in silos. MassDOT was created in 2009 to 
streamline and merge many legacy agencies (such as The Massachusetts Highway 
Department, Executive Office of Transportation and Public Works and Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority) into a single body. Despite these reforms, the Highway 
Division within the new MassDOT is implementing the ABP while the Office of 
Transportation Planning is coordinating the Grounding Study. Although both bodies 
are part of the same overarching agency, and therefore ostensibly share the same 
overarching goals, each is in charge of implementing more specific mandates. In the 
case of the Highway Division the ABP has created a strong mandate, supported by a 
special act of the legislature, to repair bridges. The ABP legislation gives the Highway 
Division a $3 billion check that expires in 2016 for the purpose of fixing and 
building bridges. The structure of this legislative earmark does not necessarily create 
incentives for good planning by the Highway Division – instead the motivation is to 
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deliver projects and spend money as quickly as possible lest any remaining balance 
be clawed back in 2016. Therefore, it would not be particularly counterintuitive to 
the MassDOT Highway Division to spend $10 on a McCarthy Viaduct that may 
not be necessary (or desired) in the Somerville community, since by doing so they are 
satisfying their institutional mandate. Indeed, construction progress on several big 
ticket ABP projects such as the Longfellow Bridge over the Charles River has been 
held up by lengthy environmental assessment processes triggered at the federal level, 
likely creating pressure within the Highway Division to deliver other projects more 
quickly. This may seem like a rather cynical interpretation of the agency behavior, 
however, it is consistent with the goals of the ABP to rapidly finish projects, create 
jobs, and spend money rapidly. Leveraging the ABP as an opportunity to improve 
or reconceptualize the functioning of the State’s transportation system has not been 
found anywhere stated explicitly as a program goal or implementation objective 
of MassDOT. Furthermore, this proclivity of highway departments to focus on 
spending the money is a chronic problem. During the height of the highway revolt 
in Boston, Governor Sargent’s task force in 1970 reported: “the interstate highways 
within Route 128 will be built as planned, it appears, not because they are the best 
public investment – or even the best highway investment – for the money. They will 
be built solely because they involve ten cent dollars from the state standpoint.”114 
There is widespread agreement that the McCarthy Viaduct is in bad structural 
condition. However, the current scoping of even the scaled-back $10 million repair 
proposal has an arbitrarily narrow definition of deficiency that further suggests an 
institutional bias in the implementing agency. The deficiency of the McCarthy 
Viaduct encompasses more than the mere physical state of the concrete and steel in 
the bridge. The current deficiencies extend just as much to its functional (in)ability to 
safely accommodate even the basic demands of city street traffic, pedestrians, cyclists 
and ADA users. These are not ‘side-effects’ of the bridge, but instead structural 
consequences of the design of the bridge, its ramps and approaches, the intersections 
it crosses, and the streets it cuts off. Though it could be argued that the concrete 
and steel concerns are ‘structural’ deficiencies and the local access, pedestrian and 
bicycle shortcomings are ‘functional’ deficiencies, all structural deficiencies can 
only be defined with respect to a functional group of users. For example, if traffic 
on the viaduct were hypothetically restricted to pedestrians only (if, for example, 
the Viaduct were turned into a park like the High Line in New York City) there 
would not be anything deficient about the structure as it stands today. Instead, 
concern over the current load-bearing capacity today arises due to truck traffic that 
passes on the viaduct. Therefore, if it is legitimate to deem the structure deficient 
because of concern about its inability to carry trucks (which constitute only 4% of 
the traffic volume), it is just as legitimate to include the other modes that are not 
being supported by the structure in the scope of ABP repairs. This interpretation is 
consistent with the ABP legislation which specifies establishing funds “to provide 
for an accelerated structurally deficient bridge improvement program…for the 
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design, construction, reconstruction and repair of or improvements to bridges and 
approaches.” Furthermore, MassDOT is choosing not to adopt the full breath of 
the ABP earmark, which specifies “bridges and approaches,” by proposing a scope 
of work to repair the McCarthy Viaduct that only considers the elevated structure 
and not also the surface roads and approaches. It is completely inexcusable for 
MassDOT to consider spending $10 million primarily to enable trucks to continue 
using the McCarthy Viaduct (who have I-93 as a possible alternative too), while 
completely ignoring users who have been structurally excluded for decades. Doing 
so is an ugly and unnecessary trade-off between taking proactive action to avert 
future decline into structural deficiency, and forgoing even basic reactive action 
to address current failures for non-vehicular users. MassDOT is choosing to take 
the narrowest interpretation of the ABP mandate possible, a decision driven by an 
institutional culture of road building and a repair program that incentivizes this 
illogical behavior. Furthermore, MassDOT’s own assessment is that the McCarthy 
Viaduct is “functionally obsolete.” However, the proposed scope of repair work is 
poised to re-invest in the most outdated and dangerous design features of the existing 
structure: the obscure and dangerous northbound tunnel movement; the lack of 
protected pedestrian crossing across northbound McGrath at Somerville Ave; and, 
the dangerous and confusing weaving between the Somerville Ave down-ramp and 
the southbound frontage road.
Despite the formal exemption from MEPA, it is clearly unacceptable behavior for 
MassDOT to use the structurally deficient condition of McCarthy Viaduct to rush 
through a civil engineering patch job that would fundamentally undermine the 
saliency of proper public debate about whether or not the overpass should exist in the 
future. 
 
4.3 Death by 1000 cuts – Green Line Extension and Grounding 
McGrath
Realizing the potential for large parts of Somerville to revitalize and re-develop 
around the vision of walkable neighborhoods and transit-oriented land use requires 
both grounding the McGrath Highway and completing the Green Line Extension. 
The highway revolt and environmental movement of the 60s created landmark 
legislation to require a more thoughtful and comprehensive planning process 
and funding flexibility to support transit. However, with the automobile and the 
infrastructure to support it established as the status quo, planning processes and 
infrastructure funding programs are working to create anti-environmental outcomes 
that hinder the development of transit alternatives and transit-oriented land use 
necessary to reduce auto dependence. In particular, this section discusses the impact 
of systemic distortions in how the benefits and costs of auto-oriented projects 
compared to public transit are measured and considered.
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4.3.1 Benefits, costs and decision-making
In their article on cognitive barriers to environmental action Shu and Bazerman 
(2010) discuss decision-making biases at the individual level that lead people 
to systematic and predicable errors. Some of these same biases can be used as a 
framework to understand the behavioral economics of political decision-making 
about infrastructure. Two biases in particular are very relevant to this discussion: 
discounting the future and loss aversion. Despite outwardly stated positions about 
wanting to leave the world in a good condition for future generations, or even to 
improve it, implicitly people and organizations heavily discount the value of future 
benefits and use an extremely high discounting rate that creates an overweighting of 
short-term considerations. 115 As applied to political decision-making this tendency 
could translate to a fixation on the short-term benefits and costs of infrastructure 
implementation. A second relevant behavioral trait, and one of the most robust 
contributions of behavioral economics, is that “losses loom larger than gains.” 116 This 
loss aversion results because individuals anticipate and experience the pain of a loss to 
be larger than the pleasure of an equal-sized gain. Shu and Bazerman (2010) suggest 
the important policy significance of these two behavioral biases. Loss aversion creates 
a tendency to perceive any deviation from the status quo as an “aversive loss.” This, 
together with the over-discounting of future benefits, creates an unlikely climate for 
the success of policies that need to upset the status quo to deliver significant benefits.
4.3.2 Cost-benefit jujitsu 
The tendencies of loss aversion (the focus on costs rather than benefits) and of 
discounting future benefits help explain the history of road and highway building in 
the United States. In fact, many public policies for automobile infrastructure have 
been implicitly formulated to take advantage of these biases. During the 1930s, the 
deficit spending concept of WPA projects enabled government to build infrastructure 
without doing the ‘cost’ side of the benefit-cost consideration. Benefits were delivered 
rapidly, whereas the imageability of costs was postponed. The dedication of gasoline 
sales taxes exclusively to finance road construction also creates a dynamic that avoids 
the cost side of the road building calculus. Taxes that are inevitably collected at the 
pump become the cost in the motorists mind, whereas infrastructure expansion is 
the resultant benefit. Under this user pays myth, the other costs of road building to 
society may be skirted, since there may be a perception that the facility has already 
been paid for through dedicated taxes. Although such reasoning is non-Pareto 
efficient, Rose (1990) notes that by the late 1930s state road engineers were of this 
mindset: “because roads were financed from user taxes, or so went this reasoning, 
they had to produce benefits for them. Motorists’ costs, either for vehicular wear 
and tear or time lost traveling in an older route, appeared the best measure of the 
value of a new road.” The structure of Interstate highway transportation funding 
programs, which offered state DOTs 90 cents for every dollar spent building the 
Interstate network, was another great strategy taking advantage of the tendency to 
implicitly discount the future and the non-pareto, non-compensation of negative 
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impacts. For the states, financial costs became benefits as they could leverage nine 
times more short-term benefits from construction activity and medium-term 
benefits of enhanced auto-mobility. As freeway construction moved into urban 
areas, the cost-benefit dynamic was again distorted in favor of the automobile. In 
the 1950s ideology which perceived the inner city as blighted, the short-term costs 
of neighborhood destruction were portrayed as benefits, absorbed and absolved by 
urban renewal and improved mobility.
However, with the creation of planning process requirements and project 
environmental review, the cost-benefit landscape began to tip away from mindless 
road expansion. NEPA requirements helped move toward a full disclosure of 
costs and benefits where the costs are short-term and the benefits are distant and 
fuzzy, therefore, helping the no-build scenario to win politically. The success of 
community-based highway revolts also has an explanation in the perceptions of 
costs and benefits. Groups were initially fighting highways for reasons that had little 
to do with transportation. Rather, they organized around a loss aversion sentiment 
and concern about how proposed road projects threatened some important values 
that highway bureaucrats overlooked, downgraded or did not share. For example, 
a plan to cut down dozens of mature trees in Cambridge to widen Memorial Drive 
brought out strong protests and the plan was ultimately stopped. Across the river, 
citizens in Boston fought fiercely to have the Inner Belt through the Fens buried 
because of visual impacts on the Museum of Fine Arts and other revered cultural and 
educational institutions. 117
In the renewed focus on transit investment that emerged from the Highway Revolt, 
the ability to generate significant construction spending stimulus on transit was a key 
element in securing political support including the support of construction and labor 
interests who would also be primary beneficiaries of a transit-oriented plan.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of internal and informal MassDOT cost and benefit 
perception do not seem to align in favor of grounding McGrath or achieving the 
timely extension of the Green Line. Grounding McGrath holds a larger potential to 
free the surrounding area of its infrastructural legacy and to enable a significant area 
in Somerville to revitalize as walkable and transit-oriented places. However, these are 
the promise of future benefits, and they are likely to be discounted heavily or not 
considered at all by MassDOT. Unlike in the Highway Revolt where citizens rallied 
around saving existing neighborhood assets, the area around McGrath has been 
badly affected by the disamenity value of the elevated McCarthy Viaduct. As such, 
keeping the elevated up is a more of a non-decision that maintains the status quo 
and that has few present-day costs (but many latent opportunity costs). Furthermore, 
the discussion in chapter 3 demonstrates that transportation modeling as practiced 
does little to help (and in fact hinders) the perceived attainability of a more transit-
oriented and walkable future. Therefore, there is likely a substantial discounting of 
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the benefits of this potential to transform Somerville. Even worse, the modeling and 
forecasting process perpetuates the imaginary benefits of auto-oriented infrastructure 
decisions by violating capacity constraints and promising mobility gains and travel 
time savings in the short- and medium-terms that are fundamentally unachievable.
4.3.3 Do-nothing?
The cognitive and political evaluation of costs and benefits discussed above suggests 
that there is a strong permanence of infrastructure once it is built and established. 
This inertia is further compounded and institutionalized by NEPA and similar 
state-level environmental assessment process such as MEPA. The Environmental 
Assessment (EA) and Environmental and Impact Statement (EIS) prepared under 
NEPA and Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared under MEPA examine 
impacts of a proposed action on the environment in comparison to the existing 
conditions and the benchmark of a so-called ‘do nothing’ / ‘no-build’ scenario.
The reconceptualization potential of America’s ailing infrastructure lies in the 
structurally deficient condition of facilities. Structural deficiency implies an 
unacceptable condition if nothing is done (e.g. safety risk or even bridge collapse), 
and this forthcoming scenario initiates interest in infrastructure investment, which 
in turn triggers NEPA and NEPA-type processes. However, with ailing infrastructure 
that exists today but whose future is in question, NEPA is enabling highway agencies 
to perpetuate the status quo by defining the no-action scenario as undertaking 
maintenance and repair to maintain the existing condition: the condition that a 
bridge or facility exists. However, defining the existing condition based on a simple 
binary physical condition (that a facility does or does not exist) rather than in terms 
of the policy condition (that some decision is now required) does not provide a fair 
counterfactual. The do nothing alternative should entail exactly that: doing nothing. 
This would provide a meaningful counterfactual that would allow a complete range 
of outcomes to be considered in an environmental review, from facility closure (due 
to inadequate structural condition) to repair, rehabilitation, or replacement.
The EIS on the Goethals Bridge between Staten Island and New Jersey exemplifies 
this interpretation of existing conditions with a default to accepting the continued 
existence of the highway landscape: “given continued and increasing repair and 
maintenance needs and related questions of structural integrity associated with 
the 82-year-old bridge, this preliminary alternative [no-action alternative] would 
include future rehabilitation activities in addition to routine maintenance in order 
to maintain this critical crossing in the interstate highway network.” 118 Defined 
and interpreted this way, the NEPA process institutionalizes and legitimizes 
the persistence of existing infrastructure for decades into the future even when 
a significant departure from no action is required to achieve this outcome (i.e. 
considerable maintenance and rehabilitation that should be subject to environmental 
review). (figure 43) 
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Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the structurally deficient condition of 
infrastructure has largely been self-inflicted by decades of highway agencies actually 
doing nothing and failing to undertake maintenance.
In comparison to the free pass that existing highway infrastructure gets from 
meaningful deliberation over whether or not its existence should continue, transit 
projects such as the Green Line Extension that are meant to be environmentally 
benign or even beneficial are heavily burdened and delayed by significant scrutiny. 
Ironically, in the case of the Green Line Extension instating transit service actually a 
represents a return back to a prior existing condition, reversing the discontinuation 
of rail service in Somerville that was never subject to environmental review; the 
proposed GLX right of way occupies the corridor of the former Boston and 
Lowell Railroad and GLX stops at Gilman Square, Lowell St, Ball Square, and 
College Avenue are near the historic stops at Prospect Hill, Winter Hill, Somerville 
Junction and North Somerville.119 However, reinstating this service with the GLX is 
considered a departure from no-action and today’s existing condition, and a lengthy 
and counterproductive environmental process has plagued its progress. This process is 
discussed in the section below.
4.3.4 Comprehensiveness bias
In 1993, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts made a legal commitment to the 
Green Line Extension in its State Implementation Plan (SIP) to attain air quality 
standards of the Clean Air Act. Extending the Green Line from Lechmere to Medford 
Hillside was a measure to ensure that air emissions and congestion relief benefits 
from the Central Artery / Tunnel project (the ‘Big Dig’) are realized. Despite the 
1993 commitment to commence service to Medford Hillside by 2011, meaningful 
progress on pursuing the extension lagged behind schedule and the Conservation 
Law Foundation (CLF) and other parties filled a lawsuit against the State to try and 
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Figure 43: Comparison of the cycle of growth and obsolesence in land use versus permanence in 
transportation infrastructure.
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keep the project moving. As a result of the CLF court challenge in 2006, the State 
made a commitment in the 2007 SIP to have the Extension open and operating by 
Dec 2014. In 2010, further slippage to 2015 was announced, and in summer 2011 
MassDOT announced that it would not be able to complete the project by 2018 at 
the earliest and most likely only by 2020. 
Since the 1962 reforms to the Federal Highway Act to create a “3 C’s process,” there 
has been a clear directive for highway planning to be “comprehensive.” However, as 
discussed in chapter 1.3, public expenditure on road building is just the tip of the 
iceberg since a large share of the cost and investment to make the highway system 
function is externalized on to other parties. Notwithstanding the federal regulation 
requiring plans to be comprehensive, environmental processes for highway and road 
building simply assume that sufficient street capacity and parking would be provided 
to accommodate forecast traffic volumes, absent any physical plan, financial plan, or 
political support for such changes and investments. Indeed, this was an important 
critique in the Boston Transportation Planning Review, which in January 1970 
expressed to Governor Sargent: “the entire viability of the Expressway plan for the 
regional core depends on certain key assumptions about the local street capacity in 
the vicinity of interchanges. Some of these assumptions appeared quite weak: the 
South End bypass is scheduled to absorb half of the peak hour traffic coming off 
the Southwest Expressway. The bypass is a local project, which the city at present 
does not expect to be implemented. All observers, including those at the DPW, 
agree that the Expressway cannot work without the bypass.”120 However, this level 
of comprehensiveness was unique to the BTPR, as even the currently ongoing 
Grounding McGrath study fails to be comprehensive by considering roadway 
capacity constraints within the corridor of study.
In contrast, building public transit triggers a system investment that is inherently 
comprehensive given the need to provided not only the right of way, but also 
the vehicles, stations, and operation and maintenance support that make the 
system functional. Yet, in a perverse manner this attention to the comprehensive 
requirements of a transit system has led to an environmental review process for the 
Green Line Extension that is forced to consider a specter of action, alternatives, and 
impacts drastically greater in scope. As such, much of the schedule slippage on the 
GLX timeline has been self-inflicted by the State and Federal environmental process 
working in an anti-environmental way. 
In October 2006, the Executive Office of Transportation (EOT) submitted an 
Expanded Environmental Notification Form (EENF) on the GLX as required by 
MEPA to be review by the Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs. At this 
time EOT requested that the Secretary grant permission to use a clause under MEPA 
that streamlines the process and enables the requirement for project environmental 
review to be satisfied with a single Environmental Impact Report (EIR) rather than 
the usual process of a draft (DEIR) followed by a final. However, in the Certificate of 
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the Secretary on the EENF, the secretary denies the request for a streamlined process 
because of shortcomings in the comprehensiveness of the EENF. Consequently, 
the secretary specifies the extent of comprehensiveness and that the “DEIR should 
identify temporary and permanent land takings… analyze feasible alternatives to the 
Yard 8 [maintenance] site, including but not limited to the BET [Boston Engine 
Terminal]… propose specific station locations based on this analysis and describe 
how they support ridership goals and other objectives of the project… provide 
more detailed designs and renderings of the stations, describe amenities that will be 
provided  (canopies, street furniture, lighting, vending machines, trash receptacles, 
etc.)” The Secretary’s Certificate further specifies that the EIR should “describe 
operating parameters for the service including the type and number of cars required 
to provide service and headways… should detail requirements for the maintenance 
facility including parking… describe electrical systems including the catenary and 
support structures, substations and signal and communication systems.”121 
After three years of work, in January 2010 the Secretary of EOEA releases the 
certificate on the completed DEIR for the Green Line. Although the DEIR is 
approved, the secretary declined to allow the DIER to be considered a final EIR 
because of “the ongoing evaluation of maintenance facility siting alternatives, 
the need for additional discussion of impacts at College Avenue and Lechmere 
Stations, and a requirement for clarification of the future mitigation and community 
participation commitments.” Finally in July 2010, the Secretary of EOEA approves 
the final EIR submitted by MassDOT.
The burden of environmental review on MassDOT was extensive and far more 
detailed than what a highway project would be subject to; parking, maintenance, and 
fuel sources are simply beyond the scope of road projects that are narrowly defined 
to the extent of the right of way. Furthermore, significant delay was caused by the 
MassDOT effort to locate the maintenance facility at an unacceptable location (Yard 
8) and by Mass Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) insisting on 
an additional environmental process to address the revised maintenance location. 
However, the proposed maintenance facility is not an essential element of the GLX as 
promised in the SIP.
Although State-level environmental review was completed in a three and half year 
period by summer 2010, the Green Line project still did not move ahead into 
more substantial design and construction. Instead, the project progress was held 
back by undertaking a completely separate Federal Environmental Assessment, 
which duplicated much of the effort and findings from the state-level DEIR/EIR 
process under MEPA. The need for a federal environmental review was triggered 
by the bureaucratic decision of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to not 
continue to participate in the state MEPA process. The Green Line is attempting 
to secure funding under the FTA New Starts program that helps fund new fixed 
guideway transit systems, and substantial delay to the project was created as a 
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separate federal EA to satisfy FTA was produced. The Federal EA was released in 
October 2011. However, as of May 2012 FTA has not yet released a Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI) that would allow the project to enter into a preliminary 
engineering phase. Much of the delay caused by the ongoing federal process is related 
to the evaluation of the Green Line through New Starts, which allocates funding 
to projects on a competitive basis across the nation based on a cost-effectiveness 
formula. Moreover, despite the hoops that FTA makes applicants jump through, 
the Administration “continues to encourage project sponsors to request a Federal 
New Starts funding share that is as low as possible” and FTA has been instructed 
by Congress “not to sign any new full funding grant agreements after September 
30, 2002 that have a maximum Federal share of higher than 60 percent.”122 By 
contrast, the Federal Highway Administration, which administers the Federal-Aid 
Highway Program, funds eligible state DOTs projects on an 80/20 basis (federal/
local) and requires no measures of cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts 
ABP generally does not seek federal 80/20 bridge funds in order to avoid the NEPA 
environmental assessment process.
4.4 Summary 
A decided political departure from endorsing headfirst highway construction emerged 
in response to the backlash of building the Interstate system. Significant legislative 
protections for the environment were created, changes made to policy to enable 
flexible use of funding for road or transit projects, and measures enacted to reform 
the infrastructure planning process to enhance transparency and public participation 
and require the evaluation of alternative actions for projects proposed by the state. 
However, at a time where there is momentous opportunity across the nation for the 
reversal of road building policy to be expressed physically in the reconceptualization 
of infrastructure, processes do not seem adequate to prevent highway re-building 
and support public transit as a replacement. Systemic distortions in how benefits 
and costs are considered, how the status quo is normalized, how project impacts are 
evaluated, and how funding is allocated, are contributing to a proclivity to repair or 
replace existing highways rather than to build the political will to reconceptualize 
them. The factors and forces that enabled the bottom-up success of the Highway 
Revolt are not aligned now as they were in the 1960s. The stakeholders and 
beneficiaries of the auto-mobility system are widespread and locked-in to the car, 
whereas the transformative potentials of reconceptualization are latent and distant.
Without doubt, the nation’s aging infrastructure requires urgent attention, but 
for structures which typically last 50 years the projects should be thoughtful. 
Paradoxically, the cognitive fixation on losses and the implicit discounting of the 
future which reflect short-term biases fails to consider the system change potential of 
reconstruction pressures. The potential of focusing on these construction disruptions 
to enable better outcomes is discussed in the following chapter.
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5. An opportunity to rethink automobile 
infrastructure
Faced with the fact that re-building existing highway infrastructure will be more 
challenging than the initial construction, since there are existing traffic loads to 
accommodate, and also faced with the need to consider a broader set of objectives 
than just automobile level of service, this unique set of circumstances requires a 
different approach to infrastructure planning. Instead of planning for a distant 
“design year” outcome as an endpoint, a strategy focused on near-term constraints 
and the process of construction implementation may hold promise to hold back the 
seemingly inevitable growth of vehicle traffic driven by the existing approaches. 
Both the Grounding McGrath study and the Accelerated Bridge Program are focused 
on long-term outlooks for the future of the McCarthy Viaduct. However, neither 
of these two efforts explicitly considers the process of implementing the desired 
outcome, and the problems and opportunities that construction itself creates. Any 
construction work on the McGrath Highway has the potential to create significant 
traffic disruptions that will likely worsen the already poor conditions in the corridor. 
There is a tendency to regard these disruptions as an unfortunate period of pain, 
but an unavoidable means to realizing a greater end. However, the ‘grin and bear it’ 
approach is not politically savvy. It front-loads the costs of project implementation in 
terms of construction disruptions that can last for months or even years, but does not 
provide any of the anticipated benefits until project completion. Doing so weakens 
political support among the dominant stakeholder groups of existing users, but 
also does little to catalyze support from new beneficiaries since they remain a latent 
constituency. This interpretation is supported by the previously discussed findings 
of Shu and Bazerman (2009), who note the behavioral predilection to focus on the 
short-term and to weight losses heavier than costs. 
Instead of framing corridor reconceptualization as a showdown between the 
automobile worldview and prioritizing other values, this chapter examines how 
taking mitigation actions for inevitable construction disruptions, as well as making 
spot improvements to improve pedestrian and motorist experience, can be used to 
create an incremental implementation strategy that recognizes the automobile while 
moving toward considering an at-grade McGrath Boulevard as the new normal. 
5.1 Repairing the construction timeline on McCarthy Viaduct
The existing schedule to begin Accelerated Bridge Program repair work on McCarthy 
Viaduct before the completion of the Grounding Study seems clearly in favor of 
promoting automobile-oriented values over the potential of reconceptualization. 
However, the schedule of planned ABP and road construction projects over the next 
several years (listed below) is likely to create severe traffic disruptions for drivers in 
Somerville unless some significant changes in sequence can be secured. 
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• Broadway, East Somerville construction, Summer 2012: reduced access to 
I-93 through to Sullivan Square during construction and long-term reduction 
in capacity from road-diet project.
• I-93 Maintenance, Summer 2012-2013: reduction of regional relief capacity 
for McGrath Highway
• Medford Street Rail Bridge construction, Fall 2012-Summer 2013: reduced 
throughput to Gore Street 
• Gilman Street Bridge, 2014-2017: reduced throughput on McGrath Highway 
by 1 lane in each direction and 50% of capacity.
• Washington Street, Green Line Extension Station and Bridge: reduced 
throughput on Washington Street. The GLX Federal EA has noted that this 
requires mitigation. 
• Squire’s Bridge reconstruction: reduced throughput on McGrath Highway 
As currently sequenced, this set of construction plans that will see MassDOT 
investing $50 million on bridges in the area threatens to create unnecessarily 
prolonged and disruptive changes that may inundate Somerville with traffic. (figure 
44) Most concerning is that the current sequence of ABP projects brings the 
McCarthy Viaduct into construction in 2012. 
This proposed timeline to start this repair work in spring is not sound from a 
technical point of view, even when just considering the interests of drivers. With 
limited resources and many other bridges in the Commonwealth meriting far more 
urgent structural attention, it is not a wise use of funds to expedite repairs on the 
McCarthy Viaduct. In particular, the 2012 start date is far before the much-needed 
re-construction of the Gilman St Bridge in the McGrath corridor (scheduled for 
2014) which has been assessed structurally deficient and is in “serious” condition. 
Work on the Gilman St Bridge will cause a significant disruption to traffic and 
generate a capacity constraint in the McGrath corridor. Furthermore, the proposed 
2012 start date for repairs on McCarthy overlaps with scheduled construction work 
on Broadway and I-93. Advancing the timeline on the McCarthy Viaduct repairs to 
start in 2012, rather than to be simultaneous with the Gilman St reconstruction as 
initially proposed by the MassDOT ABP, only achieves a prolongation of the traffic 
disruption to the community. If done simultaneously, the Gilman St replacement and 
the McCarthy repairs could be completed with greater speed, efficiency and safety, 
and at lower cost, since the duration of the disruption is reduced and the work is 
coordinated to achieve a consistent reduction in capacity along the entire corridor 
rather than a protracted condition of spot bottlenecks moving between the various 
construction locations. The original schedule would also allow modifications to the 
I-93 HOV lane barrier curb that could increase I-93 capacity and provide somewhere 
for McGrath Highway traffic to go (other than local streets) during capacity 
reductions caused by the Gilman St Bridge reconstruction. Therefore, simply from 
the point of managing traffic disruptions it is prudent to restore the original repair 
timeline for McCarthy Viaduct to start in early 2014. Similarly, this sequencing also 
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Figure 45:  The nothrbound and southbound directions of McGrath Highway at Somerville are separated by the 
median in which the supports for the SB elevated sit (top) and also divided by the northbound tunnel (bottom).
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enables the partial or complete de-elevation of the McCarthy Viaduct to commence 
in 2014 under the ABP funding program should the Grounding Study recommend 
such action in its findings when they are issued in summer 2012. 
Regardless of the sequence and timing, the proposed reconstruction of the Gilman 
St Bridge and currently proposed repairs to McCarthy Viaduct will reduce vehicle 
throughput in the McGrath corridor and require lane closures and turn restrictions. 
The following sections examine using these realities as further opportunities to reveal 
and realize the potential for a major reconceptualization of the corridor as an at-grade 
boulevard.
5.2 Heading toward a new normal
As discussed in the case description, the primary traffic function of the McCarthy 
Viaduct is to provide a grade-separation for through traffic at the Washington St 
intersection and the Somerville Ave/Medford St/Poplar St intersection. By reducing 
the number of vehicles being processed through these two key at-grade intersections, 
the elevated viaduct can in theory contribute to improving the operational 
performance of the intersections compared to if all traffic were handled at grade. 
However, the design and configuration of the elevated structure and its ramps at 
these two key intersections also result in unsafe conditions and traffic flow patterns 
that strain the local surface street network. 
Perhaps the most troublesome location is the Somerville Ave/Medford St/Poplar 
St intersection. At this point, the southbound direction of the McGrath frontage 
road and the Somerville Ave southbound down ramp from the elevated meet at the 
signalized intersection. The northbound direction of McGrath is at grade, descending 
from the Squire’s bridge, and then separates into a northbound frontage road and 
northbound on-ramp onto the elevated over Washington St. The northbound 
roadway of McGrath is physically separated from the rest of the intersection by a 
concrete median in which the piers of the southbound elevated sit. (figure 45) This 
configuration creates several major problems. 
• For pedestrians, there is no means to cross McGrath Highway at the intersection 
(east-west) between the Union Square and Brickbottom neighborhoods, other 
than a jumping onto the concrete median and then running across three lanes of 
northbound McGrath traffic approaching at high speed as it descends from the 
Squire’s Bridge. (figure 33) This pedestrian movement is not infrequent as there is 
a bus stop for MBTA routes 80, 87 and 88 at Poplar St and northbound McGrath 
Highway.
• Because of the median, vehicles cannot access Brickbottom and Inner Belt from 
southbound McGrath or from eastbound Somerville Ave. Traffic from Somerville 
Ave and Medford St headed northbound also cannot access the on-ramp to go 
over Washington St, but instead join McGrath Highway via an obscure and 
counterintuitive at-grade tunnel that goes under the northbound elevated and 
joins the northbound surface road just shy of the Washington St signal. (figure 45) 
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This constrains the usability of the northbound McCarthy Viaduct to only traffic 
approaching from the Squire’s bridge and headed past Washington St. All other 
northbound traffic is in the tunnel or on the frontage road.
• As a result of the limited-access configuration at Somerville Ave, east-west traffic 
flow in the area is concentrated on Washington St since it provides the only through 
connection between Union Sq and Sullivan Sq across the McGrath corridor. Similarly 
the confusing and obscure access to McGrath via the tunnel at Somerville Ave results 
in a significant portion of eastbound left turns originating from Union Sq and 
points west to occur at Washington St rather than at Somerville Ave (450 versus 71 
in the AM peak hour). As a result, 35 seconds of green time in the signal cycle (120 
seconds) at Washington St are allocated to the eastbound movement, while only 12 
seconds are available for the southbound phase that accommodates the vehicles not 
using McCarthy Viaduct. These patterns exert significant pressures on the at-grade 
Washington St intersection that significantly undermine any operational benefits that 
may be created by the existence of the elevated viaduct and the vehicles it removes 
from surface intersections. (figure 46)
• The configuration of the southbound down ramp and surface road at Somerville 
Ave creates a dangerous weaving section where vehicles leaving the elevated heading 
onto Somerville Ave and Medford St conflict with motorists on the surface road 
heading southbound toward Squire’s Bridge. This conflict is not only dangerous, but 
it also reduces intersection throughput. (figure 47)
5.2.1 Short-term remedies 
The traffic detour plan proposed by the ABP to enable repair work to the McCarthy 
Viaduct stands to only aggravate these existing problems. During rehabilitation of 
the tunnel, northbound traffic from Medford St and the eastbound left turn from 
Somerville Ave to northbound McGrath will be detoured through the Somerville 
Ave and Prospect St intersection in Union Sq and sent up Washington St. This plan 
will further stain the eastbound left turn movement at Washington St and McGrath, 
by adding another 278 vehicles to the eastbound phase in the AM and an additional 
611 in the PM. Furthermore, the Somerville Ave / Prospect St intersection in Union 
Sq already faces peak hour operational challenges under existing traffic volumes and 
origin-destination patterns. 
This undesirable disruption to and worsening of intersection conditions is to 
accommodate repairing the tunnel, which is a functionally obsolete and confusing 
design that ought to be rectified. However, if MassDOT were to consider mitigation 
actions to the traffic disruptions related to the proposed repair projects as well as to 
address the obvious functional deficiencies in the McGrath corridor, the Accelerated 
Bridge Program could be harnessed to create short-term benefits that improve 
existing operational conditions and also to keep open the window for de-elevating 
the McCarthy Viaduct. This suggested alternative scope of work for the ABP is now 
proposed. 
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Figure 47: The current configuration of the southbound frontage road and down ramp at Somerville Ave creates a 
dangerous and confusing weaving movement
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• Signalize northbound McGrath Highway at Somerville Ave /Medford St /Poplar St
This need for this modification is irrefutable from the point of view of providing 
basic pedestrian safety since the existing un-signalized crossing of McGrath is a 
completely unacceptable condition. (figure 35) Doing so also has the additional 
benefit of enabling the northbound tunnel to be eliminated by modifying the median 
under the McCarthy Viaduct to allow eastbound left and northbound through traffic 
at the intersection to directly access the northbound McGrath roadway. (figure 48, 
49) This configuration has several operational benefits for motorists over the existing 
tunnel arrangement since it reduces the concentration of traffic at the Washington St 
intersection (described above), by allowing direct access to Brickbottom via Poplar 
St, providing a more clear and visible path from Somerville Ave to northbound 
McGrath, and providing a path from northbound McGrath toward Union Sq and 
points west. Making this modification does require changing the traffic signal timing 
at the intersection to accommodate an additional phase that allows the northbound 
left movement from McGrath to Somerville Ave.123 (figure 50, 51) Although this 
change would reduce intersection capacity for the existing movements on Somerville 
Ave, Medford St and Southbound McGrath, this effect can be mitigated by the next 
recommendation.
• Remove Somerville Ave southbound down ramp
As described above, the existing down ramp design leads to a weaving pattern that 
is not only dangerous, but also reduces the saturation flow rate of the southbound 
phase at the Somerville Ave / Medford St intersection. Removing the down ramp 
will not change the number of vehicles approaching the intersection, and therefore, 
will not require any widening or addition of lanes at the intersection to maintain the 
existing level of service. (figure 52) Instead, with all approaching vehicles at grade, 
intersection throughput will improve since drivers will have more time and distance 
to choose the appropriate lane position ahead of the intersection. This capacity 
improvement can be used to offset the shortening of the signal phase associated with 
implementing the removal of the tunnel as suggested above. This recommendation 
also requires prohibiting parking on the east side of the southbound frontage 
road between Washington St and Somerville Ave (parking is currently allowed on 
both sides of the three-lane frontage road) to accommodate the additional flow of 
vehicles from the ramp on to the frontage road. Removing the down ramp not only 
improves operational conditions at the Somerville Ave / Medford St intersection, 
but also creates space to plant trees, improve sidewalks, and improve the visual 
and environmental quality of the corridor. (figure 53, 54, 55)124 Removing the 
down ramp will create upstream impacts on the Washington St down ramp and 
123  Alternately, this movement could be accommodated by a mid-block U-turn on 
McGrath at the existing signal with Linwood St, a concept being examined in the Grounding 
McGrath Study.
124  A similar removal of  a down ramp from the old elevated Central Artery was key 
to building support for depressing the entire structure since it demonstrated in small-scale 
the great potential to improve neighborhood conditions from de-elevating the structure. 
(Remarks by Fred Salvucci, April 23, 2012)
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intersection by adding another 623 southbound movements in the AM peak 
hour. These additional vehicles can be accommodated at-grade.125 Furthermore, 
the condition of the intersection will improve because the some of the very heavy 
eastbound Washington St left to northbound McGrath movements can be displaced 
to Somerville Ave. (figure 46) 
125  See section 5.2.2 bullet point “Redesign Washington St at grade intersection”
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Figure 55:  McGrath Highway southbound frontage road looking south toward Boston: existing condition with 
Somerville Ave down ramp (top), and visualization of proposed removal of the ramp (bottom). 
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5.2.2 Revealing long-term reconceptualization potential
If the recommendations to remove the northbound tunnel and eliminate the down 
ramp at Somerville Ave are implemented the only traffic remaining on the McCarthy 
Viaduct are trips headed over the Squire’s Bridge to destinations in Cambridge 
and Boston.126 Therefore, a partial de-elevation condition begs the question why 
not remove the entire McCarthy Viaduct? If all the traffic on the McCarthy 
Viaduct were shifted to the frontage roads, in the AM peak hour there would be an 
additional 2416 vehicles through the Washington St intersection (412% increase) 
and 1793 vehicles through Somerville Ave / Medford St (156% increase). (figure 
52) These volumes could not be accommodated without substantial queuing and 
delay for motorists within the existing configuration of the surface roads. However, 
accommodating all the existing traffic from the elevated at grade is not necessarily 
a suitable or fair standard to test the feasibility of de-elevation given other traffic 
realities in the corridor. 
The current proposed scope of work by the Accelerated Bridge Program will anyway 
increase the number of vehicles moving through the at-grade Washington St 
intersection when capacity on the McCarthy Viaduct is reduced to enable repairs 
to it. However, no mitigation action has been proposed for this in the ABP plans. 
Even more significant is that during the reconstruction of the Gilman St Bridge, 
the southbound throughput of the McGrath Highway will be reduced by 50% for 
several years.127 During this construction period there will be a significant reduction 
in traffic volumes along the McCarthy Viaduct. The circularity in MassDOTs logic 
is inescapable. On the one hand, the McCarthy Viaduct must be repaired until a 
comprehensive de-elevation study is completed because of the significant volume of 
traffic it caries. Furthermore, this de-elevation study has established a 12.5% increase 
in traffic as the scenario for evaluating the viability of removing McCarthy. Yet, on 
the other hand the repair program necessarily constrains vehicle throughput in the 
corridor for several years and has been subject to no traffic study.
If society will have to survive with a 50% reduction in capacity on McGrath 
Highway for several years, then advocates for de-elevation argue why this shouldn’t 
be established as a long-term reality. Furthermore, there is an additional and long-
term capacity pinch point emerging at the Lechmere end of O’Brien Highway where 
the existing Green Line station is being relocated to the easterly side of the road, 
thereby forcing all pedestrians and busses using the station to cross the Highway. If 
MassDOT truly believes there is a capacity issue in the corridor, then the current 
construction activity must be accompanied by mitigation measures. In either case, 
the reality of the capacity drop must be recognized. Strategies to respond to the 
126  This analysis is focusing on the southbound direction since the inbound AM peak 
is heavier than the PM peak. The Grounding McGrath study is also using the same analytical 
approach.
127  The Gilman St Bridge construction phasing plans to keep two of  three lanes of  
capacity on McGrath at all times, but capacity will likely drop by 50% because of  a lower 
saturation flow rate in construction zones, and the constraint of  the adjacent truss bridge.
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capacity reduction and harness the potential of reduced flow on the McCarthy 
Viaduct are now suggested.
• Regional traffic displacement & I-93 HOV modification
Analysis of origin-destination patterns on the McGrath Highway using data from 
the CTPS (2012) study reveals that 14% of southbound traffic in the AM peak 
(296 vehicles/hr) is regional in nature and travels from Otis St to the Museum of 
Science in Boston. This traffic is better served by I-93. (figure 56, 57) In addition, 
64% of the traffic observed at Otis St (1399 vehicles) exits the corridor at Medford 
St and other points in Cambridge (Rufo Rd, 3rd St, Cambridge St, Land Boulevard) 
and is likely destined in large part to the major employment hub of Kendall Square 
and should therefore be considered regional in nature. When the Gilman St Bridge 
capacity reduction occurs it is likely that these regional trips, which should be on 
I-93, will be the most easily shifted away from McGrath Highway. In fact, the 50% 
capacity reduction (1085 vehicles/hr) can be resolved entirely by shifting away all 
of the through trips into Boston (296 vehicles/hr) and 56% of the trips seen at 
Otis St that are headed for Cambridge destinations (789 vehicles/hr). (figure 58) 
To support this shift, the Accelerated Bridge Program should reduce the size of the 
HOV lane barrier curb on I-93 and add this scope of work to the I-93 maintenance 
scheduled for 2012-2013. Currently, the HOV barrier design wastes an entire lane 
on I-93, and if modified this additional capacity (1800 vehicles/lane/hr) could easily 
accommodated the 1085 displaced vehicles from McGrath without an appreciable 
effect on the I-93 level of service.
• Redesign Washington St at grade intersection
Whether the conclusion of the Grounding McGrath study is to rehabilitate or 
remove the McCarthy Viaduct, repairing or demolishing the Viaduct will require 
closing the facility and losing the traffic capacity it provides. Therefore, in any 
scenario the Washington St intersection will experience increased traffic volumes for 
a period. As mitigation for this disruption, MassDOT should improve the geometric 
configuration and signal timing at the intersection. The existing condition wastes 
capacity, is confusing for drivers, and hostile to pedestrians. (figure 59) A redesigned 
layout with 3 approach lanes from each direction is proposed. (figure 60) This design 
can be built with the McCarthy Viaduct in place, and substantially simplifies the 
complexity of the intersection. The proposed redesign also reclaims a significant 
amount of space at the corners that could be reallocated for pedestrian amenities and 
public space uses. Preliminary analysis of traffic volumes using critical lane analysis 
demonstrates that this intersection design could accommodate all the traffic from the 
McCarthy Viaduct at grade during the period of 50% reduced capacity caused by the 
Gilman St Bridge reconstruction. (figure 61)128 Signal phasing is also simplified to 
three phases from the existing four. (figure 62, 63) 
128  The design accommodates an additional 1332 vehicles southbound per hour in the 
AM peak on the Washington St Ramp. Therefore, the option to only remove the Somerville 
Ave down ramp in chapter 5.2.1 (which only adds 623 vehicles to the intersection) is also 
enabled by this design. 
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Figure 57: existing origin destination patterns on McGrath highway based on analysis of CTPS license plate survey
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Figure 59: Current conditions and geometric configuration of the Washington St and McGrath Highway intersection
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5.2.3 Grounding McGrath Highway 
MassDOT has described the proposal to repair the McCarthy Viaduct as a “short 
term solution (approx.10 years) – not a long term rehabilitation plan” with the goal 
to “maintain existing level of service, while minimizing impacts to surrounding area, 
for the duration of Grounding McGrath Study.” However, the failure of the agency 
to consider construction detours undermines this stated goal since traffic disruptions 
related to repair activity would worsen existing levels of service during the short-term.
Instead of repairing the McCarthy Viaduct prematurely, the series of construction 
disruption mitigation actions proposed in this chapter, each with a sound rationale 
of its own, create a set of measures that work together to eliminate the functional 
need for the McCarthy Viaduct in the short-term. The proposed redesign of 
the Washington St intersection and retiming of the traffic signals to improve 
the configuration of the intersection (actions that warrant implementation by 
MassDOT on their own merits) would be sufficient to handle traffic volumes 
without the McCarthy Viaduct under this new normal. As such, during the multi-
year reconstruction period of the Gilman St Bridge, MassDOT can implement and 
interim grounding solution that removes all ramps and the McCarthy Viaduct. 
Both during construction and the removal of the Viaduct this design would operate 
without appreciable adverse impacts on the traffic performance at the Somerville 
Ave and Washington St intersections. (figure 64) This design could also be used as 
an interim solution that would enable more time for a complete and comprehensive 
public process to redesign and reconceptualize McGrath Highway at-grade. 
Alternately, the interim scenario can choose to remove only the ramps, and leave the 
main elevated section still standing (but closed to traffic) until the conclusion of the 
Grounding Study and subsequent design processes are completed. Whichever the 
case, the mitigation measures proposed here in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 do not pre-
determine the future of the McGrath corridor but also satisfy MassDOTs objective 
to “maintain existing level of service, while minimizing impacts to surrounding area, 
for the duration of Grounding McGrath Study.” On the other hand rushing to repair 
the McCarthy Viaduct at the moment does constitute a de facto decision about de-
elevation.
5.2.4 Long-term implications
One of the main criticisms of the approach by MassDOT on the Grounding Study 
and the ABP to repair the McCarthy Viaduct is that the outlook is temporally 
shortsighted and uncoordinated as well as spatially narrowly defined to a single 
corridor. While the series of mitigation actions and improvements proposed in 
chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are also short-term, they are relevant to and directionally 
correct for the long-term and a broader outlook.
The displacement of regional traffic equivalent to the capacity reduction during 
the Gilman St Bridge reconstruction can be maintained as a long-term shift by 
modifying the HOV lane barrier on I-93. This represents a more livable and 
appropriate distribution of traffic through the available road network in Somerville. 
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There is a history of such transportation shifts in the Boston area related to roadway 
construction. Reconstruction of the Southeast Expressway in the mid 80s and the 
Central Artery/Tunnel project involved enhancing commuter boat services. However, 
the ability to maintain the traffic shifts enabled by these expanded services was 
reduced by the return or expansion of roadway capacity after construction. This 
would not be desirable for Somerville; a 50% throughput reduction on McGrath 
Highway can and should be established as a new normal rather than an interim 
condition to promote livability, neighborhood economic development, and the 
success of the $1 billion investment in the Green Line Extension. These reduced 
volumes and the changes associated to I-93 should be used as the analysis and design 
scenario for the Grounding Study rather than examining the McGrath corridor in 
isolation. Furthermore, the suggested set of short-term actions addresses longer-term 
issues of capacity constraint in the corridor by providing an outlet for regional traffic 
through the modifications to I-93. On the other hand, the ongoing Grounding Study 
narrowly examines only the McGrath corridor and attempts to deal with the difficult 
and illogical situation where forecast 2035 traffic volumes will exceed inescapable 
capacity constraints.
152
6. Summary & Conclusions 
6.1 Summary
The thesis examines the story of cars in American cities and how planning and 
engineering, individual demand responses, and the politics of transportation 
infrastructure align to establish, preserve and perpetuate the automobile metropolis. 
The growth of automobile travel, the infrastructure to support it, and the changes 
in metropolitan structure and development patterns it enabled have been attributed 
to many different explanations in the literature, however, the key interpretation of 
this thesis is the lens of the political will to accommodate automobile. The initial 
growth of the automobile city rapidly became a self-enforcing process through the 
impacts of the car on urban design, zoning, metropolitan decentralization, suburban 
development patterns and individual travel choice. The viability or existence of 
other modes of travel in cities and the fabric that hitherto supported them was 
undermined, and new landscapes opened up by freeway connectivity are oriented 
wholly around automobile mobility.
The key observation is that traffic growth cannot simply just happen, since 
congestion is an otherwise physically self-limiting condition given the existence 
of finite roadway capacity constraints. To become as pervasive as it is today, the 
automobile had to be invited into the city – or at least accommodated. However, a 
failure to recognize the myth of accommodating the car as a way to relieve congestion 
has led to the political ‘tragedy of expanding the concrete commons’ that perpetuates 
the political will to keep building the very infrastructure that is a key driver of 
systems lock-in to car use.
Dissatisfaction with the top-down highway building culture and concern over the 
corridor-, neighborhood-, and regional-scale impacts of freeways through cities 
generated significant revisions to transportation policy in the late 60s and early 
1970s. Significant increases in funds for public transit became available at both the 
national and state levels. Citizen movements were at times successful in stopping 
certain urban highway projects, and they helped catalyze political will to enshrine 
protections for the environment and due planning process (such as section 4(f ) and 
NEPA) that challenged the mentality that highway expansion is inevitable. These 
requirements helped move toward a full disclosure of costs and benefits, tipping the 
landscape away from mindless road expansion and helping the no-build scenario to 
win politically.
Now, the nation faces a new type of infrastructure scenario to consider: the ‘de-
build.’ America’s highway infrastructure, the bulk of which was built with Federal 
grants since the 1950s and 60s and inadequately maintained is now ailing. There is 
interest, need and opportunity to reconceptualize these facilities both to improve the 
sustainability of the transportation system and to serve as a catalyst for much more 
widespread neighborhood regeneration and revitalization.
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The case study of the McGrath Highway in Somerville, MA, demonstrates a 
quintessential example of a scenario ripe for de-building highway infrastructure. 
Historical changes in the transportation network and local land use environment, 
planned expansions to public transit, aspirations for transit-oriented land 
redevelopment, functional, operational and structural deficiency, and political 
attention to address the challenges of aging infrastructure bring attention to the 
McGrath Highway and the McCarthy Viaduct at this moment in time. For abutting 
properties and those on foot or bicycle the McGrath Highway is an unpleasant 
and inhospitable environment. Complex lane channelization, unintuitive traffic 
islands, unusual signal phasing, and badly designed weaving sections at the off-ramps 
make the facility perform poorly for automobile users too. Concern over this these 
substandard conditions is heightened by Green Line Extension: the GLX offers the 
potential to relieve the need for automobile capacity in the corridor by supporting 
land use and behavior that is transit-oriented. However, the success of this $1 billion 
investment also hinges on reconceptualizing McGrath as a boulevard to generate a 
surrounding context that supports last-mile connectivity to and from the stations, 
and to make feasible the attraction of new, dense, transit- and pedestrian-oriented 
development by removing the disamentiy value of the ugly Viaduct.
 
Unfortunately, the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis suggest dynamics of 
cost and benefit perception that do not seem to align in favor of grounding McGrath 
or achieving the timely extension of the Green Line. The ongoing processes for these 
two complementary projects are dominated by the tools, methods and assumptions, 
political biases, procedural failures, and instilled human behaviors of the first 
highway-building era. This status quo approach has significant policy implications 
since it threatens to implicitly usher in a second era of highway (re)building.
The misuse of modeling and forecasting as described in this thesis perpetuates the 
demand first versus infrastructure first paradox, and does not help summon the 
political will for visionary thinking where infrastructure change is the necessary 
catalyst for neighborhood change and behavior change.
• Transportation forecasting and modeling as being conducted in the 
Grounding McGrath study does not explicitly reflect the dynamics of system 
change, and instead systemically overlook important pathways to modifying 
the transportation landscape. In particular, the 4-step travel model built on 
the basis of people’s existing and observed behavior misses critical pathways of 
behavioral change in response to infrastructure change. Forecasting the ‘no-
build’ year is a misnomer since the practice of doing so is both conceptually 
and technically biased to perpetuate the business as usual approach of 
preferencing the car and providing for it. Such misuse of modeling and 
forecasting have become policy-making, rather than policy analysis, since future 
traffic volumes are taken as a fait accompli.
• Forecasts of volume to capacity ratios exceeding 1 (V/C>1) create alarm over 
the operational (in)feasibility of traffic growth at levels that are fundamentally 
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infeasible since they violate real-world capacity constrains. Static traffic 
assignments in the models also violate capacity constraints by allowing cars at 
V/C>1 to keep moving artificially, thereby creating imaginary mobility benefits 
of auto-oriented infrastructure decisions that are infeasible.
With the automobile and the infrastructure to support it established as the status 
quo, planning processes and infrastructure funding programs are working to create 
anti-environmental outcomes that preference the car and hinder the development of 
transit alternatives necessary to reduce auto dependence.
• Much like the structure of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, which offered state 
DOTs 90 cents for every dollar spent building the Interstate network, targeted 
repair programs like the Massachusetts Accelerated Bridge Program incentivize 
and motivate highway agencies to spend money as quickly as possible. This 
program structure takes advantage of the tendency to discount the future and 
disregard the negative impacts of poor or thoughtless planning. 
• Special exemptions from environmental process legislation, such as MEPA, 
for emergency repair programs that remedy self-inflicted deferred highway 
maintenance dramatically undercut the legislative intent of such acts, since the 
end of life stage is also the very time that infrastructure investments are made 
and when environmental and planning process requirements are triggered.
• When environmental processes are applied to infrastructure end of life 
decisions, there is a risk that processes normalize the continued existence of 
existing structures as the null-hypothesis or ‘do nothing’ scenario. However, 
there is serious doubt as to whether many highway structures through cities 
were viable propositions had they been subject to adequate the environmental 
review when first constructed.
• By contrast, transit projects that are meant to be environmentally benign or 
even beneficial, and which have the potential to avert the tragedy of  expanding 
the concrete commons are heavily burdened and delayed by the significant 
scrutiny of  “environmental” processes that fixate on the minutiae of  details 
and demand a level of  comprehensiveness that far exceeds that which highway 
projects are subject to. 
When considering the four supporting factors for highway removal that Napolitan 
(2007) identifies, neither the technocratic nor the political environment seems well 
situated at the moment to generate the forces required to overcome the inertia to 
change: repair programs obscure the necessary window of change that structural 
deficiency creates to allow freeway removal to gain serous consideration and 
legitimacy; modeling and forecasting practices overstate the mobility benefits of 
continued road expansion; and stakeholders and beneficiaries of the auto-mobility 
system are widespread and locked-in to the car, whereas the transformative potentials 
of reconceptualization are latent and distant.
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6.2 Implications for national policy
The Federal Highway Authority has rated one in nine bridges in cities “structurally 
deficient,” and estimates that an investment of $70.9 billion will be needed to 
rehabilitate these structures.129 The $70 billion national bill for highway and bridge 
repair is also in large part self-inflicted by failure of DOTs do regular maintenance: 
the initial federal Interstate program which provided 90 cents on the dollar to state 
DOTs incentivized over-building in the short-term without considering the long-
term ability to fund and execute maintenance, and state road funds continue to 
be prioritized to match federal dollars for new projects. As such, money to address 
this infrastructure crisis should not be simply handed unconditionally to highway 
agencies so that they may again be allowed to repeat the failures of the past and 
continue bad institutional practices. 
The Boston region demonstrated a dramatic policy change with the BTPR, 
intstitutionalized the capacity of the BTPR in the CTPS, and adopted best 
practices and focused over the last 40 years on major transit investments such as 
the Orange Line relocation, Red Line extensions and Silver Line. Nevertheless, 
current conditions have slipped badly again into a climate of thoughtless repair 
programs, non-participatory decision-making, uncoordinated planning, and 
painfully slow progress on legally committed and environmentally beneficial transit 
expansion. Despite efforts to make project planning more thoughtful such as the 
1962 reforms to the Federal Highway Act, the 1966 DOT Act and section 4(f ), 
NEPA in 1970, the multi-modal flexibility of funding of 1973 and 1991, and the 
linking of transportation planning and air quality goals in the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (1991), the out of sequence planning of repairs 
on the McCarthy Viaduct under the Massachusetts Accelerated Bridge Program 
demonstrates that the institutional culture of highway agencies has still not evolved to 
the point where self-evaluation and self-enforcement of planning and environmental 
objectives is a reasonable option. The case study of the McGrath Highway presented 
in this thesis is therefore a cautionary tale with policy relevance to the entire nation. 
A planning process is required to respond to the country’s infrastructure repair crisis.
The technical and political merits in favor of reconceptualizing aging highway 
infrastructure will vary from project to project, but in light of the scale of national 
investment forthcoming it will be necessary to carefully consider the need for and 
purpose of this infrastructure. Several types of project circumstances exist. 
• Type 1: In many cases there will be a strong rationale to rebuild existing 
bridges and highways because they play a vital role in the transportation 
network not easily substituted. For example, there is little debate in the 
community about the need to rebuild the Gilman St Bridge on McGrath 
Highway, since without it the corridor would be severed for all modes of 
transportation. 
• Type 2: Those similar to the iconic Longfellow Bridge define a second class 
129  Transportation for America (2011), 3-6
156
of rehabilitation projects. Here again there is little debate about the necessity 
for rebuilding this vital link between Cambridge and Boston. However, there 
has been considerable and ongoing debate about how the reconstructed bridge 
should allocate space between transit, vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists. There 
is also a significant discussion about using reconstruction as an opportunity 
to restore earlier historic conditions by reversing undesirable changes made 
to the infrastructure over time (such as sidewalk narrowing) as well as taking 
remedial action for current impacts of the infrastructure (such as the intrusion 
of roadways related to and under the bridge into the Esplanade parkland). 
• Type 3: A third class of projects are those similar to the McCarthy Overpass 
where there have been significant changes in transport and land use over time 
that raise serious doubt about the functional necessity for the facility and 
simultaneously create a strong latent potential for corridor and neighborhood 
revitalization.
• Type 4: A fourth class of circumstance is that where there is a significant 
opportunity for roadway down-sizing and potential to generate positive 
neighborhood impacts, but where this potential is tied to providing alternate 
capacity through public transit improvements or tunnels.
For projects such as the Gilman St Bridge where the need and purpose of 
reconstruction is not contested, the general spirit and intent of the Accelerated Bridge 
Program is appropriate and I do not recommend that these projects be subject to 
lengthy environmental assessment processes such as those delaying the extension of 
the Green Line. Nevertheless, a serious process is required. The goal of environmental 
process is ostensibly to enhance livability, but lengthy and seemingly indefinite 
processes are themselves not liveable. However, with the BTPR a major reversal in 
the direction of transportation policy in Boston was achieved in only 18 months and 
completed with the same rigor demanded of an environmental impact statement. 
Therefore, process does not necessarily result in undue delay. In fact, the lack of 
process increases the risk of unexpected and unpredictable delays, such as when 
major community concerns over a proposed scope of work surface at the moment of 
implementation.
For all classes of projects (types 1 through 4), a new approach to define the ‘do-
nothing’ and ‘existing conditions’ are required for end of life highway evaluations. 
This approach should recognize that many existing structures came to be in a policy 
and political environment that did not subject projects to the same level of scrutiny 
as is expected today, and that now is the time and opportunity to rectify those 
past failures. Given that highway infrastructure has created a disamentiy value on 
surrounding areas for decades, the baseline comparison in environmental review for 
end of life highway projects should be raised from doing no harm to a counterfactual 
baseline of a non-degraded environment. Doing so would create an onus for 
highway agencies to explicitly consider generating neighborhood and community 
benefits during project implementation, and to take meaningful steps to remedy the 
externalities from a legacy of poor planning as a part of project definition.
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Projects in the ‘type 1’ category may likely constitute the majority of forthcoming 
highway reconstruction projects in the United States. Nevertheless, these projects 
should include public participation to at least determine if there is reasonable 
consensus on the merits of rapid rehabilitation. Furthermore, even if functionally 
required, some projects may create such unlivable and intolerable impacts on 
surrounding areas that they should be rebuilt in a substantially more sensitive way 
such as below grade. Indeed, the Central Artery/Tunnel project in Boston and the 
recently started work in Seattle to replace the elevated Alaskan Way with a tunnel 
demonstrate this idea of accommodating automobile capacity in cities in a more 
context sensitive and responsible way. 
“For a while there, the highway department was so focused on construction and 
road projects, it’s almost as if the contractors became their customers.” 130
– Frank DePaola; Administrator, MassDOT Highway Division 
The institutional culture of highway agencies to feed contractors undercuts the 
intent of all the policy reforms of 1962, 1966, 1970 and 1991 which imply reasoned 
comparison, choice and evaluation of projects. Behind the successes of having 
highway projects stopped, such as I-40 through Overton Park in Memphis or the 
Inner Belt in Boston, is that the tension between spending and thoughtful planning 
was relieved; in the Overton Park case money was transferred to another highway 
project and in Boston funds were traded-in for investments in public transit. These 
arrangements satisfied in part the desire to secure the short-term stimulus of federally 
matched construction dollars into the local economy and to gain the political 
support of construction and labor constituencies who are the immediate beneficiaries 
of infrastructure investment. However, the differential treatment of funding for 
highway projects by FHWA and transit projects by FTA undermines this solution by 
constricting the flow of dollars to transit projects in relative and absolute terms.
Despite the dominant focus on highway and road building in the 20th century 
history of transportation planning and funding in the United States, there is some 
evidence of recognition even from auto-oriented interests that transit can help to 
avoid excessive congestion. During the Nixon administration federal funding was 
extended to cover transit operating costs and during the Reagan administration the 
gasoline tax was expanded by 5 cents per gallon: 4 cents for highway and 1 cent for 
transit. Even Los Angeles, a city lampooned globally for its car culture, successfully 
passed a public referendum in 2008 (with a two-thirds majority) to enact a half-cent 
transit sales tax to raise $40 billion to aggressively expand transit service over the next 
30 years.131 Although type 3 and 4 projects may be more niche opportunities among 
the inventory of infrastructure requiring attention, given the way that FTA process 
slows and stalls projects there is likely a huge backlog of requests for transit projects 
in many cities across the nation. Therefore, to support type 3 and type 4 projects 
work is required to reform transportation policy. 
130  Schwartz (2012)
131  Nagourney (2010)
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Highway agency culture has been a major force in shaping the transportation and 
land use landscape that exists today in the United States – and still continues to 
influence project planning and implementation in unfavorable ways as in the case 
of McGrath Highway. However, since the 1960s there has been recognition of 
the failures of inadequate and thoughtless planning, and in response increasing 
requirements from the legislative branch to reform and improve the infrastructure 
investment process. 1962 reforms to the Federal Highway Act, the 1966 DOT Act 
and section 4(f ), NEPA in 1970, the multi-modal flexibility of funding of 1973 
and 1991, and the linking of transportation planning and air quality goals in the 
ISTEA (1991), show this sporadic but directionally consistent effort at reforming the 
process.
With the expiration of SAFTEA-LU in 2009 the United States has been without a 
surface transportation act for over two and a half years. The nation wanders without 
direction from Congress on transportation and infrastructure priorities and without 
stable funding to make badly needed investments. Highway agencies have been 
the single biggest institutional beneficiaries of federal spending on transportation 
infrastructure, and now their existence is threatened by the lack of a stable federal 
program. Interests that have been historically less powerful or marginalized in US 
transportation policy (such as transit, walking and cycling) are threatened too by 
political inaction, but have far less to lose than highway agencies by virtue of their 
subordinate status. Worse yet, the Tea Party movement, so steadfast in its anti-
government rhetoric, seems unfazed by the nation’s infrastructure crisis and willing 
to stand behind a nonsensical position of cutbacks and disinvestment as structures 
risk literally falling into the water. Recognizing this dynamic, there is now a window 
of opportunity to build coalitions among interest groups that may traditionally hold 
different ideas in transportation policy, but all of whom are fundamentally united in 
recognizing a need for policy and for public investment in infrastructure. Therefore, 
in the process to reauthorize the surface transportation act, interests traditionally not 
well integrated into the transportation debate are important power brokers since their 
buy-in can be crucial to building the critical mass of support required to build the 
political will to address the issue. As such, there exists a great opportunity to continue 
reforming highway agency culture through federal legislation and to continue 
correcting many of the systematic biases in favor of automobile use. These reforms 
can help increase the focus on providing multi-modal accessibility, on ensuring 
thoughtful planning process and balanced project evaluation, and on considering 
interactions between transportation, land use, and other policy realms such as health, 
energy, environment, and equity. Perhaps all funding and environmental review 
should be managed through the Metropolitan Planning Organizations, rather than 
the highway departments which have demonstrated a strong highway advocacy 
culture. The funding match from FTA for transit should be increased and the New 
Starts process streamlined to allow the concurrent completion of design work and 
preliminary implementation with the funding evaluation. Federal Highway Aid 
dollars should be subject to cost effectiveness measures too. Assessments of road 
projects should be required to seriously consider and evaluate maintaining the “new 
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normal” scenario (inevitable reduction in road capacity caused by construction 
disruptions) as a possible long-term solution. This would be conceptually similar to 
the FTA requirement for New Starts to compare against a baseline of more modest 
transit improvements. 
These suggested reforms are not only relevant in the United States, but should also 
be considered a cautionary tale for transportation policy in the developing world, 
especially by institutions involved in funding global infrastructure development such 
as the World Bank.
6.3 Future outlook
Despite the structural challenges facing infrastructure reconceptualization at 
the policy level and in the political arena, this thesis identifies an alternative 
implementation strategy for McGrath Highway to curb the growth of vehicle traffic 
that seems inevitable with existing planning approaches. Instead of planning for a 
distant “design year” as an endpoint, I recommend a strategy that focuses both on 
near-term constraints and on the system change potential of project implementation 
itself and reconstruction pressures. 
Corridor reconceptualization need not be a confrontation between the automobile 
worldview and prioritizing other values. Chapter 5 of this thesis demonstrates how 
considering mitigation actions for inevitable construction disruptions to motorists as 
well as undertaking basic remedies to rectify the deficiencies of highway designs for 
pedestrian (such as signalizing crosswalks) can be used to rapidly establish an at-grade 
McGrath Highway as the new normal. The suggested approach is likely to generate 
political support among the dominant stakeholder groups of existing motorists 
interested in the concrete commons since it addresses short-term disruptions to 
level of service. At the same time, incrementally humanizing the highway helps 
build support from new beneficiaries and from advocates of the green commons 
who support a long-term shift of the transportation system in a directionally correct 
manner. 
On the other hand the existing approach of being beholden to the interests of 2035 
motorists (as implied by the misuse of modeling) is a political approach with little 
strategic value since it considers a scenario that is not real. It also fails to provide 
immediate benefits to existing auto users and generates disbenefits and agitation 
amongst livable streets advocates who see their interests swept off the agenda to 
accommodate those of future motorists who do not (and cannot) exist. This current 
approach is driven by and large by the culture of highway departments with a vested 
interest in expanding the concrete commons and perpetuating their institutional 
existence. 
160
Future Research Directions
At the project planning scale improved technical practices are needed to help 
elucidate the transformative potential and benefits of corridor reconceptualization, 
and this support of the technical bureaucracy is key to help generate and support 
the political will for projects like grounding McGrath Highway. Future work to 
improve modeling should adopt a systems approach and understand the second order 
effects of transportation supply characteristics on the underlying nature of behavioral 
decisions like trip generation and mode choice. Modeling should also be used as a 
planning tool to evaluate many different scenarios and test for key sensitivities which 
can act as policy levers. Model results, which are simple equilibrium points, should 
not be considered as final outputs. Instead, model outputs should be considered 
in a broader systems sense in terms of how the magnitude of modeled values will 
effect changes in behavior and also trigger different policy decisions. Transportation 
models and analytical methods should also focus on operationalizing the behavioral 
findings from work like that of Zhao (2009), to better understand how land-use and 
travel can be jointly planned to shape travel preferences in a manner that supports 
infrastructure reconceptualization. Detailed analysis of local cases studies such as 
the growth in Kendall Square will be key to understanding the factors underlying 
transit-oriented growth potential and to recreate and even surpass this pattern of 
development elsewhere in the region.
The findings and recommendations of this thesis, along with the contribution 
of future research identified here, can help to begin a slow reorientation of 
transportation systems in cities in the United States. By revealing the latent potential 
of unique conditions in certain corridors and neighborhoods to support transit 
expansion, and land use development that is transit-oriented, roadway right-sizing 
and reconceptualization can be achieved and begin to demonstrate a more balanced 
and multi-modal model of infrastructure to support city life.
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